Free thought and official propaganda : delivered at South Place Institute on March 24, 1922
“Manwhile the whole machinery of the State, in all the different countries, is turned on to making defenceless children believe absurd propositions the effect of which is to make them willing to die in defence of sinister interests under the impression that they are fighting for truth and right. This is only one of countless ways in which education is designed, not to give true knowledge, but to make the people pliable to the will of their masters. Without an elaborate system of deceit in the elementary schools it would be impossible to preserve the camouflage of democracy.
… It must not be supposed that the officials in charge of education desire the young to become educated. On the contrary, their problem is to impart information without imparting intelli- gence. Education should have two objects : first, to give definite knowledge — reading and writing, languages and mathematics, and so on ; secondly, to create those mental habits which will enable people to acquire knowledge and form sound judgments for themselves. The first of these we may call information, the second intelligence. The utility of information is admitted practically as well as theoretically ; without a literate population a modern State is impossible. But the utility of intelligence is admitted only theoretically, not practically ; it is not desired that ordinary people should think for themselves, because it is felt that people who think for themselves are awkward to manage and cause administrative difficulties. Only the guardians, in Plato‘s language, are to think ; the rest are to obey, or to follow leaders like a herd of sheep. This doctrine, often unconsciously, has survived the introduction of political democracy, and has radically vitiated all national systems of education.
The Freedom of the Press Orwell’s Proposed Preface to ‘Animal Farm’
Excerpt
Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban. Anyone who has lived long in a foreign country will know of instances of sensational items of news — things which on their own merits would get the big headlines-being kept right out of the British press, not because the Government intervened but because of a general tacit agreement that ‘it wouldn’t do’ to mention that particular fact. So far as the daily newspapers go, this is easy to understand. The British press is extremely centralised, and most of it is owned by wealthy men who have every motive to be dishonest on certain important topics. But the same kind of veiled censorship also operates in books and periodicals, as well as in plays, films and radio. At any given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all right-thinking people will accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to say this, that or the other, but it is ‘not done’ to say it, just as in mid-Victorian times it was ‘not done’ to mention trousers in the presence of a lady. Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the highbrow periodicals.
This book was first thought of, so far as the central idea goes, in 1937, but was not written down until about the end of 1943. By the time when it came to be written it was obvious that there would be great difficulty in getting it published (in spite of the present book shortage which ensures that anything describable as a book will ‘sell’), and in the event it was refused by four publishers. Only one of these had any ideological motive. Two had been publishing anti-Russian books for years, and the other had no noticeable political colour. One publisher actually started by accepting the book, but after making the preliminary arrangements he decided to consult the Ministry of Information, who appear to have warned him, or at any rate strongly advised him, against publishing it. Here is an extract from his letter:
I mentioned the reaction I had had from an important official in the Ministry of Information with regard to Animal Farm. I must confess that this expression of opinion has given me seriously to think… I can see now that it might be regarded as something which it was highly ill-advised to publish at the present time. If the fable were addressed generally to dictators and dictatorships at large then publication would be all right, but the fable does follow, as I see now, so completely the progress of the Russian Soviets and their two dictators, that it can apply only to Russia, to the exclusion of the other dictatorships. Another thing: it would be less offensive if the predominant caste in the fable were not pigs[*]. I think the choice of pigs as the ruling caste will no doubt give offence to many people, and particularly to anyone who is a bit touchy, as undoubtedly the Russians are.
* It is not quite clear whether this suggested modification is Mr… ’s own idea, or originated with the Ministry of Information; but it seems to have the official ring about it. [Orwell’s Note]
This kind of thing is not a good symptom. Obviously it is not desirable that a government department should have any power of censorship (except security censorship, which no one objects to in war time) over books which are not officially sponsored. But the chief danger to freedom of thought and speech at this moment is not the direct interference of the MOI or any official body. If publishers and editors exert themselves to keep certain topics out of print, it is not because they are frightened of prosecution but because they are frightened of public opinion. In this country intellectual cowardice is the worst enemy a writer or journalist has to face, and that fact does not seem to me to have had the discussion it deserves.
Any fairminded person with journalistic experience will admit that during this war official censorship has not been particularly irksome. We have not been subjected to the kind of totalitarian ‘co-ordination’ that it might have been reasonable to expect. The press has some justified grievances, but on the whole the Government has behaved well and has been surprisingly tolerant of minority opinions. The sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary.
Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban. Anyone who has lived long in a foreign country will know of instances of sensational items of news — things which on their own merits would get the big headlines-being kept right out of the British press, not because the Government intervened but because of a general tacit agreement that ‘it wouldn’t do’ to mention that particular fact. So far as the daily newspapers go, this is easy to understand. The British press is extremely centralised, and most of it is owned by wealthy men who have every motive to be dishonest on certain important topics. But the same kind of veiled censorship also operates in books and periodicals, as well as in plays, films and radio. At any given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all right-thinking people will accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to say this, that or the other, but it is ‘not done’ to say it, just as in mid-Victorian times it was ‘not done’ to mention trousers in the presence of a lady. Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the highbrow periodicals.
At this moment what is demanded by the prevailing orthodoxy is an uncritical admiration of Soviet Russia. Everyone knows this, nearly everyone acts on it. Any serious criticism of the Soviet régime, any disclosure of facts which the Soviet government would prefer to keep hidden, is next door to unprintable. And this nation-wide conspiracy to flatter our ally takes place, curiously enough, against a background of genuine intellectual tolerance. For though you arc not allowed to criticise the Soviet government, at least you are reasonably free to criticise our own. Hardly anyone will print an attack on Stalin, but it is quite safe to attack Churchill, at any rate in books and periodicals. And throughout five years of war, during two or three of which we were fighting for national survival, countless books, pamphlets and articles advocating a compromise peace have been published without interference. More, they have been published without exciting much disapproval. So long as the prestige of the USSR is not involved, the principle of free speech has been reasonably well upheld. There are other forbidden topics, and I shall mention some of them presently, but the prevailing attitude towards the USSR is much the most serious symptom. It is, as it were, spontaneous, and is not due to the action of any pressure group.
The servility with which the greater part of the English intelligentsia have swallowed and repeated Russian propaganda from 1941 onwards would be quite astounding if it were not that they have behaved similarly on several earlier occasions. On one controversial issue after another the Russian viewpoint has been accepted without examination and then publicised with complete disregard to historical truth or intellectual decency. To name only one instance, the BBC celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army without mentioning Trotsky. This was about as accurate as commemorating the battle of Trafalgar without mentioning Nelson, but it evoked no protest from the English intelligentsia. In the internal struggles in the various occupied countries, the British press has in almost all cases sided with the faction favoured by the Russians and libelled the opposing faction, sometimes suppressing material evidence in order to do so. A particularly glaring case was that of Colonel Mihailovich, the Jugoslav Chetnik leader. The Russians, who had their own Jugoslav protege in Marshal Tito, accused Mihailovich of collaborating with the Germans. This accusation was promptly taken up by the British press: Mihailovich’s supporters were given no chance of answering it, and facts contradicting it were simply kept out of print. In July of 1943 the Germans offered a reward of 100,000 gold crowns for the capture of Tito, and a similar reward for the capture of Mihailovich. The British press ‘splashed’ the reward for Tito, but only one paper mentioned (in small print) the reward for Mihailovich: and the charges of collaborating with the Germans continued. Very similar things happened during the Spanish civil war. Then, too, the factions on the Republican side which the Russians were determined to crush were recklessly libelled in the English leftwing [sic] press, and any statement in their defence even in letter form, was refused publication. At present, not only is serious criticism of the USSR considered reprehensible, but even the fact of the existence of such criticism is kept secret in some cases. For example, shortly before his death Trotsky had written a biography of Stalin. One may assume that it was not an altogether unbiased book, but obviously it was saleable. An American publisher had arranged to issue it and the book was in print — 1 believe the review copies had been sent out — when the USSR entered the war. The book was immediately withdrawn. Not a word about this has ever appeared in the British press, though clearly the existence of such a book, and its suppression, was a news item worth a few paragraphs.
