Psychologists Collaborated with CIA & Pentagon on Post-9/11 Torture Program, May Face Ethics Charges
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"Disobedience is the true foundation of liberty. The obedient must be slaves." ~Henry David Thoreau
103d Congress, 2d Session - COMMITTEE PRINT - S. Prt. 103-97 IS MILITARY RESEARCH HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS' HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF A CENTURY A STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE DECEMBER 8, 1994 JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska GEORGE J. MITCHELL, Maine STROM THURMOND, South Carolina BOB GRAHAM, Florida ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado Jim Gottlieb, Chief Counsel/Staff Director John H. Moseman, Minority Staff Director/Chief Counsel Diana M. Zuckerman, Professional Staff Member Patricia Olson, Congressional Science Fellow
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs,
Washington, DC, December 8, 1994
During the last few years, the public has become aware of several examples where U.S. Government researchers intentionally exposed Americans to potentially dangerous substances without their knowledge or consent. The Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, which I have been privileged to chair from 1993-94, has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which veterans participated in such research while they were serving in the U.S. military. This resulted in two hearings, on May 6, 1994, and August 5, 1994.
This report, written by the majority staff of the Committee, is the result of that comprehensive investigation, and is intended to provide information for future deliberations by the Congress. The findings and conclusions contained in this report are those of the majority staff and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs.
This report would not have been possible without the dedication and expertise of Dr. Patricia Olson, who, as a Congressional Science Fellow, worked tirelessly on this investigation and report, and the keen intelligence, energy, and commitment of Dr. Diana Zuckerman, who directed this effort.
John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman
I. Introduction
II. Background
III. Findings and conclusions
IV. Recommendations
Appendix — Survey of 150 Persian Gulf War Veterans
During the last 50 years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel have been involved in human experimentation and other intentional exposures conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD), often without a servicemember’s knowledge or consent. In some cases, soldiers who consented to serve as human subjects found themselves participating in experiments quite different from those described at the time they volunteered. For example, thousands of World War II veterans who originally volunteered to “test summer clothing” in exchange for extra leave time, found themselves in gas chambers testing the effects of mustard gas and lewisite. (Note 1) Additionally, soldiers were sometimes ordered by commanding officers to “volunteer” to participate in research or face dire consequences. For example, several Persian Gulf War veterans interviewed by Committee staff reported that they were ordered to take experimental vaccines during Operation Desert Shield or face prison. (Note 2)
The goals of many of the military experiments and exposures were very appropriate. For example, some experiments were intended to provide important information about how to protect U.S. troops from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons or other dangerous substances during wartime. In the Persian Gulf War, U.S. troops were intentionally exposed to an investigational vaccine that was intended to protect them against biological warfare, and they were given pyridostigmine bromide pills in an experimental protocol intended to protect them against chemical warfare.
However, some of the studies that have been conducted had more questionable motives. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted numerous “man-break” tests, exposing soldiers to chemical weapons in order to determine the exposure level that would cause a casualty, i.e., “break a man.” (Note 3) Similarly, hundreds of soldiers were subjected to hallucinogens in experimental programs conducted by the DOD in participation with, or sponsored by, the CIA. (Note 4), (Note 5) These servicemembers often unwittingly participated as human subjects in tests for drugs intended for mind-control or behavior modification, often without their knowledge or consent. Although the ultimate goal of those experiments was to provide information that would help U.S. military and intelligence efforts, most Americans would agree that the use of soldiers as unwitting guinea pigs in experiments that were designed to harm them, at least temporarily, is not ethical.
Whether the goals of these experiments and exposures were worthy or not, these experiences put hundred of thousands of U.S. servicemembers at risk, and may have caused lasting harm to many individuals.
Every year, thousands of experiments utilizing human subjects are still being conducted by, or on behalf of, the DOD. Many of these ongoing experiments have very appropriate goals, such as obtaining information for preventing, diagnosing, and treating various diseases and disabilities acquired during military service. Although military personnel are the logical choice as human subjects for such research, it is questionable whether the military hierarchy allows for individuals in subordinate positions of power to refuse to participate in military experiments. It is also questionable whether those who participated as human subjects in military research were given adequate information to fully understand the potential benefits and risks of the experiments. Moreover, the evidence suggests that they have not been adequately monitored for adverse health effects after the experimental protocols end.
Veterans who become ill or disabled due to military service are eligible to receive priority access to medical care at VA medical facilities and to receive monthly compensation checks. In order to qualify, they must demonstrate that their illness or disability was associated with their military service. Veterans who did not know that they were exposed to dangerous substances while they were in the military, therefore, would not apply for or receive the medical care or compensation that they are entitled to. Moreover, even if they know about the exposure, it would be difficult or impossible to prove if the military has not kept adequate records. It is therefore crucial that the VA learn as much as possible about the potential exposures, and that the DOD assume responsibility for providing such information to veterans and to the VA.
The Nuremberg Code is a 10-point declaration governing human experimentation, developed by the Allies after World War II in response to inhumane experiments conducted by Nazi scientists and physicians. The Code states that voluntary and informed consent is absolutely essential from all human subjects who participate in research, whether during war or peace. The Code states:
The person involved should have the legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health and person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiments. (Note 6)
There is no provision in the Nuremberg Code that allows a country to waive informed consent for military personnel or veterans who serve as human subjects in experiments during wartime or in experiments that are conducted because of threat of war. However, the DOD has recently argued that wartime experimental requirements differ from peacetime requirements for informed consent. According to the Pentagon, “In all peacetime applications, we believe strongly in informed consent and its ethical foundations…..But military combat is different.” (Note 7) The DOD argued that informed consent should be waived for investigational drugs that could possibly save a soldier’s life, avoid endangerment of the other personnel in his unit, and accomplish the combat mission.
More than a decade after the development of the Nuremberg Code, the World Medical Association prepared recommendations as a guide to doctors using human subjects in biomedical research. As a result, in 1964 the Eighteenth World Medical Assembly met in Helsinki, Finland, and adopted recommendations to be used as an ethical code by all medical doctors conducting biomedical research with human subjects. This code, referred to as the Declaration of Helsinki, was revised in 1975, 1983, and 1989. (Note 8) It differs from the Nuremberg Code in certain important respects. The Declaration of Helsinki distinguishes between clinical (therapeutic) and nonclinical (nontherapeutic) biomedical research, and addresses “proxy consent” for human subjects who are legally incompetent, such as children or adults with severe physical or mental disabilities. (Note 9) Proxy consent for legally competent military personnel who participate in military research is not considered appropriate under the Nuremberg Code or the Declaration of Helsinki.
On June 18, 1991, the Federal Government announced that 16 U.S. governmental agencies would abide by a set of regulations, referred to as the “Common Rule,” designed to protect human subjects who participate in federally funded research. (Note 10) The provisions of the “Common Rule,” first promulgated for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in 1974, described how federally funded research involving human subjects shall be conducted. However, local Institutional Review Boards (IRB’s) may revise or exclude some or all consent elements if the research exposes subjects to no more than “minimal risk,” meaning “that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.” (Note 11) IRB’s vary greatly in their interpretation of the risks of daily life.
There are three provisions governing research funded by DHHS that are intended to protect vulnerable populations, such as pregnant women and fetuses, prisoners, and children. (Note 12) There are no special Federal regulations to protect military personnel when they participate as human subjects in federally funded research, despite logical questions about whether military personnel can truly “volunteer” in response to a request from a superior officer.
Current law prevents the Department of Defense from using Federal funds for research involving the use of human experimental subjects, unless the subject gives informed consent in advance. This law applies regardless of whether the research is intended to benefit the subject. (Note 13)
According to a report published by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) last year, approximately 60,000 military personnel were used as human subjects in the 1940’s to test two chemical agents, mustard gas and lewisite. Most of these subjects were not informed of the nature of the experiments and never received medical followup after their participation in the research. (Note 14) Additionally, some of these human subjects were threatened with imprisonment at Fort Leavenworth if they discussed these experiments with anyone, including their wives, parents, and family doctors. (Note 15) For decades, the Pentagon denied that the research had taken place, resulting in decades of suffering for many veterans who became ill after the secret testing. According to the 1993 IOM report, such denial by the DOD continues: “This committee discovered that an atmosphere of secrecy still exists to some extent regarding the WWII testing programs. Although many documents pertaining to the WWII testing programs were declassified shortly after the war ended, others were not.” (Note 16)
Based on findings from the National Academy of Sciences, the Department of Veterans Affairs recently published a final rule to compensate veterans for disabilities or deaths resulting from the long-term effects of inservice exposure to mustard gas and other agents which blister the skin (these are called vesicants). (Note 17) The final rule expands coverage to veterans exposed to mustard gas under battlefield conditions in World War I (WWI), those present at the German air raid on the harbor of Bari, Italy (WWII), and those engaged in manufacturing and handling vesicant agents during their military service. Thus, for the first time, VA will compensate certain veterans for illnesses which may have been caused by their exposure to vesicants over half a century ago.
Many experiments that tested various biological agents on human subjects, referred to as Operation Whitecoat, were carried out at Fort Detrick, MD, in the 1950’s. The human subjects originally consisted of volunteer enlisted men. However, after the enlisted men staged a sitdown strike to obtain more information about the dangers of the biological tests, Seventh-Day Adventists who were conscientious objectors were recruited for the studies. (Note 18) Because these individuals did not believe in engaging in actual combat, they instead volunteered to be human subjects in military research projects that tested various infectious agents. At least 2,200 military personnel who were Seventh-Day Adventists volunteered for biological testing during the 1950’s through the 1970’s. (Note 19)
Unlike most of the studies discussed in this report, Operation Whitecoat was truly voluntary. Leaders of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church described these human subjects as “conscientious participants,” rather than “conscientious objectors,” because they were willing to risk their lives by participating in research rather than by fighting a war. (Note 20), (Note 21)
Dugway Proving Ground is a military testing facility located approximately 80 miles from Salt Lake City. For several decades, Dugway has been the site of testing for various chemical and biological agents. From 1951 through 1969, hundreds, perhaps thousands of open-air tests using bacteria and viruses that cause disease in human, animals, and plants were conducted at Dugway. (Note 22) For example, antigens produced by animals that had come in contact with Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE), a disease usually found in horses, were later found in animals around Dugway. Prior to the identification of these substances in the Dugway vicinity, VEE had only been identified in the rat population in Florida. Such a finding suggested that VEE had been used in the open-air tests at Dugway or within laboratories, and transferred to the nearby animal population. (Note 23)
In 1968, approximately 6,400 sheep died following the intentional release of a deadly nerve gas from a plane. According to a veterinarian who evaluated the sick and dying sheep, there was little doubt that the sheep had been poisoned with nerve gas. (Note 24) The sheep and other animals in the area had depressed cholinesterase levels, suggesting organophosphate nerve poisoning. Initially, the Department of Defense denied any responsibility for the accident, stating that the sheep died from organophosphate pesticides sprayed on a nearby alfalfa field. However, the nerve agent VX was identified when the poisoned sheep were autopsied, which made it clear that the deaths were not caused by pesticides. (Note 25) Eventually, the Department of Defense reimbursed the ranchers for their animals.
It is unknown how many people in the surrounding vicinity were also exposed to potentially harmful agents used in open-air tests at Dugway. In 1969, concerns were expressed at a congressional hearing about the possible public health implications of the VEE virus tested at Dugway. (Note 26)
Due to previous problems with dangerous organisms and chemicals, Dugway has developed an active program of “simulant” testing. According to the Department of Defense, simulants are harmless organisms or chemicals which do not cause disease. However, during 45 years of open-air testing, the Army has stopped using a variety simulants when they realized they were not as safe as previously believed. (Note 27)
From 1945 to 1962, the United States conducted numerous nuclear detonation tests: Crossroads (Bikini); Sandstone, Greenhouse, and Ivy (Eniwetok Atoll); Castle (Bikini Atoll); Pacific Ocean 400 miles southwest of San Diego; Redwing and Hardtack I (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls); Argus (South Atlantic); and Dominic (Christmas Island, Johnston Island, 400 miles west of San Diego). (Note 28) The main goal was to determine damage caused by the bombs; however, as a result, thousands of military personnel and civilians were exposed to radioactive fallout. Similar tests were conducted within the continental United States, including sites in New Mexico and Nevada. (Note 29) Veterans who participated in activities that directly exposed them to radioactive fallout are referred to as “atomic veterans.”
Data obtained on some military personnel who were exposed to radioactive fallout were collected after these men were unintentionally exposed. However, some atomic veterans believe they were used as guinea pigs to determine the effects of radiation from various distances, including those at ground zero, on human subjects. Their suspicions are supported by a 1951 document from the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, Research and Development Board, Department of Defense, which identified general criteria for bomb test-related “experiments” and identified 29 “specific problems” as “legitimate basis for biomedical participation.” (Note 30)
The National Research Council’s Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) have prepared a series of reports to advise the U.S. Government on the health consequences of radiation exposure. (Note 31) The first of these reports was not published until the late 1980’s, decades after military personnel were first exposed to ionizing radiation. For the last 13 years, the VA has provided free medical care to atomic veterans who have disorders they believe to be caused by ionizing radiation, even if there is no conclusive evidence of the cause. (Note 32) In addition, the VA provides monthly compensation to veterans who were exposed to ionizing radiation during military service, who have illnesses that are believed to be associated with their exposure. The lists of compensable diseases have been revised as more research information has become available. For example, on October 11, 1994, the VA announced that tumors of the brain and central nervous system would be considered for disability compensation for veterans exposed to ionizing radiation. (Note 33)
In addition to detonation testing, radioactive releases were also intentionally conducted at U.S. nuclear sites in the years following World War II. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), at least 12 planned radioactive releases occurred at three U.S. nuclear sites during 1948-1952. These tests were conducted at Oak Ridge, TN; Dugway, UT; and Los Alamos, NM. (Note 34) Additionally, a planned release occurred at Hanford, WA, in December 1949, which has been referred to as the Green Run test. It is not known how many civilians and military personnel were exposed to fallout from these tests.
In January 1994, the Clinton administration established a Human Radiation Interagency Working Group to coordinate a Government-wide effort to uncover the nature and extent of any Government-sponsored experiments on individuals involving intentional exposure to ionizing radiation. The working group represents the Administration’s response to Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary’s promise to comb Government files for information on hundreds of experiments conducted on people in the 1940’s and 1950’s.
To assist in identifying those people who may have been harmed by secret experiments utilizing ionizing radiation, the Clinton administration solicited complaints from possible victims by installing several telephone hotlines. As of September 1994, 86 percent of the 21,996 callers to the radiation hotline were veterans who believed they had participated in various radiation “experiments.” (Note 35)
A VA advisory committee has concluded that activities other than atomic weapons tests and occupation force activities resulted in the exposure of veterans to ionizing radiation during their military service prior to 1970. (Note 36) The committee concluded that the records for many individuals who were exposed to such activities are inadequate or inaccessible. Additionally, the committee concluded that information pertinent to military exposures is not always adequate to evaluate the health risks.
Working with the CIA, the Department of Defense gave hallucinogenic drugs to thousands of “volunteer” soldiers in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In addition to LSD, the Army also tested quinuclidinyl benzilate, a hallucinogen code-named BZ. (Note 37) Many of these tests were conducted under the so-called MKULTRA program, established to counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing techniques. Between 1953 and 1964, the program consisted of 149 projects involving drug testing and other studies on unwitting human subjects. (Note 38)
One test subject was Lloyd B. Gamble, who enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1950. In 1957, he volunteered for a special program to test new military protective clothing. He was offered various incentives to participate in the program, including a liberal leave policy, family visitations, and superior living and recreational facilities. However, the greatest incentive to Mr. Gamble was the official recognition he would receive as a career-oriented noncommissioned officer, through letters of commendation and certification of participation in the program. During the 3 weeks of testing new clothing, he was given two or three water-size glasses of a liquid containing LSD to drink. Thereafter, Mr. Gamble developed erratic behavior and even attempted suicide. He did not learn that he had received LSD as a human subject until 18 years later, as a result of congressional hearings in 1975. (Note 39) Even then, the Department of the Army initially denied that he had participated in the experiments, although an official DOD publicity photograph showed him as one of the valiant servicemen volunteering for “a program that was in the highest national security interest.” (Note 40)
According to Sidney Gottlieb, a medical doctor and former CIA agent, MKULTRA was established to investigate whether and how an individual’s behavior could be modified by covert means. (Note 41) According to Dr. Gottlieb, the CIA believed that both the Soviet Union and Communist China might be using techniques of altering human behavior which were not understood by the United States. Dr. Gottlieb testified that “it was felt to be mandatory and of the utmost urgency for our intelligence organization to establish what was possible in this field on a high priority basis.” Although many human subjects were not informed or protected, Dr. Gottlieb defended those actions by stating, “…harsh as it may seem in retrospect, it was felt that in an issue where national survival might be concerned, such a procedure and such a risk was a reasonable one to take.” (Note 42)
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, all vaccines and medical products must be proven safe and effective by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to be sold and distributed in the United States. This law also applies to medical products used by the Department of Defense, even if given to U.S. troops who are stationed in other countries.
FDA also regulates medical products that are proven safe and effective for some uses or with specific doses, but not for other uses or other doses. If the product is only sold at certain doses and not others, its use at the non-approved dose would be considered investigational. If the product is legally available for sale at the same dosage, physicians can legally prescribe it; however, manufacturers can not advertise it for that purpose. Such “off label” use is also considered investigational. So, for example, a drug may be proven safe and effective to treat one kind of cancer, but be considered investigational to treat a different disease.
Under current law, an unapproved vaccine or investigational use of a drug could only be administered by the DOD under an Investigational New Drug (IND) procedure. (Note 43) Under an IND, any individual who is given the investigational product must give informed consent, i.e., must be told of the potential risks and benefits of the product, orally and in writing, and choose freely whether or not to participate. In addition, the IND requires that the medical product be distributed under carefully controlled conditions where safety and effectiveness can be evaluated.
When the Department of Defense began preparations for Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990, officials were extremely concerned that Iraq would use chemical and biological weapons against the United States. Despite years of study and billions of dollars, the DOD lacked drugs and vaccines that were proven safe and effective to safeguard against anticipated chemical nerve agents and biological toxins. Therefore, DOD officials wanted to use a medication (pyridostigmine bromide) and vaccine (botulinum toxoid) that they believed might protect against chemical nerve agents and botulism. Because the safety and effectiveness of pyridostigmine bromide and botulinum toxoid had not been proven for their intended use, these products were considered investigational drugs.
Pyridostigmine bromide is a chemical which enhances the effectiveness of two drugs, atropine and 2-PAM, which are proven effective for the treatment of nerve agent poisoning. (Note 44) Pyridostigmine is also a nerve agent itself. Nerve agents exert their biological effects by binding to, and inhibiting, the enzyme acetylcholinesterase (AChE) which normally shuts off the neurotransmitter, acetylcholine (ACh). When levels of ACh increase, nerve impulses and organ activity increase. When nerve and organ stimulation are excessive, death can result.
There are two major categories of nerve agents, carbamates and organophosphate (OP) compounds. (Note 45) German scientists developed many of the OP compounds for warfare agents and pesticides in the 1930’s and 1940’s. Examples of warfare agents include tabun, sarin, soman, and VX. Many organophosphates permanently inhibit AChE. This permanent effect, which can only be reversed when new enzymes are synthesized, makes OP warfare agents extremely lethal.
