Excerpt from Prof. Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (1950).
(Op.cit. p.99):
“The attitude common to the teachings of the founders of all great Eastern and Western religions is one in which the supreme aim of living is a concern with man’s soul and the unfolding of his powers of love and reason. Psychoanalysis, far from being a threat to this aim, can on the contrary contribute a great deal to its realization.” […]
(Op.cit. pp.100-102):
“The marketing orientation has established its dominant role as a character pattern only in the modern era. In the personality market all professions, occupations, and statuses appear. Employer, employee, and free-lance—each must depend for material success on personal acceptance by those who would use his services. Here, as in the commodity market, use value is not sufficient to determine exchange value. The “personality factor” takes precedence over skills in the assessment of market value and most frequently plays the deciding role. While it is true that the most winning personality cannot make up for a total lack of skill indeed, our economic system could not function on such a basis—it is seldom that skill and integrity alone account for success.
Success formulae are expressed in such terms as “selling oneself,” “getting one’s personality across,” and “soundness,” “ambition,” “cheerfulness,” “aggressiveness,” and so forth, which are stamped on the prize-winning personality package. Such other intangibles as family background, clubs, connections, and influence are also important desiderata and will be advertised however subtly as basic ingredients of the commodity offered. To belong to a religion and to practice it is also widely regarded as one of the requirements for success. Every profession, every field has its successful personality type.
The salesman, the banker, the foreman, and the headwaiter have met the requirements, each in a different way and to a different degree, but their roles are identifiable, they have measured up to the essential condition: to be in demand. Inevitably man’s attitude toward himself is conditioned by these standards for success. His feeling of self-esteem is not based primarily on the value of his powers and the use he makes of them in a given society. It depends on his salability on the market, or the opinion others have about his “attractiveness.” He experiences himself as a commodity designed to attract on the most favorable, the most expensive terms.
The higher the offered price the greater the affirmation of his value. Commodity man hopefully displays his label, tries to stand out from the assortment on the counter and to be worthy of the highest price tag, but if he is passed by while others are snapped up he is convicted of inferiority and worthlessness. However high he may be rated in terms of both human qualities and utility, he may have the ill-luck—and must bear the blame—of being out of fashion. From early childhood he has learned that to be in fashion is to be in demand and that he too must adapt to the personality mart. But the virtues he is taught ambition, sensitivity, and adaptibility to the demands of others—are qualities too general to provide the patterns for success.
He turns to popular fiction, the newspapers, and the movies for more specific pictures of the success story and finds the smartest, the newest models on the market to emulate. It is hardly surprising that under these circumstances man’s sense of his value must suffer severely.
The conditions for his self-esteem are beyond his control. He is dependent on others for approval and in constant need of it; helplessness and insecurity are the inevitable results. Man loses his own identity in the marketing orientation ; he becomes alienated from himself. If man’s highest value is success, if love, truth, justice, tenderness, mercy are of no use to him, he may profess these ideals but he does not strive for them. He may think that he worships the god of love but he actually worships an idol which is the idealization of his real goals, those rooted in the marketing orientation.”
Cf. The chapter on the marketing orientation in “Man for Himself” (Fromm, 1947).
Liberticide = “destruction of liberty”. adjective liberticidal = “destructive of liberty”. after the French noun combining form liberticide: liberté, liberty + -i- + -cide, killing.
Latin etymology: libertas, liberty