It is important to distinguish between the kind of censorship that the English literary intelligentsia voluntarily impose upon themselves, and the censorship that can sometimes be enforced by pressure groups. Notoriously, certain topics cannot be discussed because of ‘vested interests’. The best-known case is the patent medicine racket. Again, the Catholic Church has considerable influence in the press and can silence criticism of itself to some extent. A scandal involving a Catholic priest is almost never given publicity, whereas an Anglican priest who gets into trouble (e.g. the Rector of Stiffkey) is headline news. It is very rare for anything of an anti-Catholic tendency to appear on the stage or in a film. Any actor can tell you that a play or film which attacks or makes fun of the Catholic Church is liable to be boycotted in the press and will probably be a failure. But this kind of thing is harmless, or at least it is understandable. Any large organisation will look after its own interests as best it can, and overt propaganda is not a thing to object to. One would no more expect the Daily Worker to publicise unfavourable facts about the USSR than one would expect the Catholic Herald to denounce the Pope. But then every thinking person knows the Daily Worker and the Catholic Herald for what they are. What is disquieting is that where the USSR and its policies are concerned one cannot expect intelligent criticism or even, in many cases, plain honesty from Liberal [sic — and throughout as typescript] writers and journalists who are under no direct pressure to falsify their opinions. Stalin is sacrosanct and certain aspects of his policy must not be seriously discussed. This rule has been almost universally observed since 1941, but it had operated, to a greater extent than is sometimes realised, for ten years earlier than that. Throughout that time, criticism of the Soviet régime from the left could only obtain a hearing with difficulty. There was a huge output of anti-Russian literature, but nearly all of it was from the Conservative angle and manifestly dishonest, out of date and actuated by sordid motives. On the other side there was an equally huge and almost equally dishonest stream of pro-Russian propaganda, and what amounted to a boycott on anyone who tried to discuss all-important questions in a grown-up manner. You could, indeed, publish anti-Russian books, but to do so was to make sure of being ignored or misrepresented by nearly me whole of the highbrow press. Both publicly and privately you were warned that it was ‘not done’. What you said might possibly be true, but it was ‘inopportune’ and played into the hands of this or that reactionary interest. This attitude was usually defended on the ground that the international situation, and me urgent need for an Anglo-Russian alliance, demanded it; but it was clear that this was a rationalisation. The English intelligentsia, or a great part of it, had developed a nationalistic loyalty towards me USSR, and in their hearts they felt that to cast any doubt on me wisdom of Stalin was a kind of blasphemy. Events in Russia and events elsewhere were to be judged by different standards. The endless executions in me purges of 1936-8 were applauded by life-long opponents of capital punishment, and it was considered equally proper to publicise famines when they happened in India and to conceal them when they happened in me Ukraine. And if this was true before the war, the intellectual atmosphere is certainly no better now.
But now to come back to this book of mine. The reaction towards it of most English intellectuals will be quite simple: ‘It oughtn’t to have been published.’ Naturally, those reviewers who understand the art of denigration will not attack it on political grounds but on literary ones. They will say that it is a dull, silly book and a disgraceful waste of paper. This may well be true, but it is obviously not me whole of the story. One does not say that a book ‘ought not to have been published’ merely because it is a bad book. After all, acres of rubbish are printed daily and no one bothers. The English intelligentsia, or most of them, will object to this book because it traduces their Leader and (as they see it) does harm to the cause of progress. If it did me opposite they would have nothing to say against it, even if its literary faults were ten times as glaring as they are. The success of, for instance, the Left Book Club over a period of four or five years shows how willing they are to tolerate both scurrility and slipshod writing, provided that it tells them what they want to hear.
The issue involved here is quite a simple one: Is every opinion, however unpopular — however foolish, even — entitled to a hearing? Put it in that form and nearly any English intellectual will feel that he ought to say ‘Yes’. But give it a concrete shape, and ask, ‘How about an attack on Stalin? Is that entitled to a hearing?’, and the answer more often than not will be ‘No’, In that case the current orthodoxy happens to be challenged, and so the principle of free speech lapses. Now, when one demands liberty of speech and of the press, one is not demanding absolute liberty. There always must be, or at any rate there always will be, some degree of censorship, so long as organised societies endure. But freedom, as Rosa Luxembourg [sic] said, is ‘freedom for the other fellow’. The same principle is contained in the famous words of Voltaire: ‘I detest what you say; I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ If the intellectual liberty which without a doubt has been one of the distinguishing marks of western civilisation means anything at all, it means that everyone shall have the right to say and to print what he believes to be the truth, provided only that it does not harm the rest of the community in some quite unmistakable way. Both capitalist democracy and the western versions of Socialism have till recently taken that principle for granted. Our Government, as I have already pointed out, still makes some show of respecting it. The ordinary people in the street-partly, perhaps, because they are not sufficiently interested in ideas to be intolerant about them-still vaguely hold that ‘I suppose everyone’s got a right to their own opinion.’ It is only, or at any rate it is chiefly, the literary and scientific intelligentsia, the very people who ought to be the guardians of liberty, who are beginning to despise it, in theory as well as in practice.
One of the peculiar phenomena of our time is the renegade Liberal. Over and above the familiar Marxist claim that ‘bourgeois liberty’ is an illusion, there is now a widespread tendency to argue that one can only defend democracy by totalitarian methods. If one loves democracy, the argument runs, one must crush its enemies by no matter what means. And who are its enemies? It always appears that they are not only those who attack it openly and consciously, but those who ‘objectively’ endanger it by spreading mistaken doctrines. In other words, defending democracy involves destroying all independence of thought. This argument was used, for instance, to justify the Russian purges. The most ardent Russophile hardly believed that all of the victims were guilty of all the things they were accused of: but by holding heretical opinions they ‘objectively’ harmed the régime, and therefore it was quite right not only to massacre them but to discredit them by false accusations. The same argument was used to justify the quite conscious lying that went on in the leftwing press about the Trotskyists and other Republican minorities in the Spanish civil war. And it was used again as a reason for yelping against habeas corpus when Mosley was released in 1943.
