“Violations of moralnorms can be made ‘morally invisible’ even if all relevant facts are unobscured: This can be achieved by embedding these facts into a context that prevents eliciting widespread unease and indignation. One example is the structural violence associated with the implementation of neoliberal economical doctrine. While societal and humanitarian consequences of this violence have so far been mostly observed in so-called third-world countries, they also manifest themselves more and more often in western industrialized nations. Mass media play a pivotal role in making facts morally and cognitively visible: In addition to reporting simple facts, media typically also deliver the contextual frame necessary for interpreting the facts, thus shaping our political world view. The invisibility of some moral transgressions is thus part of our daily live and concerns us all.” (Mausfeld, 2015)
However, as soon as the causal reason for the fragmentation becomes available to us (i.e., when we become aware of the visual or ideological “mask”) we are able to use inferential deductivecognitive reasoning processes to identify (and understand) the underlying pattern – despite the fragmentation of information/knowledge (see Figure 2). Without this “causative information” which masks the underlying pattern the likelihood of successful pattern recognition is minute (note that both figures display the letter “R” in various orientations – the difference between them is that Figure 2 shows the mask whereas Figure 1 does not) .
Insight1 (cf. Köhler, 1925)2 into the mechanism which causes the occlusion and fragmentation thus allows us to understand the broader meaning of the percept (or the psychological narrative), viz., we are able to see “the bigger picture” in context. This contextual knowledge can be a visual mask or a historical pattern (as outlined below). The adumbrated perceptual analogy is thus generalisable across prima vista unrelated domains (i.e., it is domain non-specific).
The same idea can be applied to the social sphere. An understanding of the mechanisms which undergird “neoliberal psychological indoctrination” is crucial in order to understand the “bigger picture” – the “holistic gestalt” (Ash, 1998; Sharps & Wertheimer, 2000) of the social, political, economic, and academic environment we inhabit. Based on this overarching knowledge we can then “try our best” to take an appropriate and responsible course of action. However, we first have to perceive and acknowledge the problem. That is, a valid diagnosis is primary. Without this broader understanding we “lose sight of the wood for the trees” (cf. global vs. local perception/information processing), that is, we attend to seemingly unrelated semantic information fragments without an understanding of their mutual interrelations. Interestingly, emotions & affective states play a significant modulatory role in the underlying cognitive processes (e.g., Basso, Schefft, Ris, & Dember, 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010). In other words, our emotional system is centrally involved in perception and reasoning. Therefore, the emotional system (i.e., limbic system) can be systematically manipulated in order to interfere with rational higher-order (prefrontal) cognitive processes which are necessary for logical inferential reasoning and problem-solving. Primordial fear (phylogenetically ancient amygdalae circuitry) is perhaps the most significant inhibitor of higher-order cognitive processes.
Gross, C. T., & Canteras, N. S.. (2012). The many paths to fear. Nature Reviews Neuroscience
“Fear is an emotion that has powerful effects on behaviour and physiology across animal species. it is accepted that the amygdala has a central role in processing fear. however, it is less widely appreciated that distinct amygdala outputs and downstream circuits are involved in different types of fear. data show that fear of painful stimuli, predators and aggressive members of the same species are processed in independent neural circuits that involve the amygdala and downstream hypothalamic and brainstem circuits. here, we discuss data supporting multiple fear pathways and the implications of this distributed system for understanding and treating fear.”
Povinelli, D. J., & Bering, J. M.. (2002). The mentality of apes revisited. Current Directions in Psychological Science
“Although early compara- tive psychology was seriously marred by claims of our spe- cies’ supremacy, the residual backlash against these archaic evolutionary views is still be- ing felt, even though our un- derstanding of evolutionary biology is now sufficiently ad- vanced to grapple with possi- ble cognitive specializations that our species does not share with closely related species. the overzealous efforts to dis- mantle arguments of human uniqueness have only served to show that most compara- tive psychologists working with apes have yet to set aside the antiquated evolutionary ‘lad- der.’ instead, they have only attempted to pull chimpan- zees up to the ladder’s highest imaginary rung–or perhaps, to pull humans down to an equally imaginary rung at the height of the apes. a true com- parative science of animal minds, however, will recog- nize the complex diversity of the animal kingdom, and will thus view homo sapiens as one more species with a unique set of adaptive skills crying out to be identified and understood.”