Pyridostigmine bromide is a carbamate, rather than an OP compound. (Note 46) Although it is a nerve agent, pyridostigmine has a reversible effect which can protect the AChE from permanently binding to OP compounds. When appropriate doses are selected, pyridostigmine theoretically should not cause nerve agent poisoning and should help protect against some lethal chemical warfare.
Efficacy. Pyridostigmine only works when taken in combination with other drugs and only if taken before exposure to nerve gas. (Note 47) Two antidotes to nerve agents, atropine and pyridine-2-aldoxime methochloride (2-PAM), are reportedly enhanced if pyridostigmine has already been given. Atropine and 2-PAM were included in the nerve agent antidote kits (Mark I) which were issued to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf.
In research studies, animals given pyridostigmine, atropine, and 2-PAM were more likely to survive exposure to one chemical nerve agent, soman, than those given only atropine and 2-PAM. However, pyridostigmine is unable to enter and protect the brain, so that animals exposed to soman can still suffer from convulsions despite the pyridostigmine pretreatment. (Note 48) To protect against brain damage from ongoing seizure activity, valium may also be required following exposure to a warfare nerve agent. Similarly, pyridostigmine may offer little protection against the damage caused by nerve agents in the spinal cord. (Note 49)
Safety. Pyridostigmine bromide is approved by the FDA for treating myasthenia gravis, a neurological disease characterized by extreme weakness. This disease occurs when individuals develop antibodies that prevent ACh from causing muscle impulses at the neuromuscular junction. Therefore, treatment with relative high doses of pyridostigmine increases ACh to levels that are able to overcome the “block” created by the antibodies. An analogy might be that of a fishing pond. The two ways to increase the number of fish caught are to increase the number of fishing poles or to increase the number of fish in the pond.
FDA and DOD officials claimed they were confident of the safety of pyridostigmine as an antidote enhancer for chemical warfare protection because it would be used at a much lower dose (Note 50) in combat than normally used for treating patients with myasthenia gravis. However, normal patients and those with myasthenia gravis may not respond similarly to the same dose of pyridostigmine bromide. Whereas the dosage of pyridostigmine bromide for patients with myasthenia gravis may reach 120 mg every three hours, (Note 51) the dose for U.S. troops was only 30 mg every 8 hours. A good analogy is the use of insulin for diabetes mellitus; very high doses of insulin are sometimes necessary to treat diabetics, but similar doses could be fatal for non-diabetic individuals.
Some scientists also question whether pyridostigmine is completely safe even for treating patients with myasthenia gravis. The proportion of patients with myasthenia gravis that recover after surgical treatment (thymectomy) has decreased since pyridostigmine therapy was introduced several decades ago. (Note 52) Experts speculate that whereas the problems caused by myasthenia gravis can be corrected by surgery, pyridostigmine may cause immune damage to the neuromuscular junction that cannot be corrected by surgery. Since the symptoms of pyridostigmine damage would be similar to the symptoms of myasthenia gravis, any damage from the pyridostigmine would be extremely difficult if not impossible to diagnose.
In addition to its use for myasthenia gravis, pyridostigmine bromide has been approved by FDA for use with surgical patients; it is administered after surgery to reverse the effect of anesthesia, which are neuromuscular blocking agents. The dose is relatively small (15 mg) and not repeated. This treatment does not provide relevant information about the safety of repeated use of pyridostigmine by healthy individuals, since the dosage is small and the patients have received neuromuscular blocking agents.
The bromide that is included in pyridostigmine bromide pills is known to sometimes cause problems referred to as “bromide intoxication” when used for the treatment of myasthenia gravis. (Note 53) Bromide intoxication may cause confusion, irritability, tremor, memory loss, psychotic behavior, ataxia, stupor, and coma. Some patients with bromide intoxication have a skin disorder of the face and hands resembling acne. A 60 mg tablet of the commercially available pyridostigmine bromide contains 18.4 mg bromide (30.6 percent). (Note 54), (Note 55)
FDA has not approved pyridostigmine bromide for repeated use in healthy individuals as an antidote enhancer or for any other reason. Since it would be unethical to expose individuals to potentially lethal chemical weapons in order to evaluate the efficacy of pyridostigmine, this use has only been studied on animals. The product is therefore an investigational drug when used as an antidote enhancer for treating nerve gas poisoning.
Botulinum toxoid is an unapproved vaccine that is used to protect laboratory workers and others who are likely to be exposed to botulism. Botulism is caused by at least one of seven neurotoxins produced by the bacteria Clostridium botulinum. When home-canning of food was common, food poisoning was the most common cause of botulism in the United States; the bacteria in the food produces a toxin which is eaten. Today, the most common form of botulism occurs in infants, since the bacteria that produces the toxin can thrive in a baby’s intestinal tract.
A botulism vaccine that is intended to protect against five of seven neurotoxins (called A,B,C,D,E) is produced by the Michigan Department of Health. This is called pentavalent toxoid. This vaccine is not a licensed product and must be distributed as an Investigational New Drug (IND).
Efficacy. Desert Shield began on August 8, 1990. Since the air war did not begin until January 16, 1991, and the ground war took place from February 24-27, 1991, the Pentagon had several months to review the possible use of investigational drugs and vaccines. In December 1990, the FDA advised the Department of Defense that it would be unable to test the botulism vaccine for efficacy, presumably because of limited time before the onset of the war. The FDA agreed to test the vaccine for safety, but these tests were not completed until late January 1991. At a meeting of the Informed Consent Waiver Review Group (ICWRG) on December 31, 1990, a representative of FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research discussed the vaccine, explaining that the existing supply was nearly 20 years old and consisted of three lots, stored under continuous refrigeration. (Note 56) Given the age of these vaccines, there were concerns about their safety.
The recommended schedule for immunization with the pentavalent vaccine includes a series of three initial injections at 0, 2, and 12 weeks, followed by a booster 12 months after the first injection. According to the Centers for Disease Control’s Center for Infectious Diseases, subjects given the vaccine did not have detectable antitoxin titers after the first two shots in the initial series, which means that they were unlikely to be protected at week 2. (Note 57) If for any reason only two immunizations can be given, at least 4 to 8 weeks should elapse between injections if most individuals are to be protected against the disease. (Note 58)
Safety. The Michigan Department of Health reported that 4.2 percent of patients reported a sore arm or other local reactions to the initial series of three shots, and 12.1 percent had local reactions to the booster shots. (Note 59) Almost 3 percent had systemic reactions, such as general malaise, after either the initial three shots or the booster shots. Because of the relatively large percentage of adverse reactions, new lots of the vaccine were manufactured in 1971. However, there is no evidence that the newer lots produced fewer adverse reactions than the older lots.
In her review of the DOD’s application for use of botulinum toxoid in the Persian Gulf, an FDA reviewer pointed out that in 1973, the Centers for Disease Control had considered terminating the distribution of the vaccine because of the relatively large number of individuals who had negative reactions to it. (Note 60) The FDA reviewer also pointed out that “there are no efficacy data in humans” and that the dose for humans was an estimate based on results from guinea pigs. In addition, potency testing had suggested that the vaccine would not be effective against two of the five botulism toxins.
According to the Michigan Department of Health, the effects of the botulism vaccine on pregnant women had not been studied prior to its use in the Persian Gulf War.
Anthrax vaccine is an FDA-approved vaccine that is considered safe and effective for individuals whose skin may come in contact with animal products such as hides, hair, or bones likely to contain the anthrax infection. It is also recommended for veterinarians and others who are likely to touch infected animals. (Note 61) However, the vaccine’s effectiveness against inhaled anthrax is unknown. Unfortunately, when anthrax is used as a biological weapon, it is likely to be aerosolized and thus inhaled. Therefore, the efficacy of the vaccine against biological warfare is unknown.
It appears that there is only one relevant animal study which showed that anthrax vaccine apparently provided additional protection against relapse in monkeys exposed to inhalation anthrax and treated with antibiotics. (Note 62) Although the results of this study suggest the vaccine might protect against anthrax that has been sprayed, it is not sufficient to prove that anthrax vaccine is safe and effective as used in the Persian Gulf. The vaccine should therefore be considered investigational when used as a protection against biological warfare.
The anthrax vaccine is given as three injections 2 weeks apart, followed by three additional injections given 6, 12, and 18 months after the initial injection. If immunity is to be maintained, subsequent booster injections of anthrax vaccine are recommended at 1-year intervals. (Note 63) According to the Interagency Task Force on Persian Gulf War Illnesses, one dose provides some immunity in 85 percent of those individuals vaccinated. (Note 64)
According to the Michigan Department of Public Health which manufactures anthrax vaccine, it is not known whether anthrax vaccine is safe for pregnant women or their offspring.
A. FOR AT LEAST 50 YEARS, DOD HAS KNOWINGLY EXPOSED MILITARY PERSONNEL TO POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, OFTEN IN SECRET.
The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on September 28, 1994, which stated that between 1940 and 1974, DOD and other national security agencies studied hundreds of thousands of human subjects in tests and experiments involving hazardous substances. (Note 65) GAO stated that some tests and experiments were conducted in secret. Medical research involving the testing of nerve agents, nerve agent antidotes, psychochemicals, and irritants was often classified. Additionally, some work conducted for DOD by contractors still remains classified today. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has not released the names of 15 of the approximately 80 organizations that conducted experiments under the MKULTRA program, which gave psychochemical drugs to an undetermined number of people without their knowledge or consent. According to the GAO report, the CIA has not released this information because the organizations do not want to be identified. (Note 66)
As recently as 1993, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences reported that an atmosphere of secrecy still existed regarding World War II testing of mustard gas and lewisite. (Note 67) Although many documents pertaining to the World War II testing programs were declassified shortly after World War II ended, others remain “restricted” even today. In addition to the classified or restricted documents, World War II veterans who participated in the research were sworn to secrecy. These classified documents and promises of secrecy have impeded medical care for thousands of veterans during half of the last century.
For example, Rudolph R. Mills participated in gas chamber experiments as an 18-year-old in 1945, one year after he joined the U.S. Navy. (Note 68) He was sworn to secrecy and did not learn until 46 years later that approximately 4,000 servicemen were human subjects in mustard gas experiments conducted from 1942 through 1945 by the Chemical Warfare Service. Although his health began to deteriorate even before his discharge from the Navy in 1946, he did not learn that mustard gas might be responsible for his physical problems until more than 40 years later.
At a May 6, 1994, hearing of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, entitled “Is Military Research Hazardous to Veterans’ Health? Lessons from World War II, the Persian Gulf War, and Today,” Mr. Mills testified, “I had on an experimental mask and the Navy was trying to determine if people wearing these masks could communicate with each other. I was enticed to sing over the intercom….No one ever told me that the mask became less effective against the gas with each use….We were sworn to secrecy….At the age of 43 I underwent a long series of radiation treatments and later surgery to remove part of my voice box and larynx….It didn’t occur to me that my exposure to mustard gas was responsible for my physical problems until June 1991, when I read an article in my hometown newspaper.” (Note 69)
John T. Harrison participated in Navy chemical tests in 1943 to get an extra week pass. He was also sworn to secrecy. According to written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs by Mr. Harrison, “[I] was never warned or told anything about the dangers of what [I] volunteered for….told never to reveal what [I] did or where [I] was; if anyone asked [I] was to say [I] was on rowing maneuvers.” (Note 70) At the time of his discharge from the military, he could not even describe his exposures to a Navy doctor who was trying to determine the cause of his severe respiratory illnesses. Although Mr. Harrison has suffered from recurrent breathing problems and has greatly diminished pulmonary function, he has never received any compensation for his illness. According to the VA and DOD, his medical and services records have been lost, making it difficult to prove that his disability is service-connected.
During the years immediately following World War II, military personnel were intentionally exposed to radiation during the testing of atomic bombs and during radioactive releases. While it is unclear how many of these servicemembers were intentionally exposed to what were known to be harmful levels of radiation, there is clear evidence that in some cases military personnel were ordered to locate themselves in areas of high radioactive fallout. They were given no choice in the matter, and they were not told of the potential risks of those exposures.
Similarly, military personnel were intentionally given hallucinogenic drugs to determine the effects of those drugs on humans. The servicemembers were not told that they would be given experimental drugs, they had no choice of whether or not to take them, and even after the unusual effects of the drugs were obvious to researchers, the unwitting human subjects were given no information about the known effects of the drugs. Even if the DOD did not know about the potential long-term effects of the drugs, that would not justify their failure to provide information to thousands of servicemembers about the known short-term effects of the drugs.
Persian Gulf veterans were also given investigational vaccines and ordered not to tell anyone. In a Committee survey of 150 individuals who served in the military during the Persian Gulf War (see Appendix), many of those surveyed indicated they were ordered, under threat of Article 15 or court martial, to discuss their vaccinations with no one, not even with medical professionals needing the information to treat adverse reactions from the vaccine. Similarly, 86 percent of the military personnel who told the Committee that they were ordered to take pyridostigmine bromide reported that they received no information on what they were taking or the drug’s potential risks. According to a DOD study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, commanding officers and medical personnel were also inadequately informed about the investigational drugs; as a result, they were ill-prepared to recognize or treat military personnel who experienced side effects. (Note 71)
B. DOD HAS REPEATEDLY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH REQUIRED ETHICAL STANDARDS WHEN USING HUMAN SUBJECTS IN MILITARY RESEARCH DURING WAR OR THREAT OF WAR.
The major principle of all research ethics involving human subjects, as described by the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the “Common Rule” of the U.S. Government, states that the voluntary, competent, informed, and understanding consent of the subject is absolutely essential, whether during war or peace. (Note 72)
These standards are more than 50 years old. For example, the Nuremberg Code was based on testimony of two U.S. physicians, Drs. Leo Alexander and Andrew Ivy, who served as expert medical witnesses for the Nazi crime prosecutors. The code was not the outcome of an attempt to frame a new code of ethics, but rather a description of criteria said to be widely accepted by the medical profession at the time. (Note 73) Therefore, DOD research during the 1940’s was clearly conducted in an era when researchers were well aware of ethical codes regarding the use of human subjects.
The Department of Defense has violated these well-established ethical principles each time soldiers are required to participate in military research or take investigational drugs or vaccines or are not adequately informed about the risks of the experiments.
Many individuals were recruited for various military experiments of mustard gas and lewisite under the guise of testing clothing, without being warned beforehand that they would be exposed to dangerous chemicals. Additionally, young servicemembers frequently reported that they were enticed to volunteer for experiments by being promised extra leave time from duty.
For example, in 1944, Nathan Schnurman was a 17-year-old sailor who was recruited to test Navy summer clothing, in exchange for a 3-day pass. Instead, he participated in the testing of gas masks and clothing while he was locked in a gas chamber and exposed to mustard gas and lewisite. Mr. Schnurman believes that he was not really a volunteer since the research was misrepresented. Additionally, Mr. Schnurman stated in written testimony submitted to the Committee that “many were denied the 3-day pass, and many went to their graves without revealing this story.” (Note 74) Perhaps most outrageous, Mr. Schnurman was not allowed to leave the gas chamber when he became violently ill. Mr. Schnurman testified before the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives that, “During my sixth exposure in the chamber, I determined something was wrong. I called to the corpsman, via an intercom, and informed him of my condition, and what was happening and requested I be released from the chamber, now. The reply, was `No’ as they had not completed the experiment. I became very nauseous. Again, I requested to be released from the chamber. Again, permission was denied. Within seconds after the denial, I passed out in the chamber. What happened after that, I don’t know. I may only assume, when I was removed from the chamber, it was presumed I was already dead.” (Note 75)
John William Allen enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1945 at the age of 17. Immediately after boot camp, he volunteered to test summer uniforms so he could go home before shipping out. His test clothing consisted of one pair of pants, undershorts, a gas mask, and a shirt that had been used in previous experiments and was therefore impregnated with toxic chemicals. According to Mr. Allen, the actual testing consisted of determining the amount of sulfur mustard that would cause illness (“man-break” test), not the testing of summer uniforms. He was exposed several times to sulfur mustard and was removed from further exposure on May 5, 1945, when he passed out in the gas chamber. A physical examination on May 14, 1945, revealed many wounds as the result of exposure to mustard gas.
Mr. Allen stated in written testimony submitted to the Committee, “The government has lied to us for 50 years over and over again. If I would have been shot on the front lines at least I would had it on my record and would have received medical treatment.” (Note 76)
Almost 50 years after World War II veterans were exposed to unethical research, the Department of Defense again failed to comply with the well- established ethical requirement that all soldiers and civilians make an informed choice of whether or not to use investigational medical treatment.
Under current law, the unapproved vaccine and the investigational use of pyridostigmine for healthy individuals could only be administered under an Investigational New Drug (IND) procedure. (Note 78) Under an IND, any individual who is given the investigational product must give informed consent, i.e., must be told of the potential risks and benefits of the product, orally and in writing, and choose freely whether or not to participate. In addition, the IND requires that the medical product be distributed under carefully controlled conditions where safety and effectiveness can be evaluated.
In August 1990, the DOD contacted FDA to review regulatory restrictions of DOD’s plan to use pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid for U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. The major focus of the meeting was informed consent. The DOD sought a waiver of requirements for informed consent for the use of pyridostigmine bromide and botulinum toxoid, arguing that these investigational products had well-established uses and were safe. They also claimed that there were no reasonable alternatives. According to minutes of the meeting, “FDA expressed some concern about liability and the need to comply with the regulations,” and FDA’s Deputy Director for Drug Review “pointed out the need to establish an appropriate investigational framework to collect observational data and evaluate the military medical products in question.” (Note 79)
In summary, DOD informed FDA that they did not want to abide by informed consent regulations, and FDA officials pointed out that pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid were investigational and that there are laws regulating how they can be used. DOD claimed that “under the DOD directive the Secretary of Military Departments [could] dictate the use of unapproved FDA regulated products” in the Persian Gulf, but “DOD’s current position is that this not their primary choice at this time.” (Note 80)
The issue was debated by the two agencies for several months. Finally, at a meeting on December 31, 1990, an agreement was reached. According to minutes of that meeting, DOD officials agreed that the botulism vaccine would be administered by trained individuals with a health care background, and that information would be provided orally “at minimum, and in written form if feasible, to all personnel receiving the vaccine.” (Note 81) Officials from the DOD said that the feasibility of distributing an information sheet would depend on many factors, and would vary from location to location within the military theater of operation. DOD officials “reiterated that at least verbal [sic] information would be provided to each person receiving the vaccine.”
The FDA Informed Consent Waiver Review Group recommended that pregnant women be excluded from receiving the vaccine and that information about the vaccine be “posted at places where vaccine is administered.” However, DOD argued that pregnant women would be at greater risk from exposure to botulism toxins than to the vaccine, and FDA agreed that instead of excluding pregnant women, a statement would be added to the information sheet stating that, “If you are pregnant, it is not known if this vaccine will hurt the unborn baby, however, most vaccines do not.” (Note 82)
In their application for a waiver, DOD described the safeguards that would be in place regarding the distribution of the botulism vaccine. In addition to oral warnings regarding the vaccine, DOD promised that the soldiers would be observed for 30 minutes after receiving the vaccine, and if possible, they would also be checked again 48 hours later. In addition, DOD claimed that they would provide all three vaccine injections and stated that all three were necessary to provide protection.