These people don’t see that if you encourage totalitarian methods, the time may come when they will be used against you instead of for you. Make a habit of imprisoning Fascists without trial, and perhaps the process won’t stop at Fascists. Soon after the suppressed Daily Worker had been reinstated, I was lecturing to a workingmen’s college in South London. The audience were working-class and lower-middle class intellectuals — the same sort of audience that one used to meet at Left Book Club branches. The lecture had touched on the freedom of the press, and at the end, to my astonishment, several questioners stood up and asked me: Did I not think that the lifting of the ban on the Daily Worker was a great mistake? When asked why, they said that it was a paper of doubtful loyalty and ought not to be tolerated in war time. I found myself defending the Daily Worker, which has gone out of its way to libel me more than once. But where had these people learned this essentially totalitarian outlook? Pretty certainly they had learned it from the Communists themselves! Tolerance and decency are deeply rooted in England, but they are not indestructible, and they have to be kept alive partly by conscious effort. The result of preaching totalitarian doctrines is to weaken the instinct by means of which free peoples know what is or is not dangerous. The case of Mosley illustrates this. In 1940 it was perfectly right to intern Mosley, whether or not he had committed any technical crime. We were fighting for our lives and could not allow a possible quisling to go free. To keep him shut up, without trial, in 1943 was an outrage. The general failure to see this was a bad symptom, though it is true that the agitation against Mosley’s release was partly factitious and partly a rationalisation of other discontents. But how much of the present slide towards Fascist ways of thought is traceable to the ‘anti-Fascism’ of the past ten years and the unscrupulousness it has entailed?
It is important to realise that the current Russomania is only a symptom of the general weakening of the western liberal tradition. Had the MOI chipped in and definitely vetoed the publication of this book, the bulk of the English intelligentsia would have seen nothing disquieting in this. Uncritical loyalty to the USSR happens to be the current orthodoxy, and where the supposed interests of the USSR are involved they are willing to tolerate not only censorship but the deliberate falsification of history. To name one instance. At the death of John Reed, the author of Ten Days that Shook the World — first-hand account of the early days of the Russian Revolution — the copyright of the book passed into the hands of the British Communist Party, to whom I believe Reed had bequeathed it. Some years later the British Communists, having destroyed the original edition of the book as completely as they could, issued a garbled version from which they had eliminated mentions of Trotsky and also omitted the introduction written by Lenin. If a radical intelligentsia had still existed in Britain, this act of forgery would have been exposed and denounced in every literary paper in the country. As it was there was little or no protest. To many English intellectuals it seemed quite a natural thing to do. And this tolerance or [sic = of?] plain dishonesty means much more than that admiration for Russia happens to be fashionable at this moment. Quite possibly that particular fashion will not last. For all I know, by the time this book is published my view of the Soviet régime may be the generally-accepted one. But what use would that be in itself? To exchange one orthodoxy for another is not necessarily an advance. The enemy is the gramophone mind, whether or not one agrees with the record that is being played at the moment.
I am well acquainted with all the arguments against freedom of thought and speech — the arguments which claim that it cannot exist, and the arguments which claim that it ought not to. I answer simply that they don’t convince me and that our civilisation over a period of four hundred years has been founded on the opposite notice. For quite a decade past I have believed that the existing Russian régime is a mainly evil thing, and I claim the right to say so, in spite of the fact that we are allies with the USSR in a war which I want to see won. If I had to choose a text to justify myself, I should choose the line from Milton:
By the known rules of ancient liberty.
The word ancient emphasises the fact that intellectual freedom is a deep-rooted tradition without which our characteristic western culture could only doubtfully exist. From that tradition many of our intellectuals arc visibly turning away. They have accepted the principle that a book should be published or suppressed, praised or damned, not on its merits but according to political expediency. And others who do not actually hold this view assent to it from sheer cowardice. An example of this is the failure of the numerous and vocal English pacifists to raise their voices against the prevalent worship of Russian militarism. According to those pacifists, all violence is evil, and they have urged us at every stage of the war to give in or at least to make a compromise peace. But how many of them have ever suggested that war is also evil when it is waged by the Red Army? Apparently the Russians have a right to defend themselves, whereas for us to do [so] is a deadly sin. One can only explain this contradiction in one way: that is, by a cowardly desire to keep in with the bulk of the intelligentsia, whose patriotism is directed towards the USSR rather than towards Britain. I know that the English intelligentsia have plenty of reason for their timidity and dishonesty, indeed I know by heart the arguments by which they justify themselves. But at least let us have no more nonsense about defending liberty against Fascism. If liberty means anything at all it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear. The common people still vaguely subscribe to that doctrine and act on it. In our country — it is not the same in all countries: it was not so in republican France, and it is not so in the USA today — it is the liberals who fear liberty and the intellectuals who want to do dirt on the intellect: it is to draw attention to that fact that I have written this preface.
The term habitus(/ˈhæbɪtəs/) refers to ingrained habits, skills, and psychological/behavioral dispositions. It is the way that individuals perceive the social world around them and react to it. These dispositions are usually shared by people with similar backgrounds (such as social class, religion, nationality, ethnicity, education, profession etc.). The habitus is acquired through imitation (mimesis) and is the reality that individuals are socialized, which includes their individual experience and opportunities. Thus, the habitus represents the way group culture and personal history shape the body and the mind, and as a result, shape present social actions of an individual.
Pierre Bourdieu suggested that the habitus consists of both the hexis (the tendency to hold and use one’s body in a certain way, such as posture and accent) and more abstract mental habits, schemes of perception, classification, appreciation, feeling, and action. These schemes are not mere habits: Bourdieu suggested they allow individuals to find new solutions to new situations without calculated deliberation, based on their gut feelings and intuitions, which Bourdieu believed were collective and socially shaped. These attitudes, mannerisms, tastes, moral intuitions and habits have influence on the individual’s life chances, so the habitus not only is structured by an individual’s objective past position in the social structure but also structures the individual’s future life path. Pierre Bourdieu argued that the reproduction of the social structure results from the habitus of individuals (Bourdieu, 1987).
References
Reay, D.. (2004). “It’s all becoming a habitus”: Beyond the habitual use of habitus in educational research. British Journal of Sociology of Education
“The concept of habitus lies at the heart of bourdieu’s theoretical framework. it is a complex concept that takes many shapes and forms in bourdieu’s own writing, even more so in the wider sociological work of other academics. in the ®rst part of this paper i develop an understanding of habitus, based on bourdieu’s many writings on the concept, that recognizes both its permeability and its ability to capture continuity and change. i also map its relationship to bourdieu’s other concepts, in particular ®eld and cultural capital. in the second part of the paper i examine attempts to operationalize habitus in empirical research in education. i critique the contemporary fashion of overlaying research analyses with bourdieu’s concepts, including habitus, rather than making the concepts work in the context of the data and the research settings. in the ®nal part of the paper i draw on a range of research examples that utilize habitus as a research tool to illustrate how habitus can be made to work in educational research.”
Lyons, A. P., Bourdieu, P., & Nice, R.. (1980). Outline of a Theory of Practice. ASA Review of Books
“Outline of a theory of practice is recognized as a major theoretical text on the foundations of anthropology and sociology. pierre bourdieu, a distinguished french anthropologist, develops a theory of practice which is simultaneously a critique of the methods and postures of social science and a general account of how human action should be understood. with his central concept of the habitus, the principle which negotiates between objective structures and practices, bourdieu is able to transcend the dichotomies which have shaped theoretical thinking about the social world. the author draws on his fieldwork in kabylia (algeria) to illustrate his theoretical propositions. with detailed study of matrimonial strategies and the role of rite and myth, he analyses the dialectical process of the ‘incorporation of structures’ and the objectification of habitus, whereby social formations tend to reproduce themselves. a rigorous consistent materialist approach lays the foundations for a theory of symbolic capital and, through analysis of the different modes of domination, a theory of symbolic power.”