Ruiz, G., & Sánchez, N.. (2014). Wolfgang Köhler’s the mentality of apes and the animal psychology of his time. Spanish Journal of Psychology
in 1913, the anthropoid station for psychological and physiological research in chimpanzees and other apes was founded by the royal prussian academy of sciences (berlin) near la orotava, tenerife. eugene teuber, its first director, began his work at the station with several studies of anthropoid apes’ natural behavior, particularly chimpanzee body language. in late 1913, the psychologist wolfgang köhler, the second and final director of the station, arrived in tenerife. during his stay in the canary islands, köhler conducted a series of studies on intelligent behavior in chimpanzees that would become classics in the field of comparative psychology. those experiments were at the core of his book intelligenzprüfungen an menschenaffen ( the mentality of apes ), published in 1921. this paper analyzes köhler’s experiments and notions of intelligent behavior in chimpanzees, emphasizing his distinctly descriptive approach to these issues. it also makes an effort to elucidate some of the theoretical ideas underpinning köhler’s work. the ultimate goal of this paper is to assess the historical significance of köhler’s book within the context of the animal psychology of his time.
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.” (Edward Bernays, Propaganda, 1928)
Bernays, E. L. (1928). Propaganda. Horace Liveright.
Bernays, E. L. (1936). Freedom of Propaganda. Vital Speeches of the Day, 2(24), 744–746.
L’Etang, J. (1999). The father of spin: Edward L. Bernays and the birth of public relations. Public Relations Review, 25(1), 123–124.
“That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages, and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough. . . . [a]s a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power…. Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in the sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our thinking have become variables. It is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to self-deception, and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify. It has been demonstrated that we cannot rely upon intuition, conscience, or the accidents of casual opinion if we are to deal with the world beyond our reach. … The public must be put in its place, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and roar of a bewildered herd.” (Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, Chapter XV)
Lippmann, W. (1920). Liberty and the News. Museum.
Lippmann, W. (1970). The Phantom Public. Politics.
From 1930 onwards, Brecht became part of a wider complex of projects exploring the role of intellectuals (or “Tuis” as he called them) in a capitalist society. A Tui is an intellectual who sells his or her abilities and opinions as a commodity in the marketplace or who uses them to support the dominant ideology of an oppressive society. ] The German modernist theatre practitioner Bertolt Brecht invented the term and used it in a range of critical and creative projects, including the material that he developed in the mid-1930s for his so-called Tui-Novel—an unfinished satire on intellectuals in the German Empire and Weimar Republic—and his epic comedy from the early 1950s, Turandot or the Whitewashers’ Congress. The word is a neologism that results from the acronym of a word play on “intellectual” (“Tellekt-Ual-In”).
According to Clark (2006): “… the critique of intellectuals which Brecht developed… around the notion of ‘Tuismus’ engages a model of the public intellectual in which the self-image of the artist and thinker as a socially and politically engaged person corresponded to the expectations of the public.”
Clark, M. W. (2006). Hero or villain? Bertolt Brecht and the crisis surrounding June 1953. Journal of Contemporary History.
Hunt, T. C. N.-. (2004). Goodbye to Berlin: For 200 years, German thinkers have shaped British intellectual life – but their influence is fading fast. The Guardian.
“It is very useful to differentiate between rational and irrational authority. By irrational authority I mean authority exercised by fear and pressure on the basis of emotional submission. This is the authority of blind obedience, the authority you will find most clearly expressed in all totalitarian countries.
But there is another kind of authority, rational authority by which I mean any authority which is based on competence and knowledge, which permits criticism, which by its very nature tends to diminish, but which is not based on the emotional factors of submission and masochism, but on the realistic recognition of the competence of the person for a certain job.”
― 1958. The Moral Responsibility of Modern Man, in: Merrill-Palmer. Quarterly of Behavior and Development, Detroit, Vol. 5, p. 6.
“No expert certification is required to think about these questions, even if the ruling elites try their best to restrict discourse about them to a narrow group of “qualified experts”. As “citoyens”, well-informed and dutiful citizens trying to actively participate in forming our community, we possess what in the age of enlightenment came to be called “lumen naturale”: We are endowed with a natural reasoning faculty that allows us to engage in debates and decisions about matters which directly affect us. We can therefore adequately discuss the essential core of the ways in which grave violations of law and morality are hidden from our awareness without having some specialist education.”(Mausfeld, 2015)
Despite the clear words of these very influential and prominent personalities (i.e., Bernays and Lippmann) some social psychologists argue that “irrational conspiracy theories” are based on fallacious and “illusionary pattern perception” – but see article below.