FDA granted the waiver on a temporary basis, concurring that obtaining informed consent during wartime is not feasible in a specific military operation involving combat or the threat of combat. (Note 83) On January 8, 1991, Dr. David Kessler, FDA Commissioner, wrote to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs regarding the waiver for informed consent for pyridostigmine. In his letter, Dr. Kessler agreed that since there was “no available satisfactory alternative therapy” for protection against organophosphorus nerve gas, he would “concur with your assessment that informed consent is not feasible.” This agreement was apparently based on DOD officials’ promise to “provide and disseminate additional information to all military personnel concerning the risks and benefits of pyridostigmine.” (Note 84)
Although FDA agreed to waive informed consent for both the pyridostigmine bromide and the botulism vaccine, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs notified Dr. Kessler on March 15, 1992, that “Central Command” had decided that the vaccine would be administered on a voluntary basis. (Note 85) However, based on interviews with 150 Persian Gulf War veterans by Committee staff (Appendix), 88 percent of those who said they received a botulism vaccine were told they had no choice.
According to the DOD, all 696,562 U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf War were issued pyridostigmine bromide as a pretreatment for nerve agent poisoning, and officials estimate that approximately two-thirds took the drug for varying periods of time. Of 150 who were interviewed by Committee staff, 73 took pyridostigmine and 74 percent of them were told they could not refuse to take it. Approximately 8,000 individuals received botulinum toxoid in the Persian Gulf. Given the high proportion who have reported that they had no choice, it appears that hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops were ordered to take an investigational drug or vaccine without having the opportunity to refuse.
The other risk is that even if serious side effects were rare, they could have been treated if medical personnel were able to diagnose the problem. For example, Carol Picou, a nurse who was stationed in the Gulf for 5 months, had obvious side effects from the pyridostigmine starting on the third day that she took it. These side effects included incontinence, drooling, and blurry vision, among others. The side effects became worse 1 hour after she took each pill. One day, she did not take the pill as scheduled, and the side effects stopped; unfortunately, her commanding officer ordered her to continue taking the pills, and watched to make sure she swallowed them. She was ordered to take the pills for 15 days. She now has many permanent medical problems, including incontinence, muscle weakness, and memory loss, that might have been avoided had she been allowed to stop taking the pills. (Note 87)
Similarly, Lt. Col. Neil Tetzlaff had immediate side effects when he started taking pyridostigmine bromide on the plane ride over to Saudi Arabia. His nausea and vomiting became so severe that he needed emergency surgery to repair a hole in his stomach. When he became ill, the military doctor told him to continue to take the pills, because the doctor apparently did not know that nausea and vomiting were known side effects. According to Tetzlaff’s sworn testimony, the doctor acted as if the pyridostigmine was as safe as a cough drop. (Note 88)
Numerous civilians have reported to Committee staff that they also were given investigational drugs during the Persian Gulf War without informed consent. For example, civilians who worked for DOD contractors and news media personnel were apparently instructed to take the pyridostigmine bromide tablets. They usually were not told it was experimental or that the pyridostigmine bromide was being administered in a regime that was not proven efficacious or safe, and received no information on potential side effects of the drug.
For example, according to journalists who covered the Gulf War, some were given the pills by the U.S. military. Several of these journalists experienced serious medical problems similar to Persian Gulf War veterans. (Note 89) The Committee has also received letters from civilians who are suffering from “Gulf War syndrome” who report the widespread use of pyridostigmine by civilians working for DOD during the Gulf War.
Following the Committee’s May 6, 1994, hearing, several individuals who were in the Air Force during the 1980’s contacted Committee staff to report they had also received pyridostigmine bromide without their consent. (Note 90) They indicated that they did not volunteer for any research study, were ordered to take the pyridostigmine pills as part of a research project, and were ordered to report any side effects to the flight surgeons. One individual estimated that several hundred individuals in his squadron participated in the pyridostigmine studies, and reported that the studies were conducted over a period of at least 2 years.
The descriptions of these studies are disturbing because, if accurate, they indicate that even during peacetime, the Air Force totally ignored the requirements of informed consent that are a central provision of the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the “Common Rule” which had been in effect in at least some U.S. Government agencies at the time.
In addition to being unethical, these studies were reportedly unscientific; there were apparently no safeguards to ensure that the pilots took the pills or accurately reported the side effects. Many pilots who participated in these studies were on flight status; if they reported any side effects, they could lose their flight pay. (Note 91) Obviously, this provided an incentive for them not to report any side effects, since they did not want to lose their flight pay. Similarly, those who experienced side effects had an incentive to stop taking the drug without notifying the researchers conducting the study. Moreover, pilots who contacted the Committee staff reported that many of their friends and colleagues did not take any of the pills at all, and many of those who did take at least one pill stopped taking them when they experienced headaches and other side effects. Despite the pressure to obey orders, many of the pilots apparently believed that they should not trust the Pentagon regarding the safety of these experimental pills.
One member of the air crew who was given pyridostigmine as part of these studies, Craig Crane, notified the Committee that he now has memory loss, joint pain, sensitivity to chemicals, and other symptoms that are commonly associated with Gulf War syndrome, although he is only 32 years old and did not serve in the Gulf War. He has left the Air Force because of his disabilities. (Note 92)
Despite the fact that pyridostigmine was an investigational drug whose safety and effectiveness had not been proven to FDA, the DOD claims that its use in the Persian Gulf War was prevention and treatment, not research. For example, Dr. Edward Martin, Acting Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, stated at the Committee’s hearing on May 6, 1994, that “..investigational products were employed during the Persian Gulf War as prophylactic treatments against biological and chemical warfare agents. This was not research but direct prevention and treatment.” (Note 93) Additionally, John M. Bachkosky, Deputy Director, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, wrote to Sen. Rockefeller on May 19, 1994, that “[botulinum toxoid and pyridostigmine bromide] were used for direct prevention and treatment and were not employed as part of any research effort.” (Note 94)
In a letter to Sen. Rockefeller dated November 17, 1994, DOD continues to claim that its use of pyridostigmine was not research. John Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, wrote that, “Although pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid were classified as investigational drugs as required by FDA regulations, they were not used for experimental purposes in [Operation Desert Storm] and the military personnel who received these products were not experimental subjects.” (Note 95) Mr. Deutch added that, “The fact that these drugs were used for treatment purposes, not research purposes, was clearly understood by all parties involved and specifically approved by the courts in litigation challenging the governments [sic] actions.” Once again, it appears that the DOD confuses the goals of using these medical products with the process, which was clearly considered investigational by FDA.
Dr. Arthur Caplan, who at the time he testified was Director of the Center of Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota, addressed that issue at the May 6 hearing. He explained that the fact that the goal is treatment and that DOD believed the benefits of the pills and vaccines would outweigh the risks “doesn’t transform the use of experimental, innovative, investigational agents into therapies. These agents were used, as we have heard, in large populations for purposes other than those for which they were originally designed in some cases, and circumstances under which they had never before been tried out in the desert. This seems to me to cinch the case that what took place fell into the category of experimental, innovative and investigational, and that makes them research.” (Note 96)
Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, DOD has repeatedly requested that the waiver of informed consent be made permanent, arguing that “to not finalize it provides an arguable defect under the Administrative Procedures Act and leaves both DOD and FDA open to greater liability.” (Note 97) To finalize the interim rule would grant unrestricted use of investigational drugs by military personnel, even though investigational status means that efficacy and safety have not been proven. FDA has not yet decided whether to concur with DOD’s request.
The DOD persuaded FDA that informed consent should be waived for pyridostigmine bromide and botulism vaccine because these investigational products had been used safely in the past. However, based on documents provided to the Committee staff, it is doubtful that either of these products would have been effective as used in the Persian Gulf War.
Pyridostigmine bromide, according to DOD, improves the survival of animals exposed to soman and treated with atropine and 2-PAM. However, pyridostigmine pretreatment makes individuals more vulnerable to other nerve agents, such as VX and sarin. (Note 98) The DOD scientists who studied pyridostigmine and sarin therefore concluded that pyridostigmine should only be used when the chemical warfare threat is soman. (Note 99)
The Pentagon, however, had no reason to believe that the Iraqis were more likely to use soman rather than sarin. According to a report by the Persian Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board, Iraq had several chemical weapons, including sarin. (Note 100) Moreover, at a briefing for Senators and staff on November 10, 1993, Under Secretary of Defense John Deutch stated that the Czechoslovakian military detected low levels of sarin in the Saudi theater during the opening days of the air war against Iraq. This statement was also made by Joseph Corrivean, U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, on April 27, 1994, at a National Institutes of Health workshop on “The Persian Gulf Experience and Health.”
Even if U.S. troops had been exposed to soman, it is unclear that the pyridostigmine would have provided adequate protection against nerve damage. When DOD began the second phase of research on pyridostigmine, it was noted that the atropine and 2-PAM did not seem to save the lives of animals that were exposed to soman. As a result, the dose of atropine was increased to 0.40 mg/kg, which according to FDA, increased the survival of Rhesus monkeys exposed to soman. (Note 101) However, when the Department of Defense developed a treatment regimen for U.S. troops during the Persian Gulf War, it was based on the inadequate dose of atropine in the animal studies (0.096 mg/kg) rather than the higher, effective dose. (Note 102) Therefore, even if Persian Gulf soldiers had been exposed to soman, it is questionable if the pyridostigmine pretreatment would have provided any protection, since the dose of atropine was apparently inadequate.
In response to posthearing questions about this dosage discrepancy from Sen. Rockefeller, the DOD stated “the dose of atropine in the Mark I kit was established based exclusively on safety, rather than on efficacy, considerations.” (Note 103) This statement suggests that hundreds of thousands of servicemembers were put at risk by requiring them to take a drug with known risks (pyridostigmine bromide) in a situation where it might have done little good since the atropine dose in the Mark I kits, 6 mg, was inadequate. Based on the monkey data, a dose of 27 mg would have been required for a 150-pound man. (Note 104) However, the side effects of only 2 mg of atropine in a normal young person (without nerve-agent exposure) include increased heart rate, decreased sweating, visual blurring, and others. (Note 105) Apparently, DOD officials decided that the high dosage required for protection would impair performance, so they selected the much lower dosage, even though its effectiveness was questionable. Although results for monkeys may not be exactly comparable to those for humans, it seems unlikely that humans would respond dramatically differently. It is therefore likely that the dose of atropine in the Mark I kits was inadequate for efficacy, and even with this very low dose could have compromised the ability of servicemembers during war. (Note 106)
Botulism vaccine was given too late to U.S. troops to be of any use had the Iraqis actually used biological warfare during Desert Storm. At a briefing on April 20, 1994, DOD officials informed Committee staff that botulism vaccine was not administered to most military personnel in the Persian Gulf until January 23, 1991, which was 7 days after the onset of the air war. Approximately 8,000 individuals received the vaccine, but most received only one or two inoculations. Because the war ended on February 27, 1991, before the third injection was scheduled to be given, it is unlikely that these soldiers were adequately immunized. Moreover, because of the severe shortage of the product, the remainder of those deployed received no inoculations, and hence no protection against botulism.
According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 696,562 individuals participated in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Therefore, 99 percent of the military personnel deployed would have received no protection due to the shortage of botulinum toxoid, and the remaining 1 percent were probably not protected because the vaccine distribution started too late.
Additionally, in December 1990, the FDA advised the Department of Defense that it would be unable to test the botulism vaccine for efficacy, presumably because of limited time before the onset of the war. (Note 107) Therefore, in addition to the limited supply of vaccine and late onset of inoculations, efficacy of the existing supply was not determined prior to the onset of the war.
Anthrax vaccine was given to approximately 150,000 military personnel in the Persian Gulf. Anthrax vaccine is considered effective for protecting against anthrax exposure of the skin; however it is unclear whether it provides protection against inhaling aerosolized anthrax. (Note 108) According to the Department of Defense, in biological warfare the anthrax would be sprayed, so the efficacy of the vaccine against aerosolized anthrax would have been the relevant test. (Note 109) As stated earlier in this report, the DOD has only one study indicating that the vaccine might be useful against aerosolized anthrax, but there are no data on humans.
Committee staff reviewed all the clinical studies and related research regarding pyridostigmine on healthy individuals which DOD provided to FDA to support their IND and their NDA (new drug approval) application. (Note 110) The number of human subjects in most studies was less than 35; several studies included as few as two or four individuals.
According to the materials that FDA provided to the Committee, virtually all the studies excluded women. The lack of studies on women is a problem, because dosage should be based on the weight of the person taking the drug, and because some scientists believe that pyridostigmine may affect men and women differently. (Note 111), (Note 112) For example, women on birth control pills may have different levels of AChE than other women or men. Similarly, women in different stages of their reproductive cycle respond differently to pyridostigmine. (Note 113) Since studies excluded women, there is no information on the potential long-term side effects of pyridostigmine on diseases unique to women (such as menstrual cycle irregularities or breast cancer).
Because of the DOD researchers’ concerns about serious adverse reactions to pyridostigmine bromide, many of the studies screened the men to determine whether they were hypersensitive to pyridostigmine bromide before allowing their participation in the experiment. In some cases they used test doses; in other cases they asked questions regarding similar medications and sensitivity to bromide. In many of the studies, patients were excluded if they were taking any medications, since adverse reactions could occur when pyridostigmine was administered with other drugs (i.e., propranolol, birth control medications, or anti-malarial drugs). In some studies, smokers were excluded; in many studies, participants were told not to drink any alcoholic beverages. Most research study participants were less than 35 years of age. In addition, individuals with abnormal blood pressure, asthma, glaucoma, low serum AChE levels, gastrointestinal disorders, urinary or intestinal blockage, or hyperthyroidism, were excluded from the studies. (Note 114)
Despite these precautions, serious adverse reactions were reported for several of the studies. For example, in one study, pyridostigmine bromide was administered to a group of 28 active duty Air Force pilots. (Note 115) One pilot experienced respiratory arrest 91 minutes after swallowing the third in a series of three 30-mg pyridostigmine tablets. This pilot had shown no sensitivity to the test dose of pyridostigmine prior to the study. In another study of 32 male subjects, one subject lost consciousness following vision problems and headache. (Note 116) In other studies, abnormal liver tests, unusual electrocardiograms, gastrointestinal disturbances, and anemia were reported. (Note 117), (Note 118), (Note 119)
Results also showed that pyridostigmine impaired performance, including tasks which require short-term memory, and prevented a number of test subjects from exercising in hot environments during the second or third day of treatment. A study of the impact of pyridostigmine on swimming in cold water had to be terminated when it was determined that its use caused severe cramps that could cause drowning.
Research published in 1978 on neostigmine, a “close relative” of pyridostigmine, found that the drug caused “profound physiological, electrophysiological, and electron microscopic disruption of nerve endings and muscles.” Some of these changes increased in severity over time with continued treatment. (Note 120) The author of that study believes this study has worrisome implications for pyridostigmine.
In August 1990, just before U.S. troops were sent to the Gulf, DOD scientists requested approval for a study of four men that would evaluate the effects of pyridostigmine on vision. This study was deemed urgent because of the situation in Kuwait, and it was approved quickly. It is important to note that this study, conducted just prior to the Gulf War, included extensive safety precautions, including giving medical exams to the men before giving the pyridostigmine. The researchers indicated that pyridostigmine should not be given to individuals who had bronchial asthma, peptic ulcer, liver, kidney, heart disease, or hypersensitivity to pyridostigmine or related drugs. They informed study volunteers that possible adverse side effects include nausea, vomiting, slow heart rate, sweating, diarrhea, abdominal cramps, increased salivation, increased bronchial secretions, and pupil constriction. They also warned of other side effects, including “weakness, muscle cramps, and muscle twitches” and explained that, “Because of these side effects, all subjects will be admitted to Lyster Army Hospital as in-patients so that they will be medically monitored during evening periods of nontesting. A drug will be available at the test site to counteract the possible adverse side effects.” (Emphasis added) (Note 121) In addition, the Human Subjects Committee that reviewed this study considered whether the possibility of pyridostigmine causing death should be mentioned in the informed consent form; after some discussion, it was decided that such a warning was unnecessary since death was unlikely.
In contrast to the extensive precautions taken before giving pyridostigmine every 8 hours for 3 days to four volunteers, a few months later approximately 400,000 U.S. soldiers were ordered to take the same dosage of the drug for days, weeks, or months, none of whom had been screened for any of the diseases mentioned in the informed consent form given to the four men, none of whom were warned about the risks associated with the drug, and none of whom were given a choice of whether or not to take it. Additionally, approximately 28,000 of the 400,000 receiving the pyridostigmine were women, who were required to take an investigational drug that DOD had never tested on healthy women. (Note 122)
The repeated claims by DOD and FDA at the Committee’s May 6, 1994, hearing and at other times since the war that they were sure pyridostigmine was perfectly safe as used is not consistent with the concerns of DOD scientists regarding the potential serious adverse reactions and drug interactions while conducting research. It does not make sense that the researchers would establish such elaborate safeguards when giving the drug to four men, and then have none of those safeguards when giving the drug to more than 400,000 U.S. troops, none of whom had been tested for sensitivity to pyridostigmine, and most of whom were not screened for medical problems or medication use that could preclude the safe use of pyridostigmine. DOD researchers were aware of the shortcomings of their research. For example, in 1989 William K. Prusaczyk suggested, “Because of the existing incidence of asthma in soldiers in the U.S. Army,” the medical monitor believes that pyridostigmine should be studies on individuals who have asthma. (Note 123)
When U.S. troops were sent to the Persian Gulf in the fall of 1994 because of concern about Kuwait, the DOD considered the use of pyridostigmine to protect against chemical weapons. However, in the 3 years since the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the DOD had not conducted studies that proved the safety of pyridostigmine bromide for that use.
The safety of pyridostigmine was evaluated during and after the Persian Gulf War. In one study, approximately 37 percent of 213 soldiers reported at least one severe symptom 24 hours after beginning to take the 30-mg pyridostigmine tablets. (Note 124) Additionally, the DOD conducted three surveys concerning the use of pyridostigmine in Operation Desert Shield/Storm which were reported in 1992. (Note 125) These surveys indicated that side effects were frequently experienced by military personnel taking pyridostigmine bromide. One published article, based on reports from medical personnel providing care to 41,650 soldiers (6.5 percent women) who took pyridostigmine bromide in the Persian Gulf, found that over half experienced gastrointestinal disturbances. (Note 126) Urinary urgency and frequency, headaches, nasal discharge, profuse sweating, and tingling of hands and feet were reported to occur in a range of 5 to 30 percent. (Note 127) Several doctors who were interviewed for the study expressed concerns that the dose for women may have been too high.
In the 3 years that have elapsed since the Gulf War, the DOD has apparently not conducted research on the safety of pyridostigmine for healthy women. In early 1994, DOD submitted an NDA (new drug approval) application to FDA, urging that FDA determine that pyridostigmine bromide is safe and effective as an antidote enhancer. The studies provided in that application did not include women.