Bourdieu, P.. (1969). Structures, Habitus, Practices. In The Logic of Practice
“This paper aims to balance the conceptual reception of bourdieu’s sociology in the united states through a conceptual re-examination of the concept of habitus. i retrace the intellectual lineage of the habitus idea, showing it to have roots in claude levi-strauss structural anthropology and in the developmental psychology of jean piaget, especially the latter’s generalization of the idea of operations from mathematics to the study of practical, bodily-mediated cognition. one important payoff of this exercise is that the common misinterpretation of the habitus as an objectivist and reductionist element in bourdieu’s thought is dispelled. the habitus is shown to be instead a useful and flexible way to conceptualize agency and the ability to transform social structure. thus ultimately one of bourdieu’s major contributions to social theory consists of his development of a new radical form of cognitive sociology, along with an innovative variety of multilevel sociological explanation in which the interplay of different structural orders is highlighted.”
Jason D. Edgerton, & Roberts, L. W.. (2014). Habitus. In Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research
“Definition the relationship (correlation) between separate scales or subscales. description the value between +1 and −1 that represents the correlation between two scales is the interscale correlation. in quality of life literature, interscale correlations are used frequently (aaronson et al., 1993; borghede & sullivan, 1996; fekkes et al., 2000; hearn & higginson, 1997). a researcher may choose to determine the interscale correlation in situations in which she/he has multiple scales and wants to investigate the relationship between the variables that those scales are measuring. depending on the nature of the research, a high or low interscale correlation could be sought after. in the case of a validity study, a researcher may want to examine how similar a newly created scale is to another scale that is deemed to be a ‘gold standard.’ finding that the researcher’s scale has a high correlation with the other scale would lend itself to evidence of”
Wacquant, L.. (2007). Esclarecer o Habitus. Educação & Linguagem
“Tomando como referência a obra do sociólogo pierre bourdieu, o presente artigo traz uma reconstituição da gênese da noção de habitus presente nos trabalhos do autor e, em uma perspectiva de síntese, procura documentar algumas de suas principais propriedades teóricas. traça, igualmente, um pequeno retrato dos principais horizontes de mobilização sociológica de que a noção tem sido alvo, destacando que a noção de habitus, para bourdieu, é um modo estenográfico de designar uma postura de investigação adequada à observação metódica da constituição social de agentes em quadros institucionais diversos.”
Crossley, N.. (2013). Habit and Habitus. Body and Society
“This article compares the concept of habitus, as formulated in the work of mauss and bourdieu, with the concept of habit, as formulated in the work of merleau-ponty and dewey. the rationale for this, on one level, is to seek to clarify these concepts and any distinction that there may be between them – though the article notes the wide variety of uses of both concepts and suggests that these negate the possibility of any definitive definitions or contrasts. more centrally, however, the purpose of the comparison is to draw out a number of important issues and debates which, it is argued, further work must address if the concepts of habit and habitus are to continue to prove useful and illuminating in social science.”
Silva, E. B.. (2016). Habitus: Beyond sociology. Sociological Review
“This paper presents a contribution of a set of interrelated innovative thinking to revitalize the sociological understanding of the notion of the habitus. it discusses contributions by sociologists exploring the sources of bourdieu’s inspiration from psychology and psychoanalysis to the development of the concept, and brings in new thinking inspired by authors and frameworks that branch out of sociology to bring into sociology fresher thinking. three areas of concern about habitus are focused on: firstly, the objectivism and subjectivism dichotomy; secondly, the plasticity or rigidity of the concept; and thirdly, the implications of intangibles attached to the notion. the paper introduces a special section including five articles on theoretical and empirical explorations bringing exciting perspectives to creative and critical sociology.”
Gaddis, S. M.. (2013). The influence of habitus in the relationship between cultural capital and academic achievement. Social Science Research
“This paper examines some of the issues surrounding student retention in higher education. it is based on the case study of a modern university in england that has good performance indicators of both widening participation (i.e. increasing the diversity of the student intake) and student retention. the two-fold nature of this success is significant, as it has been asserted that greater diversity will necessarily lead to an increase in student withdrawal. furthermore, changes to student funding in the uk put greater financial pressures and stress on students, especially those from low-income groups. nevertheless, many students cope with poverty, high levels of debt and significant burdens of paid work to successfully complete their courses of study. drawing on the work of r eay et al. (2001), this paper adopts and explores the terinstitutional habitus’, and attempts to provide a conceptual and empirical understand-ing of the ways in which the values and practices of a higher education institution impact on student retention.”
Mutch, A.. (2003). Communities of practice and habitus: A critique. Organization Studies
“Outline of a theory of practice is recognized as a major theoretical text on the foundations of anthropology and sociology. pierre bourdieu, a distinguished french anthropologist, develops a theory of practice which is simultaneously a critique of the methods and postures of social science and a general account of how human action should be understood. with his central concept of the habitus, the principle which negotiates between objective structures and practices, bourdieu is able to transcend the dichotomies which have shaped theoretical thinking about the social world. the author draws on his fieldwork in kabylia (algeria) to illustrate his theoretical propositions. with detailed study of matrimonial strategies and the role of rite and myth, he analyses the dialectical process of the ‘incorporation of structures’ and the objectification of habitus, whereby social formations tend to reproduce themselves. a rigorous consistent materialist approach lays the foundations for a theory of symbolic capital and, through analysis of the different modes of domination, a theory of symbolic power.”
Bourdieu, P.. (1986). Habitus, code et codification. Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales
“S’il est de la vocation même de la sociologie de rappeler que, selon le mot de montesquieu, on ne transforme pas la société par décret, il reste que la conscience des conditions sociales de l’efficacité des actes juridiques ne doit pas conduire à ignorer ou à nier ce qui fait l’efficacité propre de la règle, du règlement et de la loi. la juste réaction contre le juridisme, qui conduit à restituer leur place, dans l’explication des pratiques, aux dispositions constitutives de l’habitus, n’implique nullement que l’on mette entre parenthèses l’effet propre de la règle explicitement énoncée, surtout lorsque, comme la règle juridique, elle est associée à des sanctions. et inversement, s’il n’est pas douteux que le droit exerce une efficacité spécifique, imputable notamment au travail de codification, de mise en forme et en formule, de neutralisation et de systématisation, que réalisent, selon les lois propres de leur univers, les professionnels du travail symbolique, il reste que cette efficacité, qui se définit par opposition à l’inapplication pure et simple ou à l’application fondée sur la contrainte pure, s’exerce dans la mesure et dans la mesure seulement où le droit est socialement reconnu, et rencontre un accord, même tacite et partiel, parce qu’il répond, au moins en apparence, à des besoins et des intérêts réels.”