By contrast, compare the following websites for more information on the actual origin of the “conspiracy theory meme”. According to the in-depth analyses of these scholars, governmental ‘think tanks’ (e.g., well-paid social psychologists) played a crucial role in the invention of the term “conspiracy theory” which is used to prima facie discredit those who challenge the mainstream narrative propagandized by the mass-media and other other social institutions (e.g., schools & universities). The social sciences & humanities have a long well-documented history of contributing to the systematic manipulation of public attitudes & opinions (the public relations industry and the social sciences/humanities are obviously deeply intertwined) (cf. weaponized anthropology). Today, the cognitive neurosciences joined the choir (cf. techniques of neuro-marketing). Psychology (and science in general) is a two-sided sword. It can be used to contribute to the unfoldment of human potential (the humanistic perspective which emphasises liberty and self-actualisation a la Maslow) or the same methods can be used to manipulate and control people (the neoliberal doctrine a la Bernays which focuses on power and submission to authority). It is self-evident on which side of the bipolar continuum (viz., humanism versus neoliberalism) humanity finds itself at the moment…
Ash, M. G. (1998). Gestalt psychology in German culture, 1890-1967 : holism and the quest for objectivity. Cambridge Studies in the History of Psychology. doi.org/10.1021/acs.joc.6b02599
Basso, M. R., Schefft, B. K., Ris, M. D., & Dember, W. N. (1996). Mood and global-local visual processing. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society. doi.org/10.1017/S1355617700001193
Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Attending to the big picture: Mood and global versus local processing of visual information. Psychological Science. doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00406
Huntsinger, J. R., Clore, G. L., & Bar-Anan, Y. (2010). Mood and Global-Local Focus: Priming a Local Focus Reverses the Link Between Mood and Global-Local Processing. Emotion. doi.org/10.1037/a0019356
Sharps, M. J., & Wertheimer, M. (2000). Gestalt Perspectives on Cognitive Science and on Experimental Psychology. Review of General Psychology. doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.4.4.315
Inattentional blindness, also known as perceptual blindness, is a psychological lack of attention that is not associated with any vision defects or deficits. It may be further defined as the event in which an individual fails to perceive an unexpected stimulus that is in plain sight.More at Wikipedia Inattentional blindness, also known as perceptual blindness, is a psychological lack of attention that is not associated with any vision defects or deficits. It may be further defined as the event in which an individual fails to perceive an unexpected stimulus that is in plain sight.More at Wikipedia
“Many people believe that merely by opening their eyes, they see everything in their field of view. in inattentional blindness, arien mack and irvin rock make the radical claim that there is no conscious perception of the visual world without attention to it. the phenomenon of inattentional blindness has theoretical importance for cognitive psychologists studying perception, attention, and consciousness, as well as for philosophers and neuroscientists interested in the problem of consciousness.”
Simons, D. J.. (2000). Attentional capture and inattentional blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences
“Although we intuitively believe that salient or distinctive objects will capture our attention, surprisingly often they do not. for example, drivers may fail to notice another car when trying to turn or a person may fail to see a friend in a cinema when looking for an empty seat, even if the friend is waving. the study of attentional capture has focused primarily on measuring the effect of an irrelevant stimulus on task performance. in essence, these studies explore how well observers can ignore something they expect but know to be irrelevant. by contrast, the real-world examples above raise a different question: how likely are subjects to notice something salient and potentially relevant that they do not expect? recently, several new paradigms exploring this question have found that, quite often, unexpected objects fail to capture attention, a phenomenon known as ‘inattentional blindness’. this review considers evidence for the effects of irrelevant features both on performance (‘implicit attentional capture’) and on awareness (‘explicit attentional capture’). taken together, traditional studies of implicit attentional capture and recent studies of inattentional blindness provide a more complete understanding of the varieties of attentional capture, both in the laboratory and in the real world. copyright (c) 2000 elsevier science ltd.”
Most, S. B., Scholl, B. J., Clifford, E. R., & Simons, D. J.. (2005). What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness. Psychological Review
“This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person’s own attentional goals. the authors conclude that many–but not all–aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.”