In the last few year, several studies have been published on the effects of pyridostigmine on growth hormones of women and men. In one study, three of the eight women who received one 120 mg dose of pyridostigmine bromide became so ill they had to be excluded from the study. (Note 128) The entire study consisted of eight women and eight men who received pyridostigmine in single doses of 30, 60, or 120 mg. The women in the study experienced more severe and prolonged symptoms than men, especially at the 120 mg dose, such as severe abdominal cramps, nausea, vomiting, asthenia, and muscle cramps. Three subjects who received 120 mg had vision impairment that lasted several hours. (Note 129)
In addition, none of the studies of pyridostigmine evaluated the safety of pyridostigmine if taken over a period of weeks or months, as was done in the Gulf War. Moreover, none of the studies evaluated the long-term safety of pyridostigmine by providing followup information about men who had taken the drug years earlier.
Despite the Committee’s hearing in May and numerous television news magazine reports and newspaper articles reporting our concerns about the safety of pyridostigmine, the DOD has apparently not yet conducted any studies that provide any more information than was previously available. (Note 130) Several studies of pyridostigmine conducted by DOD under conditions of heat and/or exercise have been published, but they studied only four to seven young men. In one study of four men, one man became so fatigued on the third day that he was told to stop exercising; this problem was barely mentioned in the published study, and the implication for soldiers during wartime was not discussed. (Note 131)
In 1993, Dr. James Moss, a scientist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, conducted research on cockroaches that could have important implications for Persian Gulf War veterans. (Note 132) He found that when pyridostigmine was used in combination with a common insect repellent called DEET (diethyl-m-tolamide), the DEET became almost seven times as toxic as when it was used alone. Similarly, pyridostigmine became four times as toxic when used in combination with DEET. (Note 133) DEET and many other insect repellents and pesticides were widely used in the Gulf War as protection against sand flies, scorpions, and other pests. If individuals who took pyridostigmine bromide became more vulnerable to pesticides, or those exposed to pesticides became more vulnerable to pyridostigmine bromide, this could explain the serious neurological symptoms experienced by so many Gulf War veterans.
The results were similar but not as alarming for permethrin, another insecticide that was used in the Gulf War. Permethrin was used in the military uniforms, impregnating the fabric before it was cut and sewn. In his cockroach studies, Dr. Moss found that DEET became twice as toxic when used with permethrin.
Dr. Moss also studied the combination of DEET and pyridostigmine with other toxic substances that were present in the Gulf War, such as lindane (a treatment for lice) and a wide range of insecticides. These substances also became more toxic when used at the same time than when used individually. Even caffeine was found to have a potential impact on the toxicity of other substances.
Dr. Moss believes his findings regarding cockroaches are likely to be relevant to humans; however, more research is needed to determine if humans would be similarly affected. Nevertheless, his findings are consistent with concerns that have been raised by military researchers, who have stated publicly that carbamates such as pyridostigmine must never be used after nerve agent exposure, presumably because the pyridostigmine could further decrease AChE from nerve agent poisoning. If military personnel were exposed to low levels of nerve agents due to bombing of nerve agent stockpiles as proposed by some, (Note 134) as well as numerous pesticides procured by the Army, (Note 135) and pyridostigmine bromide, it is likely that the combination could have been much more toxic than any of those substances would have been individually.
Dr. Moss’ findings regarding pesticides are also consistent with a note in the Air Force records of Craig Crane, an Air Force crewman who participated in a pyridostigmine experiment in 1986. According to a description of the pyridostigmine study that was signed by medical personnel and included in Mr. Crane’s records, “There is no sensitivity to pesticides or recent significant exposure.” This medical notation suggests that Air Force medical personnel were concerned about a possible interaction between pyridostigmine and pesticides, and therefore avoided including men who had been exposed to pesticides. (Note 136)
Dr. Moss testified about his findings at the Committee’s May 6, 1994, hearing, despite efforts by USDA to prevent him from doing so. On June 31, 1994, his 3-year contract with USDA expired, and it was not renewed. Dr. Moss’ repeated efforts to continue working at USDA were unsuccessful. Sen. Rockefeller wrote to Secretary Espy in May, June, and July to ask how USDA planned to continue Dr. Moss’ research, but received no reply until after a CBS Evening News story on the subject on October 14, 1994. Secretary Espy then wrote to Sen. Rockefeller saying that the USDA had no plans to follow up on Dr. Moss’ research, but would ensure that the data were provided to DOD. (Note 137)
Although Dr. Moss made no accusations against USDA at the Committee hearing, he has subsequently expressed his views that he lost his job at USDA because of his research findings. He also now reports that his supervisor warned him that he should not discuss his research findings with anyone. Moreover, in an internal USDA memo dated December 30, 1993, Dr. Moss stated that he was advised to “keep quiet.” (Note 138) USDA and the Johnson Wax Company are the co-inventors of DEET, an ingredient in most commercially available insecticides, such as Raid.
At a meeting with DOD officials regarding informed consent in December 1990, the FDA agreed to test the botulinum toxoid (botulism vaccine) for safety. (Note 139) A representative of FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research explained that the existing supply of the vaccine was nearly 20 years old and consisted of three lots, stored under constant refrigeration. There was concern that the vaccine would break down into toxic products due to prolonged storage. General safety testing was performed by the FDA on all of the lots of botulinum toxoid used in the Persian Gulf; however, the FDA did not complete these tests until January 24, 1991, (Note 140) after the war had started.
While the results of FDA’s general safety testing were encouraging, the problem with adverse reactions to the vaccine were not resolved. In her review of the DOD’s application for use of the botulism vaccine in the Persian Gulf, an FDA reviewer pointed out that in 1973, the Centers for Disease Control had considered terminating its distribution because of adverse reactions. (Note 141) New lots of the vaccine were manufactured in 1971, but research was not conducted to determine whether the newer lots produced fewer adverse reactions than the older lots. (Note 142)
Since no records were kept for most of the Gulf War soldiers who received the vaccine, there is no new information about the safety of the botulism vaccine resulting from its use by U.S. troops. Therefore, its safety remains unknown.
Although anthrax vaccine had been considered approved prior to the Persian Gulf War, it was rarely used. Therefore, its safety, particularly when given to thousands of soldiers in conjunction with other vaccines, is not well established. Anthrax vaccine should continue to be considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military personnel because many of the support troops received anthrax vaccine, and because the DOD believes that the incidence of undiagnosed illnesses in support troops may be higher than that in combat troops. (Note 143)
Unfortunately, medical records and shot records of individuals who served in the Persian Gulf frequently do not report the vaccines they received. In some cases, anthrax was recorded as “Vac-A.” However, in many cases, veterans who believe they received anthrax vaccinations did not have them recorded in their medical records. According to testimony received at the Committee hearing on May 6, 1994, vaccines were recorded in separate vaccine records, for soldiers who had such records with them and insisted that the information be recorded. (Note 144)
Army regulation (AR) 70-25 provides guidelines for the use of volunteers as subjects in military research. Section 3 describes three exemptions whereby military researchers are exempt from the provisions of these protective regulations (the following is a direct quote from the regulation):
It is sometimes difficult to differentiate training from research. For example, military personnel at the U.S. Chemical School, Fort McClellan, AL, are currently exposed to nerve agent poisons as part of their training, so that they will learn how to cope with similar situations in combat. Soldiers who refuse to participate or do not complete live agent training are subject to reclassification in another military occupational specialty and cannot graduate. (Note 146) To determine if the students used correct procedures during the training exercise, blood samples are obtained from some students before and after the procedure, and are analyzed for red blood cell cholinesterase to determine if the soldier was exposed to the nerve agents.
If the military collects data to determine how to better train individuals, the “training” is then defined as contributing information to generalizable knowledge, and is hence “research.” For the optimal protection of U.S. troops, one would hope that training exercises are improved based on reliable information. However, during the testing of new training methods or equipment, exercises utilizing potentially dangerous substances, such as chemical weapons, should be considered research rather than training. Participants must be fully apprised of the nature of the experiments and have the opportunity to refuse without reprisal, in order to conform with the Nuremberg Code and other ethical standards.
A common theme voiced by military personnel who have participated in military research or training exercises over the last 50 years is the lack of information about the risks they faced and the lack of medical followup. World War II veterans frequently reported that they heard about the adverse health effects of mustard gas and lewisite from newspapers and television decades after they were exposed, not from the Department of Defense or Department of Veterans Affairs. Veterans and civilians who worked at the Dugway Proving Ground and were exposed to a variety of biological and chemical simulants began to question the association of poor health with work as they compared information among themselves, not because of information provided by military officials. Veterans who were inside atomic clouds from atomic testing heard nothing at all from their government after they returned home from duty. Similarly, soldiers who unknowingly participated in military research designed to test the effects of hallucinogens on human behavior were never given information to explain their hallucinations and suffered from severe psychological disorders as a result. Even today, most of those who served in the Persian Gulf indicate they have received no followup information about the investigational drugs they received.
It is the responsibility of DOD and VA to identify and keep track of veterans exposed to potentially dangerous substances so that they can receive medical care if needed. Even in situations where DOD believes an investigational drug is safe, such followup is necessary to establish with certainty whether exposures were safe, or whether they resulted in long- term side effects.
In the last year, Gulf War veterans have reported that exposures during military service have resulted in miscarriages and birth defects, as well as excruciating pain during sexual intercourse. For example, at a Committee hearing on August 5, 1994, Kelli Albuck, the wife of a Gulf War veteran, described the miscarriage and pregnancy problems she had experienced since her husband returned from the Gulf War. She also described what she called “burning semen” or “shooting fire.” Mrs. Albuck stated that many wives of Gulf War veterans complained that their husbands’ semen caused a burning sensation, and in her case that the semen itself could cause a rash or blood blister on her husband’s leg or her skin. Steve Miller, an Army nurse who also testified at that hearing, had no problems with burning semen, but his son was born with extensive birth defects, including having only one eye and one ear. The doctors told him that the combination of severe birth defects was very unusual and suggestive of a toxic exposure. Mr. Miller believes that his son’s birth defects could be related to his use of investigational drugs or vaccines, perhaps in combination with pesticide exposures.
Similarly, many atomic veterans believe that infertility, miscarriages, stillbirths, and birth defects resulted from exposure to ionizing radiation.
Although these reports have received media attention for years, the VA and DOD have not conducted research on these questions, nor have they supported independent research. Finally, 50 years after veterans were intentionally exposed to ionizing radiation, the VA will be required by law to enter into a contract with the Institute of Medicine (IOM), or a similar independent agency, to evaluate whether it is feasible to support research on the reproductive problems associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. If the IOM determines that such research is feasible, the VA and the Congress will then determine whether such research should be funded. (Note 147)
In November 1994, President Clinton signed a law that would require VA to conduct research on birth defects and miscarriages among Gulf War families. A preliminary study will be required, in which information about these reproductive outcomes will be included in the Persian Gulf War Veterans’ Health Registry. In addition, VA will be required to include semen analysis and other reproductive evaluations in a standard protocol used to evaluate Gulf War veterans with mysterious illnesses.
For decades, military personnel who were injured from various exposures have been denied compensation until scientific evidence could support their claims for service-connected disabilities. Although 60,000 military subjects were involved as human subjects in testing programs involving mustard gas and lewisite over 50 years ago, the initiation of a study to review research regarding the long-term health consequences from these military experiments did not occur until 1991, and the results of the study were not published until 1993. (Note 148)
Similarly, the use of Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam has stimulated concern and controversy ever since the United States began the military herbicide program in 1961, but a comprehensive review and evaluation of available scientific and medical information regarding the health effects of herbicides and the contaminant dioxin was not conducted until it was authorized by Congress in 1991. (Note 149) The Department of Veterans Affairs has recently announced new rules for awarding compensation for more Agent Orange-related diseases, three decades after military personnel were exposed to the defoliant in Vietnam. (Note 150)
Reports of the National Research Council’s Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR), written to advise the U.S. Government on the health consequences of radiation exposure, frequently relied on mortality and morbidity experiences of exposed individuals, some of which took decades to accumulate. (Note 151) Information is continuing to be gathered, which will be incorporated into future BEIR reports.
When investigational drugs and vaccines were given to thousands of military personnel during the Persian Gulf War, this provided an unprecedented opportunity to learn more about the safety of those products. Unfortunately, no effort was made to gather objective information, despite the fact that data gathering is required as part of the IND process for investigational drugs and vaccines. (Note 152) Any research that is conducted years after the war is over will be less scientifically valid and much more expensive as a result of the lack of objective information gathered during the war about which servicemembers took which drugs or vaccines, and the adverse reactions that they experienced.
The Medical Follow-up Agency (MFUA) of the Institute of Medicine will take 3 years to issue its final report on whether there is a scientific basis for an epidemiological study on the health consequences of service in the Persian Gulf. (Note 153) If the MFUA determines such a study or studies should be conducted, it will take several more years to gather the necessary data.
Although hundreds of thousands of U.S. military personnel have been involved in military research, their medical records usually do not contain information about the studies they participated in, or the investigational drugs or vaccines they received. (Note 154) There are currently no standardized guidelines imposed by either the DOD or VA to include a copy of the informed consent form or research proposal in the medical records of exposed human subjects.
Even if medical records contain relevant information regarding health consequences from various investigations, these medical records may be difficult to obtain. Of the 150 individuals who were interviewed for the Committee’s survey, not all respondents had tried to obtain their medical records, but 28 (19 percent) indicated that part or all of their medical record were lost and 48 (32 percent) respondents indicated that their medical records were incomplete or inaccurate (Appendix). Some of those surveyed believed their records had been deliberately altered or contained inaccurate information.
The VA Office of Inspector General recently investigated the possible illegal removal of official documents from certain veterans’ appeals files assigned to two Board of Veterans’ Appeals attorneys. (Note 155) It is unknown whether such intentional removal is a rare occurrence; clearly, any removal of medical information would make it difficult and perhaps impossible for a veteran to receive the medical care and compensation that he or she is entitled to.
In addition to any intentional removal of information, veterans’ service medical records are difficult to find. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, veterans’ service medical records can potentially be in thousands of locations. (Note 156) The DOD has attempted to simplify the retrieval of medical records by modifying the route for medical records of individuals who have left the military. The simplified route was initiated for the Army in October 1992, for the Navy in February 1994, and for the Air Force and Marines in late 1994. Although the new procedures should simplify the process, the GAO concluded that the possibility of misplaced medical records remains because there are still thousands of locations where records could be found within the new system.
According to Dr. Leonard Cole, professor at Rutgers University, the DOD has denied the possibility of harm from various exposures. However, in many instances the military belatedly recognized that some exposures may be causing disease and death. (Note 157) Such denial, however, delays the availability of medical assistance to those harmed.
For example, the military has released chemicals and biological agents through outdoor “open air” tests for over four decades. Some of these supposedly safe chemicals and biological agents, referred to as simulants, were also released over populated areas and cities. (Note 158) Although scientific evidence suggested that the tests may have caused illnesses to exposed citizens, the Army repeatedly claimed that these bacteria and chemicals were harmless until adverse health effects convinced them to change the simulants used. The death of Edward J. Nevin was associated with the release of one simulant, Serratia marcescens, over San Francisco in 1950. (Note 159) A subsequent court trial revealed that on September 26 and 27, 1950, the Army sprayed Serratia marcescens from a boat off the coast of San Francisco. (Note 160) On September 29, patients at the Stanford University Hospital in San Francisco began appearing with Serratia marcescens infections. Although the judge denied the validity of the plaintiffs’ claims that the exposures were related to the death of Mr. Nevin, the trial raised frightening questions about the selection of simulants. Serratia marcescens is no longer used by the military as a simulant.
Dugway Proving Ground has been a site for “open air” testing of chemical and biological agents for decades. The purpose of the tests is to determine how the agents spread and survive, and their effect on people and the environment. Earl Davenport is a veteran who participated in tests at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, first as a military employee and later as a civilian employee. He became ill in 1984 after being exposed to a chemical simulant called DMMP (dimethyl methylphosphate). He had been spraying the chemical into the path of a laser beam when a sudden change in wind blew the chemical all over his face and hair before he was able to put on a protective mask. Although he was “wheezing and coughing” the next day, and his symptoms lasted for weeks, the Dugway Army Hospital merely gave him cough medicine and antibiotics. The Dugway Safety Office assured him that the chemical was safe. However, by 1988, officials at Dugway had reevaluated the simulant’s danger, and were becoming concerned that DMMP could cause cancer and kidney damage. (Note 161) Mr. Davenport is currently attempting to obtain compensation for his illness from the Department of Labor, since his exposure occurred when he was employed at Dugway as a civilian.
In 1992, several military personnel from the Arizona National Guard experienced chemical burns during a summer training exercise at the Dugway Proving Grounds. According to two physicians, a daughter from one of the guardsmen also received chemical burns when she later handled her father’s duffle bag. One of these doctors, Dr. Michael Vance, was contacted by military officials and encouraged to modify his written findings on the possible cause of the daughter’s injury. (Note 162) He refused.
According to scientists and doctors from the University of Utah, there is great concern over the potential health consequences not only for military personnel who work and train at Dugway, but also for civilians who live in a small town and on an Indian reservation near the Proving Grounds. Moreover, physicians from the Utah Medical Society have complained about the lack of information provided to the medical community about the agents that are used in Dugway, despite repeated requests. (Note 163)
According to Dr. Cole, the use of potentially harmful chemical and biological agents continues at Dugway even today. For example, he testified that the Army uses a simulant called Bacillus subtilis, “which is fairly harmless in many natural conditions, [but] is recognized as a potential source of infection and can cause serious illness in some people when they are exposed to it in large numbers and they inhale large numbers of those microorganisms.” (Note 164)
Dr. Cole also testified about the lack of informed consent at Dugway in recent months. For example, in November 1993, a test that was intended to evaluate whether chemical agents could penetrate protective clothing used informed consent forms that did not mention the chemicals. (Note 165)
If investigational drugs are deemed necessary for protection or treatment, a waiver of informed consent should be sought only on a case-by- case basis. While the military might order individuals to take an investigational drug or use an investigational device if it is clearly safe and potentially efficacious, under no circumstances should the DOD fail to inform individuals about the known short-term and long-term risks prior to its administration.
In 1990, DOD applied to FDA for a waiver of informed consent, claiming they would provide warnings orally and in writing regarding the risks of pyridostigmine, even though they would not give soldiers the choice of whether or not to take it. According to reports from various sources, including DOD’s own study, DOD did not fulfill its promise. In addition, DOD personnel apparently distributed these drugs to civilians without any warnings. These failures and broken promises should be sufficient to persuade FDA to reject the DOD request for a blanket waiver, and should be taken into consideration any time DOD applies for a waiver of informed consent. In addition, FDA should investigate these problems and work with DOD to prevent similar problems in the future.
In addition, third-party or “deferred” consent should not be considered unless the individual receiving the drug is physically or mentally incompetent to make an informed decision on his/her behalf. If the DOD fails to obtain the necessary waivers, or fails to adequately inform those receiving the investigational products, DOD should be required to provide a written explanation to the appropriate congressional committees.
When DOD submits an IND (investigational new drug) application or NDA (new drug application) to FDA for any product that they plan to use, they should always be required to include women in their research, since it is likely that the product will be used by women. On the basis of that requirement, FDA should reject the currently pending NDA for pyridostigmine’s use as an antidote enhancer, which was submitted to FDA in early 1994.
