The is–ought problem, as articulated by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, arises when one makes claims about what ought to be that are based solely on statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between descriptive or positive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. Hume’s law or Hume’s guillotine, is the thesis that, if a reasoner only has access to non-moral and non-evaluative factual premises, the reasoner cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements.
“This paper introduces hume’s law (the fulcrum of the ‘is-ought’ problem of moral philosophy) into the property valuation literature, and uses it as a prism to reflect on the nature and limitations of standard valuation theory. the paper shows how a consideration of hume’ thesis can help to clarify and solve some specific practical problems in property valuation. the opportunity presented by the subject of property valuation is, in turn, used to reflect back on hume’s thesis itself, to show conditions under which hume’s law may be said to be false. the paper makes important contributions both to the property valuation literature and to the literature on moral philosophy. with respect to property valuation, it proposes a change in the manner conclusions of valuations are reported, and the replacement of the notion of valuation accuracy by the wider and more socially appropriate concept of reasonableness.”
Spielthenner, G.. (2017). The Is-Ought Problem in Practical Ethics. HEC Forum
“This article is concerned with the role empirical research can play in normative practical ethics. there is no doubt that ethical research requires some kind of collaboration between normative disciplines and empirical sciences. but many researchers hold that empirical science is only assigned a subordinate role, due to the doctrine that normative conclusions cannot be justified by descriptive premises. scientists working in the field of ethics commonly hold, however, that the empirical sciences should play a much bigger role in ethical research. the aim of this paper is to show that empirical sciences can play a substantive role in normative ethics, with no illicit inferences from is to ought. to achieve this aim, i explain (in ‘the is-ought problem explained’ section) hume’s thesis. in the following sections, i am concerned with different uses of empirical data that do not imply an illicit inference from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. the article demonstrates that there are many modes of ethical reasoning that allow for a substantive use of empirical data, and it also shows the importance of hume’s thesis for clarifying ethical reasoning.”
Hapla, M.. (2020). Justification of human rights and is-ought problem. Casopis pro Pravni Vedu a Praxi
“Clarifying the transition from facts to norms is one of the key issues of legal philosophy and ethics. in the article, the author analyzes how various theories of justification of human rights attempt to solve it. he first characterizes human rights as critical moral rights and clarifies in what sense we can say that they exist. he then describes the is-ought problem and analyzes why some approaches cannot deal with him adequately. at first, he focuses on human rights justification through the concept of basic needs and capabilities, later on robert alexy’s explicative-existential justification. however, the greatest attention is paid to the justification theory, which was constructed by alan gewirth, one of the main representatives of ethical rationalism. according to the author, this is the most sophisticated attempt to deal with this problem in the field of human rights. in the last part of the article, the author formulates his own opinion on it. according to him, the solution is to stop imposing absolute demands on the justification of these rights, but to start assessing its strengths and weaknesses in relation to the concepts that compete with it.”
Pigden, C.. (2001). The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy
“Book information the is-ought problem: an investigation in philosophical logic. by gerhard schurz. kluwer. dordrecht. 1997. pp. x + 332. {â}textsterling92.25.”
Iwasa, N.. (2011). Sentimentalism and the is-ought problem. Croatian Journal of Philosophy
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“Examining the moral sense theories of francis hutcheson, david hume, and adam smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. according to one interpretation, hume’s or smith’s theory is just a description of human nature. in this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. according to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. in this case, it draws normative claims from human nature. anyway, the sentiments of anger, resentment, vengeance, superiority, sympathy, and benevolence show that drawing norms from human nature is sometimes morally problematic. the changeability of the moral sense and moral sentiments in hume’s and smith’s theories supports this idea. hutcheson’s theory is morally more appropriate because it bases morality on disinterested benevolence. yet disinterested benevolence is not enough for morality. there are no sentiments the presence of which alone makes any action moral.”
de Vries, R.. (2011). The Uses and Abuses of Moral Theory in Bioethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Sisk, B. A., Mozersky, J., Antes, A. L., & DuBois, J. M.. (2020). The “Ought-Is” Problem: An Implementation Science Framework for Translating Ethical Norms Into Practice. American Journal of Bioethics
“We argue that once a normative claim is developed, there is an imperative to effect changes based on this norm. as such, ethicists should adopt an ‘implementation mindset’ when formulating norms, and collaborate with others who have the expertise needed to implement policies and practices. to guide this translation of norms into practice, we propose a framework that incorporates implementation science into ethics. implementation science is a discipline dedicated to supporting the sustained enactment of interventions. we further argue that implementation principles should be integrated into the development of specific normative claims as well as the enactment of these norms. ethicists formulating a specific norm should consider whether that norm can feasibly be enacted because the resultant specific norm will directly affect the types of interventions subsequently developed. to inform this argument, we will describe the fundamental principles of implementation science, using informed consent to research participation as an illustration.”