Hanks, W. F.. (2005). PIERRE BOURDIEU AND THE PRACTICES OF LANGUAGE. Annual Review of Anthropology
“This paper synthesizes research on linguistic practice and critically examines the legacy of pierre bourdieu from the perspective of linguistic anthropology. bourdieu wrote widely about language and linguistics, but his most far reaching engagement with the topic is in his use of linguistic reasoning to elaborate broader sociological concepts including habitus, field, standardization, legitimacy, censorship, and symbolic power. the paper examines and relates habitus and field in detail, tracing the former to the work of erwin panofsky and the latter to structuralist discourse semantics. the principles of relative autonomy, boundedness, homology, and embedding apply to fields and their linkage to habitus. authority, censorship, and euphemism are traced to the field, and symbolic power is related to misrecognition. and last, this chapter relates recent work in linguistic anthropology to practice and indicates lines for future research.”
Bourdieu, P.. (2000). Making the Economic Habitus: Algerian Workers Revisited. Ethnography
“During the war of national liberation algeria offered a quasi-laboratory situation for analysing the mismatch between the economic dispositions fashioned in a precapitalist economy, embedded in relations of group honour, and the rationalized economic cosmos imposed by colonization. ethnographic observation of this mismatch revealed that, far from being axiomatic, the most elementary economic behaviours (working for a wage, saving, credit, birth control, etc.) have definite economic and social conditions of possibility which both economic theory and the `new economic sociology’ ignore. acquiring the spirit of calculation required by the modern economy entails a veritable conversion via the apostasy of the embodied beliefs that underpin exchange in traditional kabyle society. the `folk economics’ of a cook from algiers allows us to grasp the practical economic sense guiding the emerging algerian working class at the dawn of the country’s independence.”
King, A.. (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A “practical” critique of the habitus. Sociological Theory
“There are two strands in bourdieu’s sociological writings. on the one hand, bourdieu argues for a theoretical position one might term his ‘practical theory’ which emphasizes virtuosic interactions between individuals. on the other hand, and most frequently, bourdieu appeals to the concept of the habitus according to which society consists of objective structures and determined-and isolated-individuals. although bourdieu believes that the habitus is compatible with his practical theory and overcomes the impasse of objectivism and subjectivism in social theory, neither claim is the case; the habitus is incompatible with his practical theory, and it retreats quickly into objectivism. however, bourdieu’s practical theory does offer a way out of the impasse of objectivism and subjectivism by focussing on the intersubjective interactions between individuals.”
Crossley, N.. (2001). The phenomenological habitus and its construction. Theory and Society
“This article focuses on the phenomenological habitus and its construction. the concepts ‘habit’ and ‘habitus,’ having almost disappeared from the sociological lexicon during the earlier part of the post-war period, are currently enjoying renewed interest in the social sciences. this is due, in large part, to the work of the sociologist pierre bourdieu. his work draws out the significance and relevance of the concept of habit for sociological purposes and in doing so makes a very appealing case for a habit or disposition based theory of agency. this is not intended as a phenomenological critique of bourdieu, a call to replace his conception of habit with a phenomenological one nor a call for a full scale ‘marriage’ of phenomenology with bourdieu’s sociology. bourdieu formulates his concept of the habitus in the context of a critical engagement with structuralism and ‘social physics,’ on the one hand, and ‘social phenomenology’ on the other. against social physics and structuralism, he argues for a notion of competent and active agency.”
Sewell, W. H.. (1992). A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation. American Journal of Sociology
“‘Structure’ is one of the most important, elusive, and undertheo- rized concepts in the social sciences. setting out from a critique and reformulation of anthony giddens’s notion of the duality of structure and pierre bourdieu’s notion of habitus, this article at- tempts to develop a theory of structure that restores human agency to social actors, builds the possibility of change into the concept of structure, and overcomes the divide between semiotic and material- ist visions of structure. ‘structure’”
Nash, R.. (1990). Bourdieu on Education and Social and Cultural Reproduction. British Journal of Sociology of Education
“Bourdieu’s work has attracted considerable interest and, not withstanding criticism of his style and obscure theoretical formulations, has introduced some powerful concepts into social theory. this paper examines bourdieu’s contribution to the sociology of education and especially his account of socially differentiated educational attainment. particular attention is given to issues of structure, agency and habitus, the cultural autonomy of the school, arbitrary and necessary school cultures, and the distinction between primary and secondary effects on educational differences. some specific criticisms, for example elster’s charge of a double account of domination, are also addressed. bourdieu’s concentration on habitus as the most significant generator of practice is held to be a theory of socialisation and the paper examines the nature of the explanation of social practice provided by such theories. the argument concludes with a plea for critical tolerance with respect to bourdieu’s work but with a suggestion that his account of socially differentiated educational attainment in terms of habitus is finally inadequate.”
“We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. our model assumes full protection of intellectual property rights at all stages of the development process, and hence does not rely on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research. instead, we focus on control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. by serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. at the same time, the private sector’s ability to direct scientists towards higher-payoff activities makes it more attractive for later-stage research.”
Academic and Professional Freedom. (1969). British Medical Journal
“This introductory chapter presents the reader with an overview of the historical trends, current status and market developments in academic and professional publishing, and a dark cloud gathering over the industry. the chapter notes how these widespread changes are addressed throughout the book, with chapters providing insight into the integrated, innovative and multi-disciplinary approaches publishers are applying to adapt to the challenges facing the industry and take publishing forward. it also outlines what publishers do, how publishers add value and what the future may look like for the industry.”
Philip G . Altbach. (2001). Academic Freedom : International Realities and Challenges. Higher Education
“Academic freedom is a central value of higher education. it affects the academic profession in all aspects of academic work. yet, academic freedom is rarely discussed in the context of the changes taking place in higher education in the current period. the concept is defined in a historical and comparative framework, and the challenges facing academic freedom around the world are discussed.”
Hill, H. H.. (1955). Academic Freedom and Responsibility. Peabody Journal of Education
“Academic freedom has become a contested category within the united states. on the one hand, conservative scholars have sought to use the term to criticize what they perceive as political correctness in the academy, whereas progressive scholars have sought to bolster academic freedom as a principle that safeguards academic self-determination over and against corporate and government intrusion. recently i published a debate with robert post in academic freedom after september 11. 1 this collection was first of all an effort to understand the definition and range of the concept of academic freedom. in his contribution, post argues that the way to pre-serve academic self-governance is to allow tenured faculty to make judg-ments about curriculum and appointments because they have undergone the relevant professional training in a given discipline and so are uniquely prepared to make these sorts of judgments. to protect academic freedom in this domain, then, depends upon our ability to protect the singular professional capacities that tenured faculty have assumed by virtue of pro-fessional training and practices of peer review. for post, the viability of the institution of academic freedom is founded upon established and agreed-upon academic norms, set and enforced by a professional class of educators who know the fields in question, and these norms, in turn, enable the kinds of research and teaching that we do. these norms, in fact, are the legitimating condition of our academic freedom. i have agreed with post that academic self-governance, which is crucial”
Giroux, H. A.. (2006). Academic Freedom Under Fire: The Case for Critical Pedagogy. College Literature
“Part of a special issue on current right-wing attacks on academic freedom in the united states. there is much more at stake in the current assault on the university than the issue of academic freedom. right-wing extremists and corporate interests are making a concerted attempt to strip the professoriate of any authority, render critical pedagogy as merely an instrumental task, eliminate tenure as a protection for teacher authority, and remove critical reason from any vestige of civic courage, engaged citizenship, and social responsibility. it is critical that academics both develop a theoretical framework for engaging critical pedagogy and develop a defense for its use in the classroom as part of a broader project of linking education to democratic values, identities, public spaces, and relationships.”