At a Senate briefing in November 1994, Dr. Ruth Merkatz, FDA’s Associate Commissioner for Women’s Health, stated that FDA will always require data on women in future drug approval applications, if the product under review is intended for use by women. However, Dr. Merkatz was not specific about whether this policy would apply to DOD.
In addition to data on women, it is increasingly clear that drugs can have long-term adverse reactions that are not immediately obvious. Given the responsibility of the Federal Government to provide medical care to veterans who were harmed during military service, DOD and FDA need to ensure that the VA and the public are aware of any potential long-term adverse reactions of any medical products that are given to military personnel.
In the case of pyridostigmine, a drug that DOD wants to have the authority to use in future conflicts in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, FDA should immediately urge DOD to conduct the kinds of research that is needed to prove its safety for future military use, including research on its potentially toxic effects when combined with insecticides and other chemical agents that are commonly used by military personnel.
Currently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture maintains a database which can identify the number of research grants awarded for studying various species, such as beef and dairy cattle, poultry, sheep, swine, and others. (Note 166) However, a database which identifies the types of human subjects does not exist.
Congress should authorize a database which would provide crucial information on federally funded research utilizing human subjects. Included in this database should be the amount of Federal dollars spent on various research efforts and the type of human subjects utilized, such as women, minorities, children, prisoners, military personnel, and others.
Annual reports from the data collected should be provided to Congress. Such information would enable legislators to understand better the use of human subjects in federally sponsored research.
Information involving human subjects in military research, which remains classified for purported reasons of national security, needs to be reevaluated and declassified whenever possible. All Federal agencies should scrutinize classified information and make information available which might benefit individuals who participated in such research.
A National Commission should standardize Federal regulations (45 CFR 46), and consider adding military personnel as a vulnerable population. Policies for the conduct of research in war or for the purposes of national security should receive greater public debate. No existing regulations governing military personnel should be finalized without such public dialogue.
Congress should provide authorization and appropriations for the National Commission, and require annual reports on potential violations of human subjects’ rights. The administrative body of the Commission should consist of nine members, three appointed by the majority party in Congress, three appointed by the minority party in Congress, and three appointed by the executive branch.
DOD and VA authorized site visits should include an evaluation of military and VA research onsite, and a random sample review of actual research and medical records, interviews with human subjects, and signed consent forms to assure investigator compliance. A mechanism should be in place whereby human subjects can express concern over perceived or actual violations of the informed consent contract. This mechanism should allow human subjects to register complaints to a regulatory agency and the National Commission, rather than solely the investigator of the research project. All military personnel and veterans involved in research should receive a copy of the “Experimental Subject’s Bill of Rights.” (Note 167)
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Feres Doctrine to mean that soldiers “injured in the course of activity incident to service” may not sue the Government for compensation. (Note 168) However, when inappropriate experimentation has resulted in suffering for military personnel, this interpretation stands in violation of established ethical standards, including the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the “Common Rule.” Congress should not apply the Feres Doctrine for military personnel who are harmed by inappropriate experimentation when informed consent has not been given.
The U.S. Supreme Court mentioned the Nuremberg Code in United States v. Stanley in 1987. James Stanley, an Army serviceman, volunteered to test the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare in February 1958. (Note 169) In the process, he unknowingly received LSD as part of an Army study to determine the effects of the drug on humans. Although Stanley suffered from periods of incoherence and memory loss for years, he only learned in 1975 that he had participated in the LSD study when the Army solicited his cooperation in a followup study. Having been denied compensation for injury by the Army, Stanley filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, split 5 to 4. (Note 170) Justice Scalia wrote that permitting Stanley to sue the Army would disrupt the Army itself and “would call into question military discipline and decision-making.” However, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for herself as one of the dissenting judges, stated that the Feres doctrine bar
“surely cannot insulate defendants from liability for deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise healthy military personnel to medical experimentation without their consent, outside of any combat, combat training, or military exigency…” (Note 171)
Justice O’Connor also commented on the Nuremberg Code in her writing, stating that voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential, even for the U.S. military. It was, after all, the U.S. military who played an instrumental role in the criminal prosecution of the Nazi officials who experimented with human beings during World War II.
Survey of 150 Persian Gulf War Veterans Male respondents: 120 [80%] Female respondents: 30 [20%] Active duty servicemembers: 46 [31%] Retired: 4 [3%] Temporarily disabled retirement list: 2 [1%] Active reservists: 46 [31%] Veteran: 15 [10%] Individual ready reserves: 10 [7%] National Guard: 27 [18%] Those ill since returning from Gulf: 136 [91%] Those who had ill family members: 60 [40%] Those who identified at least one investigational drug that they took: 75 [50%] ANTHRAX-- Number of respondents who received anthrax: 68 [45%] 1 vaccination: 31 [46% of those who received anthrax] 2 vaccinations: 31 [46%] 3 vaccinations: 2 [ 3%] Unknown number: 4 [ 6%] Of those receiving anthrax vaccinations, those who: received no oral or written information about the vaccine: 61 [90%] were told they could not refuse it: 58 [85%] described immediate side effects: 29 [43%] Of the women receiving anthrax vaccination, those who received no warning on risk if pregnant: 12/16 [75%] BOTULINUM TOXOID-- Number of respondents who received botulinum toxoid: 17 1 vaccination: 10 [59% of those who received botulinum toxoid] 2 vaccinations: 3 [18%] Unknown number: 4 [24%] Of those receiving botulinum toxoid, those who: received no oral or written information about the vaccine: 13 [76%] were told they could not refuse it: 15 [88%] described immediate side effects: 6 [35%] Of the women receiving botulinum toxoid, those who received no warning on risk if pregnant: 4/4 [100%] PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE-- Number of respondents who took pyridostigmine bromide: 73 [49%] Of those taking pyridostigmine bromide, those who: received no oral or written information on side effects: 63 [86%] were told they could not refuse it: 54 [74%] described immediate side effects: 38 [52%] did not comply and take drugs when they were supposed to: 14 [19%] Of the women receiving pyridostigmine bromide, those who received no warning on risk if pregnant: 14/18 [78%] OTHER SURVEY INFORMATION-- Number of respondents who received a vaccination but did not know what it was: 25 [17%] Number of respondents who received a drug but did not know what it was: 28 [19%] Number of respondents who have not received any information following the Persian Gulf War concerning investigational drugs from either VA or DOD: 128 [85%] Concerning medical records: Medical record is incomplete/inaccurate: 48 [32%] Medical record [part or all] is missing/lost: 28 [19%] 25 MOST COMMON SYMPTOMS REPORTED [number of respondents reporting] Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Skin problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 rashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Memory loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 blackouts, forgets where they are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Joint pain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Headaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Personality changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Diarrhea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Muscle pain, weakness, spasms, tremors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Pain [back, shoulder, neck, etc] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Trouble with vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Shortness of breath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Sleep disturbances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Hair loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Numbness [hands, fingers, feet] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Dental problems/bleeding gums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Reproductive problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Bleeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Sores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Chest problems [pain] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Abdominal/stomach pain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Fever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Nausea/vomiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Dizziness/staggering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Sinus, nasal discharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Sensitivity to light, smell, noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Children born with birth defects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Partners with reproductive problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
“Manwhile the whole machinery of the State, in all the different countries, is turned on to making defenceless children believe absurd propositions the effect of which is to make them willing to die in defence of sinister interests under the impression that they are fighting for truth and right. This is only one of countless ways in which education is designed, not to give true knowledge, but to make the people pliable to the will of their masters. Without an elaborate system of deceit in the elementary schools it would be impossible to preserve the camouflage of democracy.
… It must not be supposed that the officials in charge of education desire the young to become educated. On the contrary, their problem is to impart information without imparting intelli- gence. Education should have two objects : first, to give definite knowledge — reading and writing, languages and mathematics, and so on ; secondly, to create those mental habits which will enable people to acquire knowledge and form sound judgments for themselves. The first of these we may call information, the second intelligence. The utility of information is admitted practically as well as theoretically ; without a literate population a modern State is impossible. But the utility of intelligence is admitted only theoretically, not practically ; it is not desired that ordinary people should think for themselves, because it is felt that people who think for themselves are awkward to manage and cause administrative difficulties. Only the guardians, in Plato‘s language, are to think ; the rest are to obey, or to follow leaders like a herd of sheep. This doctrine, often unconsciously, has survived the introduction of political democracy, and has radically vitiated all national systems of education.
“The aim of totalitarian education has never been to instill convictions but to destroy the capacity to form any.” ~Hannah Arendt
“Thoughts are free and are subject to no rule” — Paracelsus
As we frantically race into the third millennium, with microprocessors becoming faster, cheaper, and smaller, with surveillance cameras proliferating in public spaces, with the human genome program about to issue its first “working draft” of the human DNA sequence, and with an out- of-control Frankensteinian machine named the War on Drugs, all a whirl in the ocean of modern day culture, it is imperative that we, as a society, expressly acknowledge the fundamental human right to cognitive liberty and immediately begin to define its contours.
Encroachments on cognitive liberty can take various forms. New technologies such as biogenetic modification, human-computer interfacing, brain-scanning, nanotechnology, neural-networking, so- called “neuro-therapy,” and new pharmaceuticals, raise exciting possibilities for human “evolution.” But, if not developed and used responsibly, they and the legislation they spawn, could also pose new threats to cognitive freedom.2 The trend of technology is to overcome the limitations of the human body. And, the Web has been characterized as a virtual collective consciousness and unconsciousness. What are the implications for mental autonomy when wearable computers become wet-wired to our own minds and memory is augmented by a high-speed wireless connection to the Web? Similarly, advances in biotechnology and drug-design increasingly raise legal and ethical questions related to cognitive liberty, including what rights people will have to access these and other technologies, and what rights we will have to avoid them.
Part of elucidating a theory of cognitive liberty is simply recognizing when free cognition is being infringed. Restrictions on physical liberty, for all their pain and terror, at least have the benefit of being relatively easy to recognize and call attention to. During World War II, the Nazi concentration camps for Jews, and the American internment camps for Japanese Americans, were marked by the machinery of physical control: fences, barbed wire, and guard towers. Similarly, from 1961 to 1989, a concrete and barbwire wall overseen by 116 guard towers divided the city of Berlin. Anyone who tried to cross that wall without a “special authorization” risked a bullet in the back of his or her skull. In contrast to the usual visibility of government restraints on physical liberty, restraints on cognitive liberty are most often difficult to recognize, if not invisible.
Consciousness is so complex and multifaceted that it may never be understood. Unfortunately, the inability to understand consciousness does not equate to an inability for others to control it. How then can we recognize nefarious attempts to control consciousness? In one respect, absolute control of one’s own consciousness is an impossibility. While each of us carries our own brain in our own skull, the process of consciousness itself is interactive. All our senses continuously feed data into our brains, producing a dance of cognition that perpetually swirls the exterior world with the interior world creating a seamless, edgeless, apperceptive feedback loop. Our minds are continually changing, continually interfacing with “the other.” Cognitive liberty clearly cannot mean cognitive isolation.
Mind control, like most everything else, comes in degrees. A discussion with a friend may make you change your opinion on a topic, it may even change your life, but does that amount to “mind control?” Was your cognitive liberty violated? Over $US200 billion dollars is spent each year by companies unabashedly striving to manipulate our desires, to literally make us want their product. If you see an advertisement (or many) for a product and that advertisement, replete with imagery of the good life, causes you to purchase the product, have you been the victim of mind control? Has your cognitive liberty been violated?
What if the advertisement is embedded with auditory or visual subliminal messages? What if the advertisement is embedded in prime-time television programs, passing as program content, rather than demarked as a “commercial?” 3 Or, suppose you are a 12-year-old placed on Prozac®, or Ritalin® largely because your schoolteacher has “diagnosed” you as depressed or suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder. Has your cognitive liberty been violated?
The answers to the above questions depend upon how finely one calibrates cognitive liberty. But some scenarios, some infringements on mental autonomy, are crystal clear and ought to present limit cases where general policies and specific rules emerge in high-definition clarity. Yet, even in so-called limit cases, the US government, including its legal system, has often acted inconsistently.
In 1969, Justice Marshall wrote, without mincing words, “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.” 4 Yet, contrary to Justice Marshall’s strong pronouncement, the US government has not consistently respected or protected cognitive liberty. Indeed, some of the government’s offenses seem to come directly from the pages of a dystopian novel like George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.5
Imagine, for example, if the government passed a law mandating that all citizens receive monthly injections of time-release sedatives, justifying the law on the “public health” grounds that sedated people are more productive at routine repetitive tasks, are less violent, and are less of a drain on public resources. What if those who did not voluntarily report at the time and place appointed for their injection were rounded up by the police, and forcefully lobotomized? Would anyone doubt that such a law infringed not just on one’s physical freedom but also on one’s cognitive freedom? It’s not exactly an unthinkable scenario. From the 1920s through 1970, pursuant to the laws of at least 32 states, more than 60,000 people were deemed “eugenically unfit.” Many of these people were involuntarily sterilized, in part because of low scores on intelligence tests.6 When one of these laws was challenged, and the case reached the United States Supreme Court, it was upheld—with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes smugly proclaiming, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”7
Until 1973, “homosexuality” was listed as a psychiatric disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). People who admitted being homosexual, or who were “accused” of being gay or lesbian, were subject to involuntary confinement under mental health laws, and subjected to “reparative therapy” or “conversion therapy” designed to convert them into heterosexuals. “Treatment,” in addition to counseling, included penile plesthysmograph (electronic shock triggered by penile erection), drugging, and hypnosis. Even though homosexuality was deleted from the DSM in 1973, it was not until December 1998 that the American Psychiatric Association finally disapproved of “reparative” or “conversion” therapy.8
In the 1950s, 60s, and early 70s, the US government illegally and unethically drugged unwitting US citizens with psychoactive substances, including LSD, as part of projects bluebird, artichoke, and mk-ultra, all in an attempt to develop techniques of mind control. Richard Helms, the chief planner of mk-ultra, wrote in a planning memorandum that the program was designed in part to:
Investigate the development of chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted for each individual. This material could potentially aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implanting suggestions and other forms of mental control.9
Alan Turing, one of the founding fathers of artificial intelligence theory, was arrested for violation of British homosexuality
statutes in 1952 after he admitted having a homosexual affair. Believing that his sexual orientation was a personal matter, neither a sin nor a crime, he presented no defense at his trial, which occurred on 31 March 1952. In lieu of prison, he was ordered to submit to estrogen injections for a year. Following a period of depression, likely the result of the injections, he committed suicide on June 7, 1954.
While the mk-ultra program began with tests in the laboratory on willing volunteers, the CIA quickly saw the need to expand the testing to determine what the effects of drugs such as LSD would be on unsuspecting people. Thus, in 1953, the CIA moved its mind control program into the streets of America and began the “covert testing of materials on unwitting US citizens.”10
In subsequent instalments of this essay, we will see how the US Government continues to promulgate certain policies that, while cloaked in “public health” or “public safety” justifications, amount to an impermissible government action aimed at policing thought and interfering with the mental processes of citizens.
The right to control one’s own consciousness is the quintessence of freedom. If freedom is to mean anything, it must mean that each person has an inviolable right to think for him or herself. It must mean, at a minimum, that each person is free to direct one’s own consciousness; one’s own underlying mental processes, and one’s beliefs, opinions, and worldview. This is self-evident and axiomatic.
In assessing what rights are fundamental and thus entitled to the most stringent legal protection, the US Supreme Court has stated that, fundamental liberties are those “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.”11 Under another test, fundamental liberties were characterized by the Court as those liberties that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”12
Slightly over seventy years ago, Justice Brandies acknowledged in a landmark privacy case that cognitive freedom was one of the principal protections designed into the Constitution:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.13
For more details on the government’s bluebird, artcichoke, and mkultra programs (at least those details not lost forever when Richard Helms, ordered the destruction of all records related to the projects in January 1973) see A. Scheflin & E. Opton, Tampering With The Mind (l) & (ll), in The Mind Manipulators, supra, (1978), 106‐212.
But, while certain justices have, at times, pointedly acknowledged the fundamental nature of cognitive freedom and the nefarious nature of government (or other “outside”) interference with the intellect, this important freedom remains only obliquely defined within the US legal system. Ironically, the lack of a comprehensive treatment may be because cognitive freedom is so self- evidently a basic human right. Whatever the reason, without a coherent cognitive liberty jurisprudence, present and future infringements on cognitive liberty risk passing unnoticed or unremedied. In the next instalment of this essay, we will begin to dig deep into privacy, due process, and First Amendment cases, in an attempt to excavate a theoretical scaffolding for cognitive liberty. As I believe the cases will show, cognitive liberty is the invisible landscape from which springs some of our most cherished and protected freedoms.
…without freedom of thought there can be no free society — U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter14
As you read this sentence you are receiving information. Words are carriers of thoughts, whether spoken from mouth to ear, digitized and passed electronically, or downloaded into ink and passed on paper across time and space. Because words are vehicles for thoughts, words can change your opinion, give you new ideas, reform your worldview, or foment a revolution.
Attempts to control the written word date from at least AD 325 when the Council of Nicaea ruled that Christ was 100 percent divine and forbade the dissemination of contrary beliefs. Since the invention of the printing press in 1452, governments have struggled to control the printed word. Presses were initially licensed and registered. Only certain people were permitted to own or control a printing press and only certain things could be printed or copied. (This was the origin of today’s copyright rules.) Works printed without prior authorization were gathered up and destroyed, the authors and printers imprisoned.
Scholars disagree as to the exact date, but sometime around 1560, Pope Paul IV published the Index Librorum Prohibitorum a list of forbidden books (i.e., controlled substances) enforced by the Roman government. When the Index was (finally) abandoned in 1966, it listed over 4,000 forbidden books, including works by such people as Galileo, Kant, Pascal, Spinoza and John Locke.15 The history of censorship has been extensively recorded by others. My point is simply the obvious one that efforts to prohibit heterodox texts and to make criminals out of those who “manufactured” such texts, were not so much interested in controlling ink patterns on paper, as in controlling the ideas encoded in printed words.
I submit that in the same way, the so-called “war on drugs” is not a war on pills, powder, plants, and potions, it is war on mental states — a war on consciousness itself — how much, what sort we are permitted to experience, and who gets to control it. More than an unintentional misnomer, the government-termed “war on drugs” is a strategic decoy label; a slight-of-hand move by the government to redirect attention away from what lies at ground zero of the war — each individual’s fundamental right to control his or her own consciousness.
In George Orwell’s dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Oceania government diligently worked to establish “Newspeak” a carefully crafted language designed by the government for the purpose of making unapproved “modes of thought impossible.”16 Prior to Newspeak, the people of Oceania communicated with “Oldspeak,” an autonomous natural language capable of expressing nuanced emotions and multiple points of view. By controlling language through the imposition of Newspeak — by “eliminating undesirable words” — the government of Oceania was able to control and, in some cases, completely extinguish certain thoughts. As a character in Nineteen Eighty-Four explained to Winston Smith “Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought?…Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller.”17 Those people raised with Newspeak, having never known the wider-range of Oldspeak, might fail to notice, indeed, might be unable to even perceive, that the Government was limiting consciousness.