They were first used in Northern Ireland in 1971 as part of Operation Demetrius – the mass arrest and internment (imprisonment without trial) of people suspected of involvement with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Out of those arrested, fourteen were subjected to a programme of “deep interrogation” using the five techniques. This took place at a secret interrogation centre in Northern Ireland. For seven days, when not being interrogated, the detainees were kept hooded and handcuffed in a cold cell and subjected to a continuous loud hissing noise. Here they were forced to stand in a stress position for many hours and were deprived of sleep, food and drink. They were also repeatedly beaten, and some reported being kicked in the genitals, having their heads banged against walls and being threatened with injections. The effect was prolonged pain, physical and mental exhaustion, severe anxiety, depression, hallucinations, disorientation and repeated loss of consciousness.[2][3] It also resulted in long-term psychological trauma. The fourteen became known as “the Hooded Men” and were the only detainees in Northern Ireland subjected to all five techniques together. Other detainees were subjected to at least one of the five techniques along with other interrogation methods.[4]
In 1976, the European Commission of Human Rights ruled that the five techniques amounted to torture. The case was then referred to the European Court of Human Rights. In 1978 the court ruled that the techniques were “inhuman and degrading” and breached the European Convention on Human Rights, but did not amount to “torture”. In 2014, after new information was uncovered that showed the decision to use methods of torture in Northern Ireland in 1971-1972 had been taken by ministers,[5] the Irish Government asked the European Court of Human Rights to review its judgement and acknowledge the five techniques as torture.
The Court’s ruling that the five techniques did not amount to torture was later cited by the United States and Israel to justify their own interrogation methods,[6] which included the five techniques.[7] British agents also taught the five techniques to the forces of Brazil’s military dictatorship.[8]
Juridical exceptionalism – The “ticking-bomb argument” in favor of the post hoc justification for violations of fundamental human rights
Further References
Vreeland, J. R.. (2008). Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the United nations convention against torture. International Organization
“This article addresses a puzzle: dictatorships that practice torture are more likely to accede to the un convention against torture ~cat! than dictator- ships that do not practice torture+ i argue the reason has to do with the logic of tor- ture+ torture is more likely to occur where power is shared+ in one-party or no-party dictatorships, few individuals defect against the regime+ consequently, less torture occurs+ but dictatorships are protorture regimes; they have little interest in making gestures against torture, such as signing the cat+ there is more torture where power is shared, such as where dictatorships allow multiple political parties+ alternative political points of view are endorsed, but some individuals go too far+ more acts of defection against the regime occur, and torture rates are higher+ because political parties exert some power, however, they pressure the regime to make concessions+ one small concession is acceding to the cat.”
Conrad, C. R., & Moore, W. H.. (2010). What stops the torture?. American Journal of Political Science
“States whose agents engage in torture in a given year have a 93% chance of continuing to torture in the following year. what leads governments to stop the use of torture? we focus on the principal–agent relationship between the executive and the individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating state prisoners. we argue that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. these relationships are strongly conditioned by the presence of violent dissent; states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat. once campaigns of violent dissent stop, however, states with popular suffrage and a free press are considerably more likely to terminate their use of torture. also given the end of violent dissent, the greater the number of veto points in government, the lower the likelihood that a state terminates its use of torture.”