Davies, M.. (2015). Academic freedom: a lawyer’s perspective. Higher Education
“The article provides information on the challenges faced by professors in dealing with academic freedom in the u.s. it mentions that it has never been clear if academic freedom is something that belongs to the educational institutions where the professors work or to professors. it states that the quality of higher education will nearly fall without academic freedom.”
Aarrevaara, T.. (2010). Academic freedom in a changing academic world. European Review
“This article considers the academic profession and academic freedom in light of the results of the changing academic profession (cap) survey in finland and four other european countries. academic freedom is examined as a phenomenon that provides a setting for goal determination by members of the academic profession. it has a bearing on both institutional autonomy and individual academic freedom, i.e. the freedom of research and teaching. academic freedom can be examined on the basis of material from the cap survey through the questions about the freedom of teaching, the definition of work, working as a member of a community, the power of influence, funding, and the evaluation of quality. the concept of academic freedom varies slightly between countries, in part because of the growth of higher education systems and because of the increasing demand for ‘relevance’ being imposed on universities. [abstract from author]”
Brown, R. S., & Kurland, J. E.. (2014). Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom. Law and Contemporary Problems
“Tenure, like any other large, occasionally inefficient system, will probably remain under attack for years to come. anecdotal evidence of inferior scholars and teachers shielded by tenure makes a powerful hostile argument, though not a valid one. the economic and social costs of the tenure system are, we believe, outweighed by the fact that tenure is vital to academic freedom. no other proposed alternative (such as legal defenses, internal safeguards, less-than-career tenure, or tenure review) can provide adequate protection to the academic community. a greater danger to the tenure system than outright abrogation is continued circumvention. deficiencies in the due process accorded fired professors, dubious financial exigency claims by colleges and universities, the discontinuation of entire programs, and, especially, runaway expansion of nontenure-track positions threaten not to tear down the tenure system, but to weaken it severely.”
Karran, T.. (2009). Academic freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna Charta?. Higher Education Policy
“This paper is a preliminary attempt to establish a working definition of academic freedom for the european union states. the paper details why such a definition is required for the european union and then examines some of the difficulties of defining academic freedom. by drawing upon the experience of the legal difficulties beset by the concept in the usa and building on previous analyses of constitutional and legislative protection for academic freedom, and of legal regulations regarding institutional governance and academic tenure, a working definition of academic freedom is then derived. the resultant definition, which, it is suggested, could form the basis for a european magna charta libertatis academicae, goes beyond traditional discussions of academic freedom by specifying not only the rights inherent in the concept but also its accompanying duties, necessary limitations and safeguards. the paper concludes with proposals for how the definition might be tested and carried forward. [publication abstract]”
Thomas, N.. (2010). The politics of academic freedom. New Directions for Higher Education
“This is a thematic examination of the most influential ideas and writings on leadership. the text creates order from the chaos of leadership literature, and its structure, style and original approach encourages reader reflection.”
Dual-use neuroscience: Neuroscience can be used to promote people's freedom and creative potential - and it can be used to control and exploit people. Like any powerful scientific method, it is a Janus-head.
“People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought which they seldom use.”
― Søren Kierkegaard
www.Cognitive-Liberty.online
Nobel laureate and PCR test inventor Dr. Kary Mullis
Quote (expressis verbis):
“With PCR, if you do it well, you can find almost anything in anybody.
It makes you believe in the Buddhist notion that everything is contained in everything else.”
Mullis vs. Fauci
Dr. Mullis comment on Dr. Anthony Fauci:
"He doesn’t know anything really about anything.”
Bill Gates
On "vaccinating" children.
Nobel laureate and PCR test inventor Dr. Kary Mullis
You assist an evil system most effectively by obeying its orders and decrees.
An evil system never deserves such allegiance.
Allegiance to it means partaking of the evil.
A good person will resist an evil system with his or her whole soul.
~ Mohandas K. Gandhi
“Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth — more than ruin, more even than death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible, thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority, careless of the well-tried wisdom of the ages. Thought looks into the pit of hell and ilis not afraid … Thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world, and the chief glory of man.”
~ Nobel laureate Lord Bertrand Russell (1920) “Why Men Fight: A Method of Abolishing the International Duel” pp. 178-179
Full text (ebook) available on the Project Gutenberg: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55610
“It must not be supposed that the officials in charge of education desire the young to become educated. On the contrary, their problem is to impart information without imparting intelligence. Education should have two objects: first, to give definite knowledge — reading and writing, languages and mathematics, and so on; secondly, to create those mental habits which will enable people to acquire knowledge and form sound judgments for themselves. The first of these we may call information, the second intelligence. The utility of information is admitted practically as well as theoretically; without a literate population a modern State is impossible. But the utility of intelligence is admitted only theoretically, not practically; it is not desired that ordinary people should think for themselves, because it is felt that people who think for themselves are awkward to manage and cause administrative difficulties. Only the guardians, in Plato’s language, are to think; the rest are to obey, or to follow leaders like a herd of sheep. This doctrine, often unconsciously, has survived the introduction of political democracy, and has radically vitiated all national systems of education.”
The term “liberty” is etymologically derived from the Latin libertatem,from the Old French liberté, and from the Middle English liberte. It can be conceptually translated as “civil or political freedom, condition of a free man, absence of cohersion”; cognate to liber “free” and libertas “freedom” (cf. library). Per analogiam, ‘liberty is to grow to one’s natural height’. Ex vi termini, “cognitive liberty” is semantically synonymous with “the right to psychological and neurocognitive self-determination“. The concept implies that human creatures have the universal right & freedom (viz., sui iuris) to control and determine their own psychology, i.e., their neurophysiological/neurochemical and cognitive processes, emotions, and all aspects of consciousness. The concept is thus essential to the universal principle of freedom of thought (Article 91 of the Human Rights Act 1998) and it forms the basis (s.c., a condicio sine qua non) for the right to freedom of speech/expression. As Prof. Erich Fromm succinctly articulated it: “The right to express our thought, however, means something only if we are able to have our own thoughts; freedom from external authority is a lasting gain only if the inner psychological conditions are such that we are able to establish our own individuality” (Fromm, The fear of freedom, 1942; pp.207-208). This quotation echoes Søren Kierkegaard: “People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought which they seldom use.”