In 1970, just four years after the Catholic Church finally abandoned the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, the United States government produced its own index of forbidden thought catalysts: the federal schedule of controlled substances. Included on the initial list of Schedule I substances were seventeen substances denoted as “hallucinogens,” and declared to have “a high potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use” in the USA, and “a lack of accepted safety” even under medical supervision. Among the list of outlawed “hallucinogens” were psilocybin and psilocin, the active principles of psilocybe mushrooms; dimethyltryptamine (DMT), the active principle in ayahuasca and many visionary snuffs; ibogaine, mescaline, peyote, and LSD.18 The experience elicited by these substances in their chemical or natural plant forms is the par excellence of “Oldspeak”—a cognitive modality dating from pre-history.
Archeological evidence suggests that humans have communed with visionary plants and potions for thousands of years. Peyote, for example, has been used for over 10,000 years. Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) was created by Dr. Albert Hofmann, a chemist employed by Sandoz Laboratories in Basel, Switzerland. In 1938, Dr. Hofmann synthesized LSD from a fungus commonly found in rye seeds. Its affect on consciousness remained undiscovered until April 16, 1943, when Dr. Hofmann accidentally ingested a minute amount of the substance and experienced a strange inebriation in which “the external world became changed as in a dream.” Several years later, Hofmann discovered that the chemical structure of LSD is nearly identical to that of the sacred entheogen ololiuhqui, prepared from morning glory seeds and used ritually by the Aztecs for thousands of years.
Mushrooms, of the genus psilocybe, were used to produce visionary states at least as early as 4000
B.C. The psilocybe mushroom was used in religious ceremonies long before the Aztec civilization. It was named teonanácatl, meaning “sacred mushroom.” In 1957, working with mushrooms obtained by R. Gordon Wasson from the now famous curandera Maria Sabina, Dr. Hofmann isolated and later synthesized two active substances derived from the psilocybe mushroom. He named these substances psilocybin and psilocin. In 1962, Dr. Hofmann traveled to Mexico and met with Maria Sabina. During a night ceremony, she ingested 30 milligrams of the synthetic psilocybin and later said the effect was indistinguishable from that elicited with the sacred mushrooms themselves.
Another substance placed on the government’s 1970 list of criminalized “hallucinogens” was N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT). This substance was first synthesized in 1931, but its entheogenic properties were not discovered until 1956. It was subsequently learned that DMT is the principal active ingredient in numerous snuffs and brews long-used by various South American Indians during religious ceremonies. The DMT containing plant psychotria viridis is a well-known admixture to the entheogenic brew known as ayahuasca or yajé, which archeological evidence suggests dates back as many as five thousand years.19
Some who ingest visionary plants believe that the plants talk to them and open up channels of communication with animals and other entities. Mazatec eaters of psilocybe mushrooms, for example, are adamant that the mushrooms speak to them:
The Mazatecs say that the mushrooms speak. If you ask a shaman where his imagery comes from, he is likely to reply: “I didn’t say it, the mushrooms did.” …he who eats these mushrooms, if he is a man of language, becomes endowed with an inspired capacity to speak…The spontaneity they liberate is not only perceptual, but linguistic, the spontaneity of speech, of fervent, lucid discourse, of the logos in activity. For the shaman it is as if existence were uttering itself through him…words are materializations of consciousness; language is a privileged vehicle of our relation to reality.20
Just as Newspeak was intended to make certain Old(speak) thoughts literally unthinkable, so the War on Entheogens makes certain sorts of cognition and awareness all but inaccessible.
Philosopher and ethnobotanist Terence McKenna suggested that early man’s ingestion of visionary plants may have been the very catalyst that led to the sudden expansion of human brain size between three and six million years ago, and the event which spawned the subsequent emergence of language itself. (See Terence McKenna, Food of the Gods (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 25.)
Religious scholar Peter Lamborn Wilson has aptly framed the War on Entheogens as a battle over the nature of thought itself:
The War on Drugs is a war on cognition itself, about thought itself as the human condition. Is thought this dualist Cartesian reason? Or is cognition this mysterious, complex, organic, magical thing with little mushroom elves dancing around. Which is it to be?21
In Orwell’s vision of 1984, Newspeak’s power to control and limit thought depended, in part, upon the passing of time and the birth of new generations that never knew Oldspeak. As explained by Orwell in the Appendix to Nineteen Eighty-Four, “It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought—that is a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc—should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words.”22
Just as Newspeak depended in part upon time eradicating knowledge of Oldspeak, today’s War on Entheogens is sustainable, in part, because the current generation of young adults (those 21 – 30 years old) have never known a time when most entheogens were not illicit. Those who have never experienced the mental states that are now prohibited do not realize what the laws are denying them. It is as if nothing is being taken away, at least nothing noticeable, nothing that is missed. As pointed out by the authors of a law review article on how mandatory schooling raises issues of mass-consciousness control: “[t]he more the government regulates formation of beliefs so as to interfere with personal consciousness,…the fewer people can conceive dissenting ideas or perceive contradictions between self-interest and government sustained ideological orthodoxy.”23
Because of the personal experiential nature of entheogen-elicited cognition, only those who have been initiated into the modern day Mysteries — those who have tasted the forbidden fruit from the visionary plants of knowledge and have not fallen victim to the stigmatizing psycho-impact of “being a drug user” — are acutely aware of the gravity of what is being prohibited: powerful modalities for thinking, perceiving, and experiencing.
The very best argument for the potential value of entheogen-elicited mind states is in the entheogenic experience itself; an experience that has, in almost every case, been outlawed. That is the dilemma of entheogen policy reformation. The advocate for entheogenic consciousness is left in an even worse position than the proverbial sighted man who must describe colors to a blind person. With regard to entheogen policy, the position is worse because the “blind” are in power and have declared it a crime to see colors.
Left with the impossible task of saying the unsayable, of describing the indescribable, those who have tasted the forbidden fruit must plead their case on the fundamental philosophical and
political level of what it means to be truly free. They must state their appeal on the ground that, with respect to the inner-workings of each person’s mind, the values of tolerance and respect are far weightier and far more conducive to the basic principles of democracy, than is the chillingly named “zero-tolerance” policy that is currently in vogue. This brings us, once again, to cognitive liberty as an essential substrate of freedom.
Benjamin Cardozo, one of the most respected and influential American legal scholars of the last century and a former Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, affirmed cognitive liberty as central to most every other freedom:
…freedom of thought…one may say…is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and legal.24
Cognitive liberty jurisprudence must begin, then, with an effort to distil the legal principles that support some of our most cherished and well-established freedoms, and then, over time, crystallize these principles into the foundation for a coherent legal scheme governing issues related to an individual’s right to control his or her own consciousness.
Given the importance of the First Amendment to U.S. and even international law, we will begin by examining how courts have construed the First Amendment—searching for evidence that the right of each person to autonomy over his or her own mind and thought processes is central to First Amendment jurisprudence.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. (The First Amendment.)25
The First Amendment’s guarantees were designed to bar the government from controlling or prohibiting the dissemination of unpopular or dissenting ideas. Central to all five guarantees is the acknowledgement that people must be treated by the government as ends not means; each person free to develop his or her mind and own belief system, and encouraged to express his or her thoughts in the so-called “marketplace of ideas.”26
Supreme Court Justice Holmes wrote in Abrams v. United States (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 630 “[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas … the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
Frankfurter emphasized in 1949, the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment guards against “thought becom[ing] checked and atrophied.”27
Free speech, free exercise, free association, a free press and the right to assemble, are all moot if the thought that underlies these actions has already been constrained by the government. If the government is permitted to prohibit the experiencing of certain thought processes, or otherwise manipulate consciousness at its very roots—via drug prohibitions, religious indoctrination, monopolizing media, or any number of methods—it need not even worry about controlling the expression of such thoughts. By prohibiting the very formation of mind states—by strangling the free mind itself—free expression is made meaningless.
Thus, in order to prevent the erosion of the First Amendment’s protection of expression, the Amendment must also provide at least as strong a protection for the underlying consciousness that forms the ideas that are later expressed. Indeed, the First Amendment was infused with the principle that each individual—not the government—ought to have control over his or her own mind, to think what he or she wants to think, and to freely form and express opinions and beliefs based on all the information at his or her disposal. The First Amendment, in other words, embraces cognitive liberty not simply as the desired outcome of the articulated guarantees (i.e., a right to express one’s ideas), but also as a necessary precondition to those guaranteed freedoms (i.e., a right to form one’s own ideas).
In (the apropos year of) 1984, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal issued an opinion in a case involving a man who was involuntarily drugged with the “antipsychotic drug” thorazine while he was being held for trial on murder charges.28 The threshold issue was whether pre-trial detainees have a fundamental right to refuse treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. To answer this question, the Tenth Circuit analogized to a 1982 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that “’[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due
competition of the market”) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Using a “marketplace” analogy for the interaction and acceptance or rejection of ideas is problematic:
“Using market mechanisms to determine the logic or merit of ideas reduces ideas to commodities. When this happens the circulation of ideas is determined by their sales profiles. The ‘consumer’ is described as voting for the products of the Consciousness Industry [a term coined by Hans Magnus Enzensberger in his 1974 collection of essays of the same name] with his or her dollars (consumer sovereignty). Such metaphors suggest democracy and freedom of choice. They deflect attention away from the tightly controlled decision‐making process that actually determine what ideas will gain entry into the commodity system. That is, they render the control system of the capitalistic consciousness industry invisible and thereby permit subterranean censorship based upon both market and political considerations. In sum, they permit elites to rule but preserve the semiotics of democracy.” (Sue Curry Jansen, Censorship: The Knot that Binds Power and Knowledge (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 134.)
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.’”29 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that if freedom from bodily restraints is a fundamental right, then individuals must also have a liberty interest in freedom from “mental restraint of the kind potentially imposed by antipsychotic drugs.”30
Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that freedom from government imposed mental restraints was just as fundamental as freedom from government imposed physical restraints – both were protected by the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found that the First Amendment was also implicated when the government attempts to involuntarily psycho- medicate a person awaiting trial. In unequivocal language, the Tenth Circuit explained “[t]he First Amendment protects communication of ideas, which itself implies protection of the capacity to produce ideas.”31
As professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School has cautioned:
In a society whose ‘whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s own minds,’ the governing institutions, and especially the courts, must not only reject direct attempts to exercise forbidden domination over mental processes; they must strictly examine as well oblique intrusions likely to produce or designed to produce, the same result.32
Prohibiting an otherwise law-abiding person from using entheogens is more than merely an “oblique intrusion” on the right to control one’s own mental processes, or a slight trespass on the “protected capacity to produce ideas” — it is a direct frontal attack. Under the recently released National Drug Control Strategy 2000, the federal government will spend just shy of $20 billion ($20,000,000,000) on an all out attempt to keep people from evoking alternative states of consciousness by the use of controlled substances.33
As I will show in the next instalment of this essay, the government’s War on Unapproved Mental States, besides violating core principles of the First Amendment, also violates the very essence of the right to privacy.
For a comprehensive survey of forced mental treatment cases, see Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, University of Miami Law Review (September 1989), 44(1) 1‐103.
In the last decade, new computer-based methods for storing, searching, and sharing data about individuals have proliferated. With the popularization and commercialization of the Internet, the tracking of individuals and their databodies has become big business, one in which governments increasingly participate. In a similar vein, optical devices have become smaller and cheaper, leading to an expansion of government and corporate surveillance cameras, which continuously monitor an ever-increasing number of private and public spaces. These technologically-facilitated developments have revitalized the ongoing debate about privacy. At issue is what form privacy will take—both as a principle, as well as a legal protection—in the so-called Information Age.
While it is commonly thought of as a fundamental right, privacy is not expressly protected by the
U.S. Constitution. In the United States, the law of privacy has developed in a hodgepodge manner, largely by Supreme Court decisions in which the Court was presented with a specific factual scenario and determined whether or not a privacy right existed in that specific instance. This development pattern has led some legal scholars to declare that rather than an overarching “right to privacy,” citizens of the United States enjoy only particularized “rights” to privacy– those that the U.S. Supreme Court has established in various cases, or that the U.S. Congress has enacted as specific statutory protections.
The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has found a fundamental right to privacy in the following basic areas: (1) reproduction, (2) marriage, (3) activities inside the home, (4) the right to refuse medical treatment, and (5) raising children. Similarly, Congress has passed federal laws or regulations that grant (to a greater or lesser degree) privacy protection in a host of areas, including the contents of first-class mail, information concerning which videotapes you rent, and information about your bank records.
Although these protections were created by particular court decisions or by specific statutory enactments, they share an underlying reasoning and common principles, revealing that a general concept of privacy does indeed exist.
The legal concept of privacy has developed in fits and starts, often in union with technological developments. Up until the late 1800s, “privacy” was by-and-large limited to providing a remedy when someone physically interfered with your (private) property or with your physical body. A hundred years ago, the right to privacy was not much more than a right to be free from physical battery and a right to repel invaders from your land. A major development occurred in 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandies penned an influential law review article titled “The Right to Privacy.”34 Warren and Brandies wrote at the time when portable cameras and audio recording devices were—for the first time—available to common people, and newspaper reporters aggressively embraced these new devices. It was the genesis of the paparazzi.
In their article, Warren and Brandies articulated a legal principle, based on general concepts of privacy, which would provide people with protection against reporters’ efforts to publicize personal information. As Warren and Brandies wrote:
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises have invaded the sacred precinct or private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the [biblical] prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.”35
With their focus on the events of their time, Warren and Brandies sketched out a theory of privacy that was an extension of the common law protection of (private) property—a new theory designed to encompass and protect the public disclosure by reporters of private or personal information. This broader right they succinctly termed “the right to be let alone.”
Over 100 years later, this basic phrase remains the touchstone of what is commonly meant by the “right to privacy.”
Just as Warren and Brandies called for a revisioning of “privacy” in the then-new age of portable cameras and audio recorders, as we enter into the third millennium, with ongoing developments in drug creation, nano-technology, genetic engineering, and mind-machine interfacing, it is again time to explore the meaning of privacy and the scope of what is to receive legal protection as “private” in this (post)modern age. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 1910:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.36
Thus, while the current privacy debate has centered on new computer surveillance technology with the power to capture and control more and more data about each of us, it is time for the privacy debate to acknowledge, and make explicit, that a person’s mind and mental processes must be protected as private. “[T]he concept of privacy embodies the ‘moral fact that a person
belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.’”37 Certainly, a person’s thoughts and thought processes belong to himself or herself, and not to society, the government, or any other meddlesome external force.
Inasmuch as a right to privacy entails the right to be let alone, and centers on the interior and intimate aspects of a person’s life, cognitive freedom and autonomy should become a central touchstone for how we conceive of, and apply, a modern right to privacy. The areas in which the Supreme Court or Congress has expressly declared a right to privacy all center on interior spaces as opposed to exterior spaces, and serve to strengthen and protect the autonomy of the personal, or individual self. There is nothing more interior, and nothing more important and central to individual autonomy than one’s consciousness. Indeed, without independent consciousness, no sense of self is even possible.
Despite its self-evident importance to us today, the idea that a person is entitled to privacy over his or her own thoughts and thought processes is actually a fairly recent concept. For most of history, the inner workings of the mind have been perceived as a threat to the Church-State.
Broad expanses of the U.S. legal system are premised on an Aristotelian-Thomistic world view. Both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas viewed God as a “Supreme Being” who exists outside of and above humankind. In contrast to God, evil was located within the individual. The concept of privacy that developed under the Aristotelian-Thomistic belief system was one inherently skeptical of the human interior and sought to essentially force into private—to shield behind closed doors—such things as death, birth, and personal hygienic matters. Under the Aristolian- Thomistic tradition, the privacy protections that did exist were limited to those that would benefit the community and ultimately promote the pleasure of God. Privacy, then, to the extent that it exists under a Aristotelian-Thomistic paradigm is there to serve and promote the “general will” rather than to advance individual autonomy and self-actualization.
A Platonic or Buddhist belief system is just one among a host of other ways to view the world. In these systems of thought (and many other “religions,” and/or “philosophies”), god(s) exists both inside and outside of each person. Thus, a person’s interior thoughts and thought processes are not feared, but are instead cultivated, revered, and protected.
Today, however, the U.S. prides itself on being a secular, pluralist country, free from the shackles of a dominating Church power. As such, it is no longer appropriate to limit the concept of privacy to centuries-old models; indeed, just as Brandies and Warren did over a century ago, it is imperative that we continue to update our concept of privacy to fit current circumstances.
A modern conception of privacy must shed the long-standing allegiance to a single way of conceiving of Reality, and recognize that privacy is rooted in furthering human dignity and autonomy, and in protecting each person’s right to conceive of the world in his or her own way. Describing the contours of a modern right to privacy, Robert Ellis Smith, attorney and publisher
of the Privacy Journal, aptly included “a sense of autonomy, a right to develop a unique personality and living space, and a right to distinguish one’s own persona from everyone else’s.”38
As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court has a spotty record with regard to upholding individual privacy. The Court has found a narrow range of situations in which a protected privacy right exists, and a host of situations in which it does not. In 1928, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that the police could tap a person’s telephone so long as they did not enter the person’s home in order to place the tap.39 Not until 1967 did the Court rule that the content of telephone conversations was protected as private regardless of whether the line was tapped from inside or outside of the home.40 In 1984, the Supreme Court held that people have no legitimate privacy right with respect to garbage cans that they have placed on the curb for pickup. Such garbage, held the Court, may be examined by a police officer without any need to obtain a warrant.41 In 1989, the Court held that the police did not violate the privacy right of an individual when they flew over his home in a helicopter and peered through a hole in his roof in a search for marijuana plants.42 The latter two cases grew out of the War on (certain) Drugs, but their holdings extend far beyond drug cases, significantly reducing the right of privacy for all Americans.
In cases raising issues that directly concern the privacy of a person’s body in the face of government intrusion, the decisional trend has been more in favor of individual autonomy. For example, in 1965 the Supreme Court held that the decision of whether to use birth control was a private issue for married couples (a ruling later extended to unmarried couples).43 That case involved a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of “any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception.” Such a law, held the Court, infringed upon a constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” reserved to individuals–the right to make their own decisions about reproduction. The Court struck down the Connecticut law based on what it called “the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’”44
In Roe v. Wade, the court held that the “zone of privacy” encompasses and protects a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.45
The principles underlying the Supreme Court’s privacy rulings, especially those invoked in cases concerning an individual’s right to make decisions about the interior of his or her body, support
the proposition that personal decisions about how to manage one’s interior thought processes and consciousness fall within a protected zone of privacy reserved for individuals, and protected against governmental invasion or usurpation. Just as the Connecticut law that banned all use of contraceptives was struck down as “unnecessarily broad,” today’s drug prohibition laws, which outlaw all use of certain plants and psychoactive chemicals, trespass upon the zone of privacy that protects an adult’s right to make decisions about how to manage his or her own consciousness.
Society recognizes cognitive privacy as reasonable. What goes on exclusively inside a person’s mind has traditionally been a private affair. The specter of Orwell’s “mind police” is universally chilling, as is the idea of a government employing mind control or thought-manipulation techniques on its citizenry. It is, indeed, a conservative position to state that if freedom is to mean anything, it must mean that what goes on inside a person’s skull is a private matter and something which that person—not the government—has the right to control.
Just about the only time this cognitive privacy principle is questioned is when it is applied to “drugs.” For example, in 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot be made a crime.”46 In this case, Mr. Stanley was found in possession (in his own home) of some pornographic films. He was prosecuted under a Georgia law that made possession of “obscene matter” a crime. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Georgia law, finding that the law violated the First Amendment. The Court distinguished laws that regulate the public distribution of “obscene material” from the Georgia law, which unlawfully targeted mere private possession of such matter. Hidden away in a footnote, however, the Court remarked that the same reasoning did not apply to drugs:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute’s infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal.47
This was non-binding dictum (commentary that is superfluous to the actual holding in the case). The Supreme Court has never been squarely presented with the argument that cognitive liberty is a fundamental right, or that outlawing mere possession or use of psychoactive drugs infringes on that fundamental right.
Aside from the comment in the footnote, the reasoning that pervades the Court’s opinion in Stanley supports the fundamental principle that what goes on inside a person’s head, the processing and information therein, is entitled to privacy. The Court emphasized that the Constitution “protects the right to receive information and ideas,” and that this right holds
irrespective of an idea’s “social worth.”48 The Court also accepted Mr. Stanley’s argument that he had a constitutional right to control his own intellect—to determine for himself what to read or watch in the privacy of his own home:
[Mr. Stanley] is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library. Georgia contends that appellant does not have these rights, that there are certain types of materials that the individual may not read or even possess. Georgia justifies this assertion by arguing that the films in the present case are obscene. But we think that mere categorization of these films as “obscene” is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own home, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.49
When Georgia countered that its law was necessary to protect people from the detrimental effects of obscenity, the U.S. Supreme Court recoiled, noting that Georgia’s argument was an inappropriate attempt “to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts… an action wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment.”50 The government, explained the Court, “cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”51
In the end, the Court in Stanley concluded that the government may regulate obscenity, but “that power simply does not extend to mere possession by an individual in the privacy of his own home.”52
The same principles ought to apply with regard to psychoactive drugs that are used by adults in the privacy of their own homes. If, as Justice Marshall wrote in Stanley, “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds,” the State has no business telling a man or woman sitting in his or her own home, what states of consciousness are acceptable and what states of consciousness are not.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has never considered a case in which the issue was framed as “cognitive privacy,” several state courts have examined the issue of whether drug use falls within
a protected privacy right.53 In all but one case, these state courts have stacked the deck against cognitive privacy, by narrowly framing the issue as whether or not there is a fundamental right to use drug x, rather than whether or not there is a fundamental right to control one’s own consciousness—a fundamental right upon which drug prohibition laws substantially infringe.
One interesting case was decided in 1975 by the Alaska Supreme Court. In Ravin v. State,54 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the possession and use of marijuana within one’s own home was included within the scope of the privacy protection guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution. The case centered on Irwin Ravin, a man arrested and charged with possession of marijuana. Mr. Ravin filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Alaska’s laws prohibiting marijuana use unconstitutionally infringed upon his right to privacy as guaranteed by both the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions.
The Alaska court examined U.S. Supreme Court precedent and concluded that the opinions by the high court do not support a privacy right to possess marijuana, because “the federal right to privacy only arises in connection with other fundamental rights.” The Alaska court then went on to examine whether the privacy protection of the Alaska Constitution protects an adult’s possession of marijuana in his or her home.55 The court noted that in a previous case,56 it struck down a public school rule that prohibited long hair, finding that the school’s rule was prohibited by the Alaska Constitution’s privacy protection. In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court explained that “the right ‘to be let alone’—including the right to determine one’s own hairstyle in accordance with individual preferences and without interference of governmental officials and agents—is a fundamental right under the constitution of Alaska.”
The court then revealed an anti-marijuana bias, stating “few would believe they have been deprived of something of critical importance if deprived of marijuana, though they would if stripped of control over their personal appearance.” Here, the court was making an assumption without evidentiary support, and was also incorrectly framing the issue. Some people consider their marijuana use at least as important as their choice of hairstyle. Further, the court drew a
Some of these cases, as well as others not listed here, have compelling dissenting opinions in which judges elaborated certain aspects of cognitive liberty. For example, in State v. Kramer (Hawaii 1972) 493 P.2d 306, a case upholding the defendant’s conviction for marijuana possession, Justice Levinson filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the experiences generated by the use of marijuana are mental in nature, and thus among the most personal and private experiences possible. (Id. at p. 315.)
55 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Alaska constitution expressly provides for a right to privacy. Article I, Sec. 22 of the Alaska constitution states: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”
false comparison: comparing a broad principle: “to control one’s appearance;” with a narrower principle: “to smoke marijuana.” The correct analogy would have been to compare the two actions at the same level of generality; thus, the right to control one’s outward appearance ought to have been compared to the right to control one’s inner cognition.
Based on its faulty comparison, the Ravin court refused to find that marijuana smoking was within the Alaska constitution’s privacy protection. Instead, the court relied on the well- established privacy protections surrounding the home. The court explained, “if there is any area of human activity to which a right to privacy pertains more than any other, it is the home.”57 The right to privacy within the home, held the court, “encompass[es] the possession and ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely non-commercial context in the home, unless the state can [show that outlawing possession of marijuana in the home is necessary to achieve a legitimate state interest.]” More specifically, the court noted that the government had the “burden of showing a close and substantial relationship between the public welfare and control of ingestion or possession of marijuana in the home for personal use.”58
Having shifted the burden to the government, the court then examined whether the government had met its burden. At trial, the government claimed that the use of marijuana caused a host of health problems to the marijuana user, including damage to the immune system and chromosomal structure, extreme panic reactions, long-term psychological problems, loss of motivation, and occasional violent behavior.
Before addressing these assertions, the Alaska Supreme Court questioned whether the government has a legitimate interest in “protecting” a person from him or herself. While the court was able to conceive of some circumstances in which the government may have a legitimate interest in protecting a person from him or herself, such government paternalism was the exception rather than the rule:
…the authority of the state to exert control over the individual extends only to activities of the individual which affect others or the public at large as it relates to matters of public health or safety, or to provide for the general welfare. We believe this tenet to be basic to a free society. The state cannot impose its own notions of morality, propriety, or fashion on individuals when the public has no legitimate interest in the affairs of those individuals. The right of the individual to do as he pleases is not absolute, of course: it can be made to yield when it begins to infringe on the rights and welfare of others.59
Having stressed that the government should not be in the business of protecting people from themselves, the court nevertheless examined the government’s claims that marijuana was dangerous to its users, finding the evidence of serious harm unpersuasive. The court explained:
It appears that the effects of marijuana on the individual are not serious enough to justify widespread concern, at least as compared with the far more dangerous effects of alcohol, barbiturates and amphetamines.60
Ultimately, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded “no adequate justification for the state’s intrusion into the citizen’s right to privacy by its prohibition of possession of marijuana by an adult for personal consumption in the home has been shown.”61
While the Ravin case was a clear victory for marijuana users, and for privacy advocates in general, it was more about the privacy of the home, than about cognitive freedom and privacy.62 As mentioned earlier, the court did not consider whether cognitive liberty was protected by the United States Constitution or by the Alaska constitution. Instead, the decision simply underscored the longstanding and socially accepted principle that a “man’s home is his castle.” The case has yet to be forcefully made that our minds, as much as our homes, are a private inward domain entitled to protection against unwanted governmental intrusions and prohibitions.
As an important nineteenth or twentieth century work on political and social theory, John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty ([1859] 1975)63 is considered to be second only to the Communist Manifesto. Written in the midst of the growing political power of Christian temperance groups pushing for alcohol prohibition and speaking directly to the issue of the rights of individuals and the limits of authoritarian control, On Liberty is a seminal anti-prohibition text, which assumes ever greater importance and relevance when considered in the context of today’s $19 billion “war on drugs.” Drafted in the tumult of the first societal debates over alcohol prohibition, Mill’s essay examines “the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual” (3) and is one of the earliest political statements against drug prohibition as well as a vindication of cognitive liberty.
On Liberty was published in 1859 but was penned in 1855, only four years after the state of Maine enacted the first law in the United States prohibiting the sale of alcohol, an action that kicked off a wave of prohibition laws in the country. By 1855, thirteen states had passed alcohol prohibition laws, and the American Temperance Society had long since shifted from a call for “temperance” to a demand for wholesale prohibition. In England, where Mill wrote, the United Kingdom Alliance of Legislative Suppression of the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors sprang up in 1853, and it used the Maine law as a model in pushing for alcohol prohibition in England. Thus, it is not surprising that Mill’s consideration of the rights of individuals vis-à-vis society and the government, forged in the midst of such heated social controversy, would confront directly the important question of cognitive liberty.
“The object of this Essay,” wrote Mill, “is to assert one very simple principle…that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection… that is to prevent harm to others” (10–11).
Government interference, wrote Mill, is appropriate only when a person engages in conduct that threatens the interests of others. What happens inside a person’s body or mind is that person’s private business, not the business of society and certainly not the business of the government.
He expressed this point unambiguously: “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (11).
So long as a person’s decision and subsequent conduct did not threaten others with harm, Mill considered the person’s action to lie within a protected “region of human liberty” (13).
Encompassed within this domain of liberty is:
the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of thought and feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological…liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. (13)
For Mill, a society that refuses to recognize and respect this sphere of liberty is not a free society, and laws that invade this province are unjustifiable; freedom demands this protected domain. “The only freedom which deserves the name,” writes Mill, “is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (14).
Mill was quick to emphasize that these principles apply only to adults. Children, while they are still under the care of an adult, “must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury” (12), and it is therefore appropriate for society or the government to act paternalistically toward them. Mill also acknowledges and repeatedly underscores that when a person’s behavior does directly affect other people, it is, by its very nature, social conduct and thus becomes an appropriate object for social and government control. The roots of alcohol prohibition grew out of Protestant Christianity. In 1832, James Teare, founder of the Preston General Temperance Society in England, was speaking for many temperance advocates of the time when he took the floor at a temperance meeting in Manchester and declared all intoxicating liquor anathema to religious people: “the sooner it is put out of this world, the better”.64 Not surprisingly, therefore, woven throughout On Liberty are subtle and not so subtle jabs at both the timidity (“essentially a doctrine of passive obedience,” (48)) and the coerciveness of Christianity. Religion, says Mill, is an “engine of moral repression” (14), seeking “control over every department of human conduct” (14). In some of his harshest words, Mill admonishes:
Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of Good: in its precepts (as has been well said) “thou shalt not” predominates unduly over “thou shalt.” In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality.(47–48)
Mill’s most fundamental objection to the Christianity of the mid–nineteenth century was to its complete capitulation to authority, coupled with its all-encompassing dogmatism and a singular way of conceiving of the world; these latter traits, Mill believed, often led Christians to suppress eccentricity, individuality, original thought, and simple pleasures.
On Liberty champions responsible alcohol inebriation as a private pleasure, which the government has no authority to interfere with as long as the drinker is not harming another person. Provided that a person’s conduct does not affect the interests of other people, writes Mill, that person should have “perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences” (70).
Mill rejects challenges that assert that a person’s actions inherently have some effect on society or that an act that harms the individual also harms society. Mill responds to these challenges on two levels. First, he acknowledges that if a person’s “self-regarding” conduct disables him from performing some public duty or produces identifiable harm to another person, then that conduct properly cannot be considered “self-regarding,” and society may control or punish the person.
Using alcohol intoxication as an example, Mill explains: “No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty.
Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law” (76). To the extent that the “harm” to others from drinking alcohol is amorphous or that the drinker violates no specific duty, Mill views the ancillary “harm” from the drinker’s action as an “inconvenience…which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom” (76).
In essence, Mill views the temperance challenge as embodying a Puritanical perspective that considers innumerable self-regarding actions to be morally wrong and thus inherently injurious to the society. He rejects this position as religious moralizing cloaked in claims for social policy. As an example, he quotes the secretary of the United Kingdom Alliance for the Legislative Suppression of the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors, who wrote:
If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery I am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse. (83)
Mill calls the secretary’s definition of social rights a “monstrous principle” (83) that, if accepted, would vitiate the meaning of liberty entirely: “there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind
a vested interest in each other’s moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard” (84).
Although Mill is perfectly capable of presenting his argument in theoretical terms, he turns his attention to what he calls “gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practiced” (82) and without equivocation responds to efforts under way at that time to prohibit the drinking of alcohol:
Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English colony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever
of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it…an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. (82–83)
Mill acknowledges that selling alcohol is a social act because it inherently involves a buyer and a seller, but, as he notes, the underlying aim of the laws that prohibit sales of alcohol is to squelch the use of alcohol. “The infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller,” notes Mill, “but on that of the buyer and consumer; since the state might just as well forbid him to drink wine as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it” (83). Mill remarks that when a “trade law” has the effect of prohibiting a commodity, it is really a prohibition law in disguise.
Similarly, Mill is skeptical of so-called sin taxes, which artificially inflate the price of a product in order to discourage its use. Such a tax, he explains, “is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste” (93). A person’s “choice of pleasures,” writes Mill, ought to be each person’s “own concern, and must rest with his own judgment” (93). Ultimately, however, Mill would permit a special tax on products such as alcohol, but only to the extent that the tax increased revenue for the government. A “sin tax” would be inappropriate if set so high that it actually dissuaded a sufficient number of buyers so as to result in a decrease in total tax revenues from sales of the product.
With respect to items that can be abused, such as “poisons,” Mill notes that “there is hardly any part of the legitimate form of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency” (89). Thus, if a person desires to purchase a poison, it is inappropriate for the government to enjoin the purchase merely because the person might abuse the poison or use it to commit a crime. Instead, the laws should stop after requiring that drugs and poisons be labeled with cautionary statements. Mill does not believe that doctors should be the gatekeepers to drugs, noting that “to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses” (90). At most, any adults who wish to purchase such an item may be required to register their name, address, and an explanation of why they are purchasing a particular item.
Although Mill firmly believes it would be an illegitimate use of power for the government to prohibit inebriation based on a inchoate concern that an inebriated person might cause harm to others, he concedes that if an inebriated person does harm another person, then the government rightfully may prohibit that person from becoming inebriated in the future. “Drunkenness,” Mill explains, “in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty…The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others” (90).
On Liberty even considers whether the government properly may regulate pubs where alcohol is served. In this regard, Mill concludes that because such places are necessarily social and because public harms associated with drunkenness are more likely to occur in or near such establishments (at least relative to other public places), the government may regulate them, setting closing times and restricting operating licenses to “persons of known or vouched for respectability” (94). Any other restrictions, however, including setting a limit on how many pubs may exist in any given area, would be overreaching. Such a limit “for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience…but is suited only to a state of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages” (94).
On Liberty stands as a classic document in defense of individual freedom, as relevant and persuasive today as it was in 1859. All elected officials, jurists, and public-policy makers should read On Liberty, along with the Bill of Rights. Whereas modern-day politicians, entranced by the “war on drugs,” rapaciously violate “the inward domain of consciousness” (13) by imposing ever more drug prohibitions and placing hundreds of thousands of citizens behind bars for drug offenses, On Liberty powerfully avows that a government grossly exceeds its legitimate power when it interferes with matters of the mind and the interior condition of its citizenry.
“Self-defense is a countermeasure that involves defending the health and well-being of oneself from harm.”
Source URL: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-defense
Protecting the mind can be seen as analogous to protecting the body from physical attacks. However, the difference is that psychological attacks are much more difficult to perceive and to objectify. However, their effects can be much more harmful to the organism than physical attacks. Many people practice physical self-defense but only very few systematically train their psychological self-defense mechanisms.
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Impression management is a conscious or subconscious process in which people attempt to influence the perceptions of other people about a person, object or event. They do so by regulating and controlling information in social interaction.[1] It was first conceptualized by Erving Goffman in 1959 in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, and then was expanded upon in 1967.[2] An example of impression management theory in play is in sports such as soccer. At an important game, a player would want to showcase themselves in the best light possible, because there are college recruiters watching. This person would have the flashiest pair of cleats and try and perform their best to show off their skills. Their main goal may be to impress the college recruiters in a way that maximizes their chances of being chosen for a college team rather than winning the game.[3]
Impression management is usually used synonymously with self-presentation, in which a person tries to influence the perception of their image. The notion of impression management was first applied to face-to-face communication, but then was expanded to apply to computer-mediated communication. The concept of impression management is applicable to academic fields of study such as psychology and sociology as well as practical fields such as corporate communication and media.
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Many of these biases affect belief formation, business and economic decisions, and human behavior in general.