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F.. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception
“With each eye fixation, we experience a richly detailed visual world. yet recent work on visual integration and change direction reveals that we are surprisingly unaware of the details of our environment from one view to the next: we often do not detect large changes to objects and scenes (‘change blindness’). furthermore, without attention, we may not even perceive objects (‘inattentional blindness’). taken together, these findings suggest that we perceive and remember only those objects and details that receive focused attention. in this paper, we briefly review and discuss evidence for these cognitive forms of ‘blindness’. we then present a new study that builds on classic studies of divided visual attention to examine inattentional blindness for complex objects and events in dynamic scenes. our results suggest that the likelihood of noticing an unexpected object depends on the similarity of that object to other objects in the display and on how difficult the priming monitoring task is. interestingly, spatial proximity of the critical unattended object to attended locations does not appear to affect detection, suggesting that observers attend to objects and events, not spatial positions. we discuss the implications of these results for visual representations and awareness of our visual environment.”
Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J.. (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science
“People often are unable to report the content of ignored information, but it is unknown whether this reflects a complete failure to perceive it (inattentional blindness) or merely that it is rapidly forgotten (inattentional amnesia). here functional imaging is used to address this issue by measuring brain activity for unattended words. when attention is fully engaged with other material, the brain no longer differentiates between meaningful words and random letters, even when they are looked at directly. these results demonstrate true inattentional blindness for words and show that visual recognition wholly depends on attention even for highly familiar and meaningful stimuli at the center of gaze.”
Jensen, M. S., Yao, R., Street, W. N., & Simons, D. J.. (2011). Change blindness and inattentional blindness. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
“Change blindness and inattentional blindness are both failures of visual awareness. change blindness is the failure to notice an obvious change. inattentional blindness is the failure to notice the existence of an unexpected item. in each case, we fail to notice something that is clearly visible once we know to look for it. despite similarities, each type of blindness has a unique background and distinct theoretical implications. here, we discuss the central paradigms used to explore each phenomenon in a historical context. we also outline the central findings from each field and discuss their implications for visual perception and attention. in addition, we examine the impact of task and observer effects on both types of blindness as well as common pitfalls and confusions people make while studying these topics.”
Most, S. B., Simons, D. J., Scholl, B. J., & Chabris, C. F.. (2000). Sustained Inattentional Blindness. Psyche
“Attempts to understand visual attention producing models based on location, in which attention selects particular regions of space, and models based on other visual attributes (e.g., in which attention selects discrete objects or specific features). previous studies of inattentional blindness have contributed to our understanding of attention by suggesting that the detection of an unexpected object depends on the distance of that object from the spatial focus of attention. when the distance of a briefly flashed object from both fixation and the focus of attention is systematically varied, detection appears to have a location-based component. however, the likelihood that people will detect an unexpected event in sustained and dynamic displays may depend on more than just spatial location. the authors investigated the influence of spatial location on inattentional blindness under precisely controlled, sustained and dynamic conditions, using a sample of 143 observers (mean age 20.4 yrs). they found that although location-based models cannot fully account for the detection of unexpected objects, spatial location does play a role even when displays are visible for an extended period. (psycinfo database record (c) 2010 apa, all rights reserved)”
Most, S. B.. (2010). What’s “inattentional” about inattentional blindness?. Consciousness and Cognition
“Surprising as it may seem, research shows that we rarely see what we are looking at unless our attention is directed to it. this phenomenon can have serious life-and-death consequences. although the inextricable link between perceiving and attending was noted long ago by aristotle, this phenomenon, now called inattentional blindness (ib), only recently has been named and carefully studied. among the many questions that have been raised about ib are questions about the fate of the clearly visible, yet unseen stimuli, whether any stimuli reliably capture attention, and, if so, what they have in common. finally, is ib an instance of rapid forgetting, or is it a failure to perceive?”
Drew, T., Võ, M. L. H., & Wolfe, J. M.. (2013). The Invisible Gorilla Strikes Again: Sustained Inattentional Blindness in Expert Observers. Psychological Science
“Researchers have shown that people often miss the occurrence of an unexpected yet salient event if they are engaged in a different task, a phenomenon known as inattentional blindness. however, demonstrations of inattentional blindness have typically involved naive observers engaged in an unfamiliar task. what about expert searchers who have spent years honing their ability to detect small abnormalities in specific types of images? we asked 24 radiologists to perform a familiar lung-nodule detection task. a gorilla, 48 times the size of the average nodule, was inserted in the last case that was presented. eighty-three percent of the radiologists did not see the gorilla. eye tracking revealed that the majority of those who missed the gorilla looked directly at its location. thus, even expert searchers, operating in their domain of expertise, are vulnerable to inattentional blindness.”