Self-determination is a cardinal principle in international law (jus cogens).2 Given the significant recent advances in psychology, the neurosciences, computer science, and artificial intelligence, cognitive liberty is becoming a topic of great concern for all human beings. This website is specifically dedicated to this timely topic and provides information from a diversity of sources (an integral interdisciplinary approach is adopted to elucidate the topic from a plurality of perspectives). Insights derived from psychology, the cognitivesciences, and the neurosciences enable the manipulation and control of cognition and consciousness, oftentimes specifically targeting unconscious processes. Moreover, advances in computer science and cybernetics (e.g., Bayesianalgorithms/deep learning convolutional neural networks) enable science to systematically tailor and “steerEtymological backgroundIn ancient Greek the word for 'steer' is 'kybernan' which in turn forms the root of the term 'cybernetics' coined 1948 by U.S. mathematician Norbert Wiener. The construction is perhaps based on 1830s French cybernétique 'the art of governing'. In an academic context cybernetics is the theory or study of communication and control. In general, cybernetics is a transdisciplinary approach for exploring regulatory systems—their structures, constraints, and possibilities. The Latin term 'gubernare' (to direct, rule, guide, steer, govern) has the same etymological root. The word 'governor' and 'goverment' are both related.” information (the flow of perceptual input) to affect cognition and emotion (and consequently behavior) in prespecified and highly predictable ways. Especially unconscious psychological processes can be effectively exploited because humans are, per definition, unaware of the programmatic excitability of unconscious mechanisms. This imbalance creates a power-differential between those who know how the human mind can be manipulated (viz., the financial power elite which utilizes media and a large segment of academic science for their purposes; cf. Mausfeld, 2017) and those who do not posses a detailed understanding of psychological manipulation and behavior modification techniques (i.e., the general populous). The list of evolutionarily built-in psychological weaknesses (vulnerable psychological exploits) is long and has been extensively studied by several generations of scientist, particularly in the domain of behavioral economics (i.e., Kahneman & Tversky’s “heuristics & biases” research agenda).
The following application provides a synopsis of numerous cognitive biases that are well documented in psychology:
Open ‘Cognitive Bias Codex’ application in a lightbox modal window (you can zoom via the mouse-wheel)
The psychological and technological developments alluded to are unprecedented in the evolution of the human species and have far-reaching implications for life on this planet as a whole, for it is obvious that human behaviour is having a significant negative impact on the “Earth system”. The relatively new terms Anthropocene and Holocene are used in this context of destruction and mass extinction. These terms refer to an important psychological, self-reflective insight that science has developed, namely that human behaviour is destroying the global ecosystem. Since human behaviour is driven by psychology, it is crucial that people are free to think in order to choose a more rational course of action. Freedom of thought must be encouraged. Currently, a large section of society is being transformed into mindless, conformist consumers through the mass media and other biocybernetic methods of psychological programming. This manipulative and neurotoxic modus operandi seriously hinders the unfolding of virtuous human potential (in contrast, primitive egocentric cognitive schemata are constantly reinforced in the ego-driven system of consumerism based on instant dopaminergic wish fulfilment, gratification, ingestion, introjection, consumption, competition, comparison and other egoic human “drives”). Indeed, the term homō consumens has been proposed as a more appropriate replacement for homō sapiēns; a clearly self-inflated nomenclature etymologically derived from the Latin sapere and thus meaning the wise or rational human being – taxonomically speaking, precisely, homō sapiēns sapiēns – duplicating anthropocentric hubris.
Coat of arms of the Fabian society: The wolf in sheep’s clothing
The turtle as a metaphor for slow societal change (gradualism)
The boiling frog analogy & Sôritês paradoxon
The boiling frog is an analogy describing a frog being slowly boiled alive. The premise is that if a frog is thrown suddenly into boiling hot water, it will immediately jump out. However, if the frog is put in cold water, which is then slowly and gradually brought to a boil, it does not perceive the danger, sit still, and is therefore be boiled to death. Transferred to human cognition & behavior, the analogy could be interpreted as follows: If the environment changes gradually (microgenetically) in an incremental step-wise fashion, humans have great difficulty recognizing the change because each step in the sequential evolution of the system (i.e., the change in the environment) is not drastic at all. Over a longer period of time, however, the system changes significantly, and the cumulative long-term effect of numerous small changes has extreme consequences. So the question is: When does the system change from stable to chaotic, i.e., from “from lukewarm to boiling hot”. Per analogiam, the demarcation criterion between hot versus cold (chaotic versus stable) is not clearly defined. In the cognitivesciences this ambiguity is discussed under the header “vagueness of attributes”.3 In philosophy, this is an ancient paradox known as Sôritês paradoxon (aka. the problem of the heap).4 The paradox is based on the seemingly simple question: When does a heap of sand become a heap? When does the system “switch” from being life-sustaining to lethal?
Sôritês paradoxon can be expressed as a conditional syllogistic argument (modus ponens). N.B. You can replace the variable “grain of sand” with “toxic chemical molecules” in the context of environmental pollution; or with the “cutting down of individual trees” in the context of global deforestation; or with the “loss of species” in the context of anthropogenic reduction of biodiversity; et cetera pp.
1 grain of sand does not make a heap.
If 1 grain of sand does not make a heap, then 2 grains do not either.
If 2 grains do not make a heap, then 3 grains don’t.
…
If 999999,99999 grains do not make a heap, then 1 million grains don’t.
∞ ad infinitum…
Deductive conclusion
∴ Ergo (Therefore)
1 million grains don’t make a heap.
The Bald Man (phalakros) paradox is another allegory which illustrates the point: A man with a full head of hair is not bald. The removal of a single hair does not make him a bold man. Viewed diachronically, however, the continuous, repeated removal of individual hairs inevitably leads to baldness. However, it is unclear when the “critical boundary/limit” is transgressed. In the psychology of reasoning, this is termed the continuum fallacy. The informal logical fallacy pertains to the argument that two states (i.e., cold vs. hot; falsum vs. verum) cannot be defined/quantised as distinct (and/or do not exist at all) because a continuum of states exists between them (cf. many-valued logic/fuzzy logic). The fundamental question whether any continua exist in the physical world is a fundamental question in physics (cf. atomism). Deterministic Newtonian physics stipulates that reality is atomised and corpuscular (in Greek a-tomos means uncuttable, i.e., an indivisible particle; cf. in-dividual). Per contrast, contemporary quantum physics is based on the notion of non-discrete states (i.e., quanta), since the notion of continuity appears to be invalid at the smallest Planck scale of physical existence (i.e., continuous fluid-like substances, spread throughout all of space-time). The binomial Aristotelian law of the excluded middle (principium tertii exclusi) is challenged by recent empirical results in this subatomic domain of inquiry (see also Prof. Erich Fromm on “paradoxical logic“).
Conditional Sôritês paradoxon in symbolic logic:
Mathematical Induction Sôritês paradoxon:
Linguistically, the Sôritês paradoxon was very aptly formulated by Black in 1937:
A symbol’s vagueness is held to consist in the existence of objects concerning which it is intrinsically impossible to say either that the symbol in question does, or does not, apply. […] Reserving the terms of logic and mathematics for separate consideration, we can say that all “material” terms, all whose application requires the recognition of the presence of sensible qualities, are vague in the sense described. — M. Black (Vagueness: an exercise in logical analysis, 1937)
In the context of visual perception (i.e., psychophysics) Lord Bertrand Russel stated the following:
It is perfectly obvious, since colours form a continuum, that there are shades of colour concerning which we shall be in doubt whether to call them red or not, not because we are ignorant of the meaning of the word “red”, but because it is a word the extent of whose application is essentially doubtful. — B. Russell (Vagueness, 1923)
Figure 1. Sôritês paradoxon in visual brightness perception.
Figure 1 illustrates Sôritês paradoxon applied to visual perception (based on Russel’s argument). Adjacent luminance differences (e.g., tick-mark 1 versus 2) are indistinguishable by the human visual system while larger contrasts (e.g., tick mark 2 versus 3) are easily distinguishable.