Name | Description |
---|---|
Ambiguity effect | The tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the probability seem “unknown”.[10] |
Anchoring or focalism | The tendency to rely too heavily, or “anchor”, on one trait or piece of information when making decisions (usually the first piece of information acquired on that subject).[11][12] |
Anthropocentric thinking | The tendency to use human analogies as a basis for reasoning about other, less familiar, biological phenomena.[13] |
Anthropomorphism or personification | The tendency to characterize animals, objects, and abstract concepts as possessing human-like traits, emotions, and intentions.[14] |
Attentional bias | The tendency of perception to be affected by recurring thoughts.[15] |
Automation bias | The tendency to depend excessively on automated systems which can lead to erroneous automated information overriding correct decisions.[16] |
Availability heuristic | The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater “availability” in memory, which can be influenced by how recent the memories are or how unusual or emotionally charged they may be.[17] |
Availability cascade | A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or “repeat something long enough and it will become true”).[18] |
Backfire effect | The reaction to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one’s previous beliefs.[19] cf. Continued influence effect. |
Bandwagon effect | The tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the same. Related to groupthink and herd behavior.[20] |
Base rate fallacy or Base rate neglect | The tendency to ignore base rate information (generic, general information) and focus on specific information (information only pertaining to a certain case).[21] |
Belief bias | An effect where someone’s evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.[22] |
Ben Franklin effect | A person who has performed a favor for someone is more likely to do another favor for that person than they would be if they had received a favor from that person.[23] |
Berkson’s paradox | The tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities.[24] |
Bias blind spot | The tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people, or to be able to identify more cognitive biases in others than in oneself.[25] |
Bystander effect | The tendency to think that others will act in an emergency situation.[26] |
Choice-supportive bias | The tendency to remember one’s choices as better than they actually were.[27] |
Clustering illusion | The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or clusters in large samples of random data (that is, seeing phantom patterns).[12] |
Confirmation bias | The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions.[28] |
Congruence bias | The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses.[12] |
Conjunction fallacy | The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general ones.[29] |
Conservatism (belief revision) | The tendency to revise one’s belief insufficiently when presented with new evidence.[5][30][31] |
Continued influence effect | The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. Misinformation can still influence inferences one generates after a correction has occurred.[32] cf. Backfire effect |
Contrast effect | The enhancement or reduction of a certain stimulus’ perception when compared with a recently observed, contrasting object.[33] |
Courtesy bias | The tendency to give an opinion that is more socially correct than one’s true opinion, so as to avoid offending anyone.[34] |
Curse of knowledge | When better-informed people find it extremely difficult to think about problems from the perspective of lesser-informed people.[35] |
Declinism | The predisposition to view the past favorably (rosy retrospection) and future negatively.[36] |
Decoy effect | Preferences for either option A or B change in favor of option B when option C is presented, which is completely dominated by option B (inferior in all respects) and partially dominated by option A.[37] |
Default effect | When given a choice between several options, the tendency to favor the default one.[38] |
Denomination effect | The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g., coins) rather than large amounts (e.g., bills).[39] |
Disposition effect | The tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist selling an asset that has declined in value.[40] |
Distinction bias | The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[41] |
Dunning–Kruger effect | The tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability and the tendency for experts to underestimate their own ability.[42] |
Duration neglect | The neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value.[43] |
Empathy gap | The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, in either oneself or others.[44] |
Endowment effect | The tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.[45] |
Exaggerated expectation | Based on the estimates,[clarification needed] real-world evidence turns out to be less extreme than our expectations (conditionally inverse of the conservatism bias).[unreliable source?][5][46] |
Experimenter’s or expectation bias | The tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations.[47] |
Focusing effect | The tendency to place too much importance on one aspect of an event.[48] |
Forer effect or Barnum effect | The observation that individuals will give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. This effect can provide a partial explanation for the widespread acceptance of some beliefs and practices, such as astrology, fortune telling, graphology, and some types of personality tests.[49] |
Form function attribution bias | In human–robot interaction, the tendency of people to make systematic errors when interacting with a robot. People may base their expectations and perceptions of a robot on its appearance (form) and attribute functions which do not necessarily mirror the true functions of the robot.[50] |
Framing effect | Drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented.[51] |
Frequency illusion | The illusion in which a word, a name, or other thing that has recently come to one’s attention suddenly seems to appear with improbable frequency shortly afterwards (not to be confused with the recency illusion or selection bias).[52] This illusion is sometimes referred to as the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon.[53] |
Functional fixedness | Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used.[54] |
Gambler’s fallacy | The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the law of large numbers. For example, “I’ve flipped heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads.”[55] |
Hard–easy effect | Based on a specific level of task difficulty, the confidence in judgments is too conservative and not extreme enough.[5][56][57][58] |
Hindsight bias | Sometimes called the “I-knew-it-all-along” effect, the tendency to see past events as being predictable[59] at the time those events happened. |
Hostile attribution bias | The “hostile attribution bias” is the tendency to interpret others’ behaviors as having hostile intent, even when the behavior is ambiguous or benign.[60] |
Hot-hand fallacy | The “hot-hand fallacy” (also known as the “hot hand phenomenon” or “hot hand”) is the belief that a person who has experienced success with a random event has a greater chance of further success in additional attempts. |
Hyperbolic discounting | Discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting leads to choices that are inconsistent over time – people make choices today that their future selves would prefer not to have made, despite using the same reasoning.[61] Also known as current moment bias, present-bias, and related to Dynamic inconsistency. A good example of this: a study showed that when making food choices for the coming week, 74% of participants chose fruit, whereas when the food choice was for the current day, 70% chose chocolate. |
Identifiable victim effect | The tendency to respond more strongly to a single identified person at risk than to a large group of people at risk.[62] |
IKEA effect | The tendency for people to place a disproportionately high value on objects that they partially assembled themselves, such as furniture from IKEA, regardless of the quality of the end result.[63] |
Illicit transference | Occurs when a term in the distributive (referring to every member of a class) and collective (referring to the class itself as a whole) sense are treated as equivalent. The two variants of this fallacy are the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division. |
Illusion of control | The tendency to overestimate one’s degree of influence over other external events.[64] |
Illusion of validity | Belief that our judgments are accurate, especially when available information is consistent or inter-correlated.[65] |
Illusory correlation | Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events.[66][67] |
Illusory truth effect | A tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is easier to process, or if it has been stated multiple times, regardless of its actual veracity. These are specific cases of truthiness. |
Impact bias | The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.[68] |
Information bias | The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.[69] |
Insensitivity to sample size | The tendency to under-expect variation in small samples. |
Irrational escalation | The phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong. Also known as the sunk cost fallacy. |
Law of the instrument | An over-reliance on a familiar tool or methods, ignoring or under-valuing alternative approaches. “If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” |
Less-is-better effect | The tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set judged separately, but not jointly. |
Look-elsewhere effect | An apparently statistically significant observation may have actually arisen by chance because of the size of the parameter space to be searched. |
Loss aversion | The disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it.[70] (see also Sunk cost effects and endowment effect). |
Mere exposure effect | The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them.[71] |
Money illusion | The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face value) of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power.[72] |
Moral credential effect | The tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent prejudice. |
Negativity bias or Negativity effect | Psychological phenomenon by which humans have a greater recall of unpleasant memories compared with positive memories.[73][74] (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[75] |
Neglect of probability | The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.[76] |
Normalcy bias | The refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened before. |
Not invented here | Aversion to contact with or use of products, research, standards, or knowledge developed outside a group. Related to IKEA effect. |
Observer-expectancy effect | When a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also subject-expectancy effect). |
Omission bias | The tendency to judge harmful actions (commissions) as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful inactions (omissions).[77] |
Optimism bias | The tendency to be over-optimistic, overestimating favorable and pleasing outcomes (see also wishful thinking, valence effect, positive outcome bias).[78][79] |
Ostrich effect | Ignoring an obvious (negative) situation. |
Outcome bias | The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time it was made. |
Overconfidence effect | Excessive confidence in one’s own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as “99% certain” turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.[5][80][81][82] |
Pareidolia | A vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing non-existent hidden messages on records played in reverse. |
Pessimism bias | The tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them. |
Placebo effect | The belief that a medication works—even if merely a placebo. |
Planning fallacy | The tendency to underestimate task-completion times.[68] |
Post-purchase rationalization | The tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was good value. |
Pro-innovation bias | The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an invention or innovation’s usefulness throughout society, while often failing to identify its limitations and weaknesses. |
Projection bias | The tendency to overestimate how much our future selves share one’s current preferences, thoughts and values, thus leading to sub-optimal choices.[83][84][74] |
Pseudocertainty effect | The tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.[85] |
Reactance | The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice (see also Reverse psychology). |
Reactive devaluation | Devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated with an adversary. |
Recency illusion | The illusion that a phenomenon one has noticed only recently is itself recent. Often used to refer to linguistic phenomena; the illusion that a word or language usage that one has noticed only recently is an innovation when it is in fact long-established (see also frequency illusion). |
Regressive bias | A certain state of mind wherein high values and high likelihoods are overestimated while low values and low likelihoods are underestimated.[5][86][87][unreliable source?] |
Restraint bias | The tendency to overestimate one’s ability to show restraint in the face of temptation. |
Rhyme as reason effect | Rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful. A famous example being used in the O.J Simpson trial with the defense’s use of the phrase “If the gloves don’t fit, then you must acquit.” |
Risk compensation / Peltzman effect | The tendency to take greater risks when perceived safety increases. |
Selection bias | The tendency to notice something more when something causes us to be more aware of it, such as when we buy a car, we tend to notice similar cars more often than we did before. They are not suddenly more common – we just are noticing them more. Also called the Observational Selection Bias. |
Selective perception | The tendency for expectations to affect perception. |
Semmelweis reflex | The tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.[31] |
Sexual overperception bias / sexual underperception bias | The tendency to over-/underestimate sexual interest of another person in oneself. |
Social comparison bias | The tendency, when making decisions, to favour potential candidates who don’t compete with one’s own particular strengths.[88] |
Social desirability bias | The tendency to over-report socially desirable characteristics or behaviours in oneself and under-report socially undesirable characteristics or behaviours.[89] |
Status quo bias | The tendency to like things to stay relatively the same (see also loss aversion, endowment effect, and system justification).[90][91] |
Stereotyping | Expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual. |
Subadditivity effect | The tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts.[92] |
Subjective validation | Perception that something is true if a subject’s belief demands it to be true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences. |
Surrogation | Losing sight of the strategic construct that a measure is intended to represent, and subsequently acting as though the measure is the construct of interest. |
Survivorship bias | Concentrating on the people or things that “survived” some process and inadvertently overlooking those that didn’t because of their lack of visibility. |
Time-saving bias | Underestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively low speed and overestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively high speed. |
Third-person effect | Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves. |
Parkinson’s law of triviality | The tendency to give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Also known as bikeshedding, this bias explains why an organization may avoid specialized or complex subjects, such as the design of a nuclear reactor, and instead focus on something easy to grasp or rewarding to the average participant, such as the design of an adjacent bike shed.[93] |
Unit bias | The standard suggested amount of consumption (e.g., food serving size) is perceived to be appropriate, and a person would consume it all even if it is too much for this particular person.[94] |
Weber–Fechner law | Difficulty in comparing small differences in large quantities. |
Well travelled road effect | Underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-traveled routes and overestimation of the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes. |
Women are wonderful effect | A tendency to associate more positive attributes with women than with men. |
Zero-risk bias | Preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk. |
Zero-sum bias | A bias whereby a situation is incorrectly perceived to be like a zero-sum game (i.e., one person gains at the expense of another). |
Most of these biases are labeled as attributional biases.
Name | Description |
---|---|
Actor-observer bias | The tendency for explanations of other individuals’ behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also Fundamental attribution error), and for explanations of one’s own behaviors to do the opposite (that is, to overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the influence of our own personality). |
Authority bias | The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion.[95] |
Cheerleader effect | The tendency for people to appear more attractive in a group than in isolation.[96] |
Defensive attribution hypothesis | Attributing more blame to a harm-doer as the outcome becomes more severe or as personal or situational similarity to the victim increases. |
Egocentric bias | Occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would credit them with. |
Extrinsic incentives bias | An exception to the fundamental attribution error, when people view others as having (situational) extrinsic motivations and (dispositional) intrinsic motivations for oneself |
False consensus effect | The tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.[97] |
Forer effect (aka Barnum effect) | The tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For example, horoscopes. |
Fundamental attribution error | The tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior[74] (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[75] |
Group attribution error | The biased belief that the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of the group as a whole or the tendency to assume that group decision outcomes reflect the preferences of group members, even when information is available that clearly suggests otherwise. |
Halo effect | The tendency for a person’s positive or negative traits to “spill over” from one personality area to another in others’ perceptions of them (see also physical attractiveness stereotype).[98] |
Illusion of asymmetric insight | People perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers’ knowledge of them.[99] |
Illusion of external agency | When people view self-generated preferences as instead being caused by insightful, effective and benevolent agents. |
Illusion of transparency | People overestimate others’ ability to know them, and they also overestimate their ability to know others. |
Illusory superiority | Overestimating one’s desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable qualities, relative to other people. (Also known as “Lake Wobegon effect”, “better-than-average effect”, or “superiority bias“.)[100] |
Ingroup bias | The tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups. |
Just-world hypothesis | The tendency for people to want to believe that the world is fundamentally just, causing them to rationalize an otherwise inexplicable injustice as deserved by the victim(s). |
Moral luck | The tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the outcome of an event. |
Naïve cynicism | Expecting more egocentric bias in others than in oneself. |
Naïve realism | The belief that we see reality as it really is – objectively and without bias; that the facts are plain for all to see; that rational people will agree with us; and that those who don’t are either uninformed, lazy, irrational, or biased. |
Outgroup homogeneity bias | Individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than members of other groups.[101] |
Self-serving bias | The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving bias).[102] |
Shared information bias | Known as the tendency for group members to spend more time and energy discussing information that all members are already familiar with (i.e., shared information), and less time and energy discussing information that only some members are aware of (i.e., unshared information).[103] |
System justification | The tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged, sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.) |
Trait ascription bias | The tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior, and mood while viewing others as much more predictable. |
Ultimate attribution error | Similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group. |
Worse-than-average effect | A tendency to believe ourselves to be worse than others at tasks which are difficult.[104] |
In psychology and cognitive science, a memory bias is a cognitive bias that either enhances or impairs the recall of a memory (either the chances that the memory will be recalled at all, or the amount of time it takes for it to be recalled, or both), or that alters the content of a reported memory. There are many types of memory bias, including:
Name | Description |
---|---|
Bizarreness effect | Bizarre material is better remembered than common material. |
Choice-supportive bias | In a self-justifying manner retroactively ascribing one’s choices to be more informed than they were when they were made. |
Change bias | After an investment of effort in producing change, remembering one’s past performance as more difficult than it actually was.[105][unreliable source?] |
Childhood amnesia | The retention of few memories from before the age of four. |
Conservatism or Regressive bias | Tendency to remember high values and high likelihoods/probabilities/frequencies as lower than they actually were and low ones as higher than they actually were. Based on the evidence, memories are not extreme enough.[86][87] |
Consistency bias | Incorrectly remembering one’s past attitudes and behaviour as resembling present attitudes and behaviour.[106] |
Context effect | That cognition and memory are dependent on context, such that out-of-context memories are more difficult to retrieve than in-context memories (e.g., recall time and accuracy for a work-related memory will be lower at home, and vice versa). |
Cross-race effect | The tendency for people of one race to have difficulty identifying members of a race other than their own. |
Cryptomnesia | A form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination, because there is no subjective experience of it being a memory.[105] |
Egocentric bias | Recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g., remembering one’s exam grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as bigger than it really was. |
Fading affect bias | A bias in which the emotion associated with unpleasant memories fades more quickly than the emotion associated with positive events.[107] |
False memory | A form of misattribution where imagination is mistaken for a memory. |
Generation effect (Self-generation effect) | That self-generated information is remembered best. For instance, people are better able to recall memories of statements that they have generated than similar statements generated by others. |
Google effect | The tendency to forget information that can be found readily online by using Internet search engines. |
Hindsight bias | The inclination to see past events as being more predictable than they actually were; also called the “I-knew-it-all-along” effect. |
Humor effect | That humorous items are more easily remembered than non-humorous ones, which might be explained by the distinctiveness of humor, the increased cognitive processing time to understand the humor, or the emotional arousal caused by the humor.[108] |
Illusion of truth effect | That people are more likely to identify as true statements those they have previously heard (even if they cannot consciously remember having heard them), regardless of the actual validity of the statement. In other words, a person is more likely to believe a familiar statement than an unfamiliar one. |
Illusory correlation | Inaccurately remembering a relationship between two events.[5][67] |
Lag effect | The phenomenon whereby learning is greater when studying is spread out over time, as opposed to studying the same amount of time in a single session. See also spacing effect. |
Leveling and sharpening | Memory distortions introduced by the loss of details in a recollection over time, often concurrent with sharpening or selective recollection of certain details that take on exaggerated significance in relation to the details or aspects of the experience lost through leveling. Both biases may be reinforced over time, and by repeated recollection or re-telling of a memory.[109] |
Levels-of-processing effect | That different methods of encoding information into memory have different levels of effectiveness.[110] |
List-length effect | A smaller percentage of items are remembered in a longer list, but as the length of the list increases, the absolute number of items remembered increases as well. For example, consider a list of 30 items (“L30”) and a list of 100 items (“L100”). An individual may remember 15 items from L30, or 50%, whereas the individual may remember 40 items from L100, or 40%. Although the percent of L30 items remembered (50%) is greater than the percent of L100 (40%), more L100 items (40) are remembered than L30 items (15).[111][further explanation needed] |
Misinformation effect | Memory becoming less accurate because of interference from post-event information.[112] |
Modality effect | That memory recall is higher for the last items of a list when the list items were received via speech than when they were received through writing. |
Mood-congruent memory bias | The improved recall of information congruent with one’s current mood. |
Next-in-line effect | People taking turns speaking in a group tend to have diminished recall for the words of others[clarify] who spoke immediately before them.[113] |
Part-list cueing effect | That being shown some items from a list and later retrieving one item causes it to become harder to retrieve the other items.[114] |
Peak-end rule | That people seem to perceive not the sum of an experience but the average of how it was at its peak (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant) and how it ended. |
Persistence | The unwanted recurrence of memories of a traumatic event.[citation needed] |
Picture superiority effect | The notion that concepts that are learned by viewing pictures are more easily and frequently recalled than are concepts that are learned by viewing their written word form counterparts.[115][116][117][118][119][120] |
Positivity effect (Socioemotional selectivity theory) | That older adults favor positive over negative information in their memories. |
Primacy effect, recency effect & serial position effect | That items near the end of a sequence are the easiest to recall, followed by the items at the beginning of a sequence; items in the middle are the least likely to be remembered.[121] |
Processing difficulty effect | That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more (processed with more difficulty) is more easily remembered.[122] |
Reminiscence bump | The recalling of more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than personal events from other lifetime periods.[123] |
Rosy retrospection | The remembering of the past as having been better than it really was. |
Self-relevance effect | That memories relating to the self are better recalled than similar information relating to others. |
Source confusion | Confusing episodic memories with other information, creating distorted memories.[124] |
Spacing effect | That information is better recalled if exposure to it is repeated over a long span of time rather than a short one. |
Spotlight effect | The tendency to overestimate the amount that other people notice your appearance or behavior. |
Stereotypical bias | Memory distorted towards stereotypes (e.g., racial or gender). |
Suffix effect | Diminishment of the recency effect because a sound item is appended to the list that the subject is not required to recall.[125][126] |
Suggestibility | A form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for memory. |
Tachypsychia | When time perceived by the individual either lengthens, making events appear to slow down, or contracts.[127] |
Telescoping effect | The tendency to displace recent events backward in time and remote events forward in time, so that recent events appear more remote, and remote events, more recent. |
Testing effect | The fact that you more easily remember information you have read by rewriting it instead of rereading it.[128] |
Tip of the tongue phenomenon | When a subject is able to recall parts of an item, or related information, but is frustratingly unable to recall the whole item. This is thought to be an instance of “blocking” where multiple similar memories are being recalled and interfere with each other.[105] |
Travis Syndrome | Overestimating the significance of the present.[129] It is related to the enlightenment Idea of Progress and chronological snobbery with possibly an appeal to novelty logical fallacy being part of the bias. |
Verbatim effect | That the “gist” of what someone has said is better remembered than the verbatim wording.[130] This is because memories are representations, not exact copies. |
von Restorff effect | That an item that sticks out is more likely to be remembered than other items.[131] |
Zeigarnik effect | That uncompleted or interrupted tasks are remembered better than completed ones. |
A 2012 Psychological Bulletin article suggested that at least eight seemingly unrelated biases can be produced by the same information-theoretic generative mechanism that assumes noisy information processing during storage and retrieval of information in human memory.[5]
People do appear to have stable individual differences in their susceptibility to decision biases such as overconfidence, temporal discounting, and bias blind spot.[134] That said, these stable levels of bias within individuals are possible to change. Participants in experiments who watched training videos and played debiasing games showed medium to large reductions both immediately and up to three months later in the extent to which they exhibited susceptibility to six cognitive biases: anchoring, bias blind spot, confirmation bias, fundamental attribution error, projection bias, and representativeness.[135]
Debiasing is the reduction of biases in judgment and decision making through incentives, nudges, and training. Cognitive bias mitigation and cognitive bias modification are forms of debiasing specifically applicable to cognitive biases and their effects.
Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases
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