Mack, A., & Rock, I.. (1998). Inattentional blindness. MIT Press/Bradford Books Series in Cognitive Psychology
“(From the preface) this book is a narrative description of research designed to explore perception without attention that began in 1988. with the exception of the 1st and last chapters, the book is a chronological history of this research project. the 1st chapter provides a summary of the main research findings and the last summarizes the conclusions drawn from the findings. the rest offer detailed accounts of the many experiments, their outcomes, and the reasoning that led from 1 experiment to the next. the single most important lesson is that there seems to be no conscious perception without attention. although the book deals with material and questions that have been the subject of much research and discussion in the field, there was no effort to summarize or refer to all the relevant literature. (psycinfo database record (c) 2008 apa, all rights reserved).”
Cartwright-Finch, U., & Lavie, N.. (2007). The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness. Cognition
Seegmiller, J. K., Watson, J. M., & Strayer, D. L.. (2011). Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Inattentional Blindness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition
“Inattentional blindness refers to the finding that people do not always see what appears in their gaze. though inattentional blindness affects large percentages of people, it is unclear if there are individual differences in susceptibility. the present study addressed whether individual differences in attentional control, as reflected by variability in working memory capacity, modulate susceptibility to inattentional blindness. participants watched a classic inattentional blindness video (simons & chabris, 1999) and were instructed to count passes among basketball players, wherein 58% noticed the unexpected: a person wearing a gorilla suit. when participants were accurate with their pass counts, individuals with higher working memory capacity were more likely to report seeing the gorilla (67%) than those with lesser working memory capacity (36%). these results suggest that variability in attentional control is a potential mechanism underlying the apparent modulation of inattentional blindness across individuals.”
Memmert, D., & Furley, P.. (2007). “I Spy with My Little Eye!”: Breadth of Attention, Inattentional Blindness, and Tactical Decision Making in Team Sports. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology
“Failures of awareness are common when attention is otherwise engaged. such failures are prevalent in attention-demanding team sports, but surprisingly no studies have explored the inattentional blindness paradigm in complex sport game-related situations. the purpose of this paper is to explore the link between breadth of attention, inattentional blindness, and tactical decision-making in team ball sports. a series of studies revealed that inattentional blindness exists in the area of team ball sports (experiment 1). more tactical instructions can lead to a narrower breadth of attention, which increases inattentional blindness, whereas fewer tactical instructions widen the breadth of attention in the area of team ball sports (experiment 2). further meaningful exogenous stimuli reduce inattentional blindness (experiment 3). the results of all experiments are discussed in connection with consciousness and attention theories as well as creativity and training in team sports.”
Memmert, D.. (2006). The effects of eye movements, age, and expertise on inattentional blindness. Consciousness and Cognition
“Individual differences in working memory predict many aspects of cognitive performance, especially for tasks that demand focused attention. one negative consequence of focused attention is inattentional blindness, the failure to notice unexpected objects when attention is engaged elsewhere. yet, the relationship between individual differences in working memory and inattentional blindness is unclear; some studies have found that higher working memory capacity is associated with greater noticing, but others have found no direct association. given the theoretical and practical significance of such individual differences, more definitive tests are needed. in two studies with large samples, we tested the relationship between multiple working memory measures and inattentional blindness. individual differences in working memory predicted the ability to perform an attention-demanding tracking task, but did not predict the likelihood of noticing an unexpected object present during the task. we discuss the reasons why we might not expect such individual differences in noticing and why other studies may have found them.”
Fougnie, D., & Marois, R.. (2007). Executive working memory load induces inattentional blindness. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
“When attention is engaged in a task, unexpected events in the visual scene may go undetected, a phenomenon known as inattentional blindness (ib). at what stage of information processing must attention be engaged for ib to occur? although manipulations that tax visuospatial attention can induce ib, the evidence is more equivocal for tasks that engage attention at late, central stages of information processing. here, we tested whether ib can be specifically induced by central executive processes. an unexpected visual stimulus was presented during the retention interval of a working memory task that involved either simply maintaining verbal material or rearranging the material into alphabetical order. the unexpected stimulus was more likely to be missed during manipulation than during simple maintenance of the verbal information. thus, the engagement of executive processes impairs the ability to detect unexpected, task-irrelevant stimuli, suggesting that ib can result from central, amodal stages of processing.”
Most, S. B., Simons, D. J., Scholl, B. J., Jimenez, R., Clifford, E., & Chabris, C. F.. (2001). How not to be seen: The contribution of similarity and selective ignoring to sustained inattentional blindness. Psychological Science
“When people attend to objects or events in a visual display, they often fail to notice an additional, unexpected, but fully visible object or event in the same display. this phenomenon is now known as inattentional blindness. we present a new approach to the study of sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events in order to explore the roles of similarity, distinctiveness, and attentional set in the detection of unexpected objects. in experiment 1, we found that the similarity of an unexpected object to other objects in the display influences attentional capture: the more similar an unexpected object is to the attended items, and the greater its differencefrom the ignored items, the more likely it is that people will notice it. experiment 2 explored whether this effect of similarity is driven by selective ignoring of irrelevant items or by selective focusing on attended items. the results of experiment 3 suggest that the distinctiveness of the unexpected object alone cannot entirely account for the similarity effects found in the first two experiments; when attending to black items or white items in a dynamic display, nearly 30% of observers failed to notice a bright red cross move across the display, even though it had a unique color, luminance, shape, and motion trajectory and was visible for 5s. together, the results suggest that inattentional blindness for ongoing dynamic events depends both on the similarity of the unexpected object to the other objects in the display and on the observer’s attentional set.”
Kim, C. Y., & Blake, R.. (2005). Psychophysical magic: Rendering the visible “invisible”. Trends in Cognitive Sciences
“The common thread in a number of experiments is that unattended stimuli cannot be accurately reported after they are gone. there are at least two plausible explanations for this failure. first, as suggested by the inattentional blindness hypothesis, the stimuli may not be seen if they are not attended. second, the stimuli may have been seen but not remembered. i wish to argue that the explanation of these apparent failures of perception is not inattentional blindness but inattentional amnesia. the inattentional amnesia hypothesis has 4 parts: 1. under normal circumstances we consciously perceive visual stuff at all locations in the visual field. 2. at the current locus of attention, visual information can make enhanced contact with other mental processes. this permits, for instance, object recognition and transfer into memory. attention may change the visual representation so that things look different while attended. overt responses, from eye movements to key presses, demand attention. 3. the present conscious visual representation is composed of the visual stuff of 1 and the effects of attention as sketched in 2. 4. the visual representation has no memory. it exists solely in the present tense. (psycinfo database record (c) 2009 apa, all rights reserved)”
Bressan, P., & Pizzighello, S.. (2008). The attentional cost of inattentional blindness. Cognition
“In this article, we establish a new phenomenon of ‘inattentional deafness’ and highlight the level of load on visual attention as a critical determinant of this phenomenon. in three experiments, we modified an inattentional blindness paradigm to assess inattentional deafness. participants made either a low- or high-load visual discrimination concerning a cross shape (respectively, a discrimination of line color or of line length with a subtle length difference). a brief pure tone was presented simultaneously with the visual task display on a final trial. failures to notice the presence of this tone (i.e., inattentional deafness) reached a rate of 79% in the high-visual-load condition, significantly more than in the low-load condition. these findings establish the phenomenon of inattentional deafness under visual load, thereby extending the load theory of attention (e.g., lavie, journal of experimental psychology. human perception and performance, 25, 596-616, 1995) to address the cross-modal effects of visual perceptual load.”
Koivisto, M., Hyönä, J., & Revonsuo, A.. (2004). The effects of eye movements, spatial attention, and stimulus features on inattentional blindness. Vision Research
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.” (Edward Bernays, Propaganda, 1928)
“That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages, and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough. . . . [a]s a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power…. Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in the sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our thinking have become variables. It is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to self-deception, and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify. It has been demonstrated that we cannot rely upon intuition, conscience, or the accidents of casual opinion if we are to deal with the world beyond our reach. … The public must be put in its place, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and roar of a bewildered herd.” (Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, Chapter XV)
From 1930 onwards, Brecht became part of a wider complex of projects exploring the role of intellectuals (or “Tuis” as he called them) in a capitalist society. A Tui is an intellectual who sells his or her abilities and opinions as a commodity in the marketplace or who uses them to support the dominant ideology of an oppressive society. ] The German modernist theatre practitioner Bertolt Brecht invented the term and used it in a range of critical and creative projects, including the material that he developed in the mid-1930s for his so-called Tui-Novel—an unfinished satire on intellectuals in the German Empire and Weimar Republic—and his epic comedy from the early 1950s, Turandot or the Whitewashers’ Congress. The word is a neologism that results from the acronym of a word play on “intellectual” (“Tellekt-Ual-In”).
“It is very useful to differentiate between rational and irrational authority. By irrational authority I mean authority exercised by fear and pressure on the basis of emotional submission. This is the authority of blind obedience, the authority you will find most clearly expressed in all totalitarian countries.