“In this paper i offer a critique of the recent popular strategy of giving a contextualist account of vagueness. such accounts maintain that truth-values of vague sentences can change with changes of context induced by confronting different entities (e.g. different pairs through a sorites series). i claim that appealing to context does not help in solving the sorites paradox, nor does it give us new insights into vagueness per se. furthermore, the contextual variation to which the contextualist is committed is problematic in various ways. for example, it yields the consequence that much of our everyday (non-soritical) reasoning is fallacious, and it renders us ignorant of what we and others have said.”
Litman, L., & Zelcer, M.. (2013). A cognitive neuroscience, dual-systems approach to the sorites paradox. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
“The principle of stability now says that if sentence is true/false in a model m, then has to stay true/false if m is getting more precise. formally, let m = d, i be a refinement of m = d, i . then it has to be the case that for all : (i) if vm() = 1, then vm () = 1. (ii) if vm() = 0, then vm () = 0.”
Campbell, R.. (1974). The sorites paradox. Philosophical Studies
“The premises that a four foot man is short and that a man one tenth of an inch taller than a short man is also short entail by universal instantiation and ‘modus ponens’ that a seven foot man is short. the negation of the second premise seems to entail there are virtually no borderline cases of short men, while to deny the second premise and its negation conflicts with the principle of bivalence, if not excluded middle. but the paradox can be dissolved without resort to degrees of truth or any non-classical system of logic. if some true predications can be semantically uncertain in a sense suitable for defining borderline cases, the second premise can be denied without denying the vagueness of ‘short’ or reintroducing a sorites paradox along with higher order borderline cases.”
Hyde, D.. (2011). Sorites Paradox. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Show/hide publication abstract
“The sorites paradox is the name given to a class of paradoxicalarguments, also known as little-by-little arguments, which arise as aresult of the indeterminacy surrounding limits of application of thepredicates involved. for example, the concept of a heap appears tolack sharp boundaries and, as a consequence of the subsequentindeterminacy surrounding the extension of the predicate ‘is aheap’, no one grain of wheat can be identified as making thedifference between being a heap and not being a heap. given then thatone grain of wheat does not make a heap, it would seem to follow thattwo do not, thus three do not, and so on. in the end it would appearthat no amount of wheat can make a heap. we are faced with paradoxsince from apparently true premises by seemingly uncontroversialreasoning we arrive at an apparently false conclusion., the hooded man: you say that you know your brother. yet thatman who just came in with his head covered is your brother and you didnot know him.”
Cognition: That which comes to be known, as through perception, reasoning, or intuition; knowledge.
mid-15c., cognicioun, “ability to comprehend, mental act or process of knowing,” from Latin cognitionem (nominative cognitio) “a getting to know, acquaintance, knowledge,” noun of action from past participle stem of cognoscere “to get to know, recognize,” from assimilated form of com“together” (see co-) + gnoscere “to know,” from PIE root *gno- “to know.” In 17c. the meaning was extended to include perception and sensation.
1375–1425; late Middle English cognicioun < Latin cognitiōn- (stem of cognitiō ), equivalent to cognit(us), past participle of cognōscere ( co- co- + gni-, variant stem of gnōscere, nōscere, to learn (see know) + -tus past participle suffix) + -iōn- -ion
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.Our invisible governors are, in many cases, unaware of the identity of their fellow members in the inner cabinet.They govern us by their qualities of natural leadership, their ability to supply needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure. Whatever attitude one chooses to take toward this condition, it remains a fact that in almost every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons—a trifling fraction of our hundred and twenty million—who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the publicmind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.” (Edward Bernays, Propaganda, 1928)
Bernays, E. L. (1928). Propaganda. Horace Liveright.
Bernays, E. L. (1936). Freedom of Propaganda. Vital Speeches of the Day, 2(24), 744–746.
L’Etang, J. (1999). The father of spin: Edward L. Bernays and the birth of public relations. Public Relations Review, 25(1), 123–124.
“That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages, and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough. . . . [a]s a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power…. Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in the sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our thinking have become variables. It is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to self-deception, and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify. It has been demonstrated that we cannot rely upon intuition, conscience, or the accidents of casual opinion if we are to deal with the world beyond our reach. … The public must be put in its place, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and roar of a bewildered herd.” (Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, Chapter XV)
Lippmann, W. (1920). Liberty and the News. Museum.
Lippmann, W. (1970). The Phantom Public. Politics.
A Tui is an intellectual who sells his or her abilities and opinions as a commodity in the marketplace or who uses them to support the dominant ideology of an oppressive society. The German modernist theatre practitioner Bertolt Brecht invented the term and used it in a range of critical and creative projects, including the material that he developed in the mid-1930s for his so-called Tui-Novel—an unfinished satire on intellectuals in the German Empire and Weimar Republic—and his epic comedy from the early 1950s, Turandot or the Whitewashers’ Congress. The word is a neologism that results from the acronym of a word play on “intellectual” (“Tellekt-Ual-In”).
According to Clark (2006): “… the critique of intellectuals which Brecht developed… around the notion of ‘Tuismus’ engages a model of the public intellectual in which the self-image of the artist and thinker as a socially and politically engaged person corresponded to the expectations of the public.”
Clark, M. W. (2006). Hero or villain? Bertolt Brecht and the crisis surrounding June 1953. Journal of Contemporary History.
Hunt, T. C. N.-. (2004). Goodbye to Berlin: For 200 years, German thinkers have shaped British intellectual life – but their influence is fading fast. The Guardian.
“It is very useful to differentiate between rational and irrational authority. By irrational authority I mean authority exercised by fear and pressure on the basis of emotional submission. This is the authority of blind obedience, the authority you will find most clearly expressed in all totalitarian countries.
But there is another kind of authority, rational authority by which I mean any authority which is based on competence and knowledge, which permits criticism, which by its very nature tends to diminish, but which is not based on the emotional factors of submission and masochism, but on the realistic recognition of the competence of the person for a certain job.”
― 1958. The Moral Responsibility of Modern Man, in: Merrill-Palmer. Quarterly of Behavior and Development, Detroit, Vol. 5, p. 6.
Ienca, M., & Andorno, R.. (2017). Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology. Life Sciences, Society and Policy, 13(1), 5.
“Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. this paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. after analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.”
Rose, N., & Abi-Rached, J.. (2014). Governing through the Brain: Neuropolitics, Neuroscience and Subjectivity. The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology
“This article considers how the brain has become an object and target for governing human beings. how, and to what extent, has governing the conduct of human beings come to require, presuppose and utilize a knowledge of the human brain? how, and with what consequences, are so many aspects of human existence coming to be problematized in terms of the brain? and what role are these new ‘cerebral knowledges’ and technologies coming to play in our contemporary forms of subjectification, and our ways of governing ourselves? after a brief historical excursus, we delineate four pathways through which neuroscience has left the lab and became entangled with the government of the living: psychopharmacology, brain imaging, neuroplasticity and genomics. we conclude by asking whether the ‘psychological complex’ of the twentieth century is giving way to a ‘neurobiological complex’ in the twenty-first, and, if so, how the social and human sciences should respond.”
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"Expand Thy wings, celestial Dove, brood o`er our nature`s night on our disordered spirits move, and let there now be light."
~ Charles Wesley
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