Brecher, B.. (2008). Torture and the Ticking Bomb. Torture and the Ticking Bomb
“We live in times when, as conor gearty has pointed out, ‘legal scholars in the us are being taken seriously when they float the idea of torture warrants as a reform to what they see as the unacceptably uncodified system of arbitrary torture that they believe currently prevails’. and he is right when he goes on to add that ‘This is like reacting to a series of police killings with proposals to reform the law on homicide so as to sanction officially approved pre-trial executions.’rnrnit is because the general public is taking these academics seriously that there is an urgent need to expose how spurious their ideologically driven arguments are. the “respectability” they confer on the argument that so-called ticking bombs justify torture, and that it had therefore better be regulated, needs to be countered. otherwise there is a real danger that western politicians will succeed in persuading us to go along with them when they insist that another basic freedom – freedom from torture – is yet one more value we must abandon in the endless “war on terrorism”. it is a short road from legalising torture intended to gain information to accepting torture as a legitimate weapon and for all sorts of purposes. the “intellectual respectability” conferred by the academy is essential for that enterprise. thus, since alan dershowitz’s carefully constructed proposal to introduce torture warrants is both the most prominent and the most sophisticated of today’s attempts to make torture respectable, it is his proposal we need to focus on.rnrnin the introduction, i say something about both the intellectual and the political contexts of the so-called ticking bomb scenario that is the basis of these proposals. in chapter two i argue that the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario remains in crucial respects a fantasy; and that the grounds it is said to offer for justifying interrogational torture so as to avoid a putative catastrophe are spurious. in chapter three i argue that, whatever you think of those arguments, the consequences of legalising interrogational torture, and thus institutionalising it, would be so disastrous as to outweigh any such catastrophes anyway. finally, in chapter four, i draw together what the details of my argument imply about torture in general and interrogational torture in particular; and about why any even semi-decent society must abhor torture -– in all circumstances, always, everywhere.”
Lightcap, T.. (2011). The politics of torture. The Politics of Torture
“BACKGROUND it remains uncertain whether basilar-type migraine (bm) is a subtype of migraine with typical aura (mta) or a distinct phenotype or genotype. objective to analyze the symptomatology, familial distribution, and genotype of bm. methods the authors recruited 105 families comprising 362 patients with mta or bm (international classification of headache disorders-1 criteria). among these patients, 38 patients from 29 families had bm. in 12 of the families with bm with an apparently dominant inheritance the authors sequenced all exons of the cacna1a (chromosome 19) and atp1a2 (chromosome 1) genes responsible for most cases of the autosomal dominantly inherited familial hemiplegic migraine and performed a linkage analysis of chromosome 1 and 19 with a nonparametric or autosomal dominant parametric model using an affected only analysis. results bm occurred in 10% (38/362) of patients with mta. the basilar-type aura had a median duration of 60 minutes and comprised vertigo 61%, dysarthria 53%, tinnitus 45%, diplopia 45%, bilateral visual symptoms 40%, bilateral paresthesias 24%, decreased level of consciousness 21%, hypacusia 21%, and ataxia 5%. the relative frequency of the individual basilar-type symptoms was not different from patients with hemiplegic migraine from a previous study. the patients with bm were equally distributed among the 105 families with mta (p = 0.37). the attacks of mta were identical in families with or without bm. no causative mutations and no linkage was identified. conclusions basilar-type aura seemingly may occur at times in any patient with migraine with typical aura. there is no firm clinical, epidemiologic, or genetic evidence that bm is an independent disease entity different from mta.”
Rejali, D.. (2011). Torture and Democracy. In Torture: Power, Democracy, and the Human Body
“I. for a long time — at least six decades — photographs have laid down the tracks of how important conflicts are judged and remembered. the western memory museum is now mostly a visual one. photographs have an insuperable power to determine what we recall of events, and it now seems probable that the defining association of people everywhere with the war that the united states launched pre-emptively in iraq last year will be photographs of the torture of iraqi prisoners by americans in the most infamous of saddam hussein’s prisons, abu ghraib. the bush administration and its defenders have chiefly sought to limit a public-relations disaster — the dissemination of the photographs — rather than deal with the complex crimes of leadership and of policy revealed by the pictures. there was, first of all, the displacement of the reality onto the photographs themselves. the administration’s initial response was to say that the president was shocked and disgusted by the photographs — as if the fault or horror lay in the images, not in what they depict. there was also the avoidance of the word ‘“torture.”’ the prisoners had possibly been the objects of ‘“abuse,”’ eventually of ‘“humiliation”’ — that was the most to be admitted. ‘ “my impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which i believe technically is different from torture,”’ secretary of defense donald rumsfeld said at a press conference. ‘ “and therefore i’m not going to address the ‘torture’ word.”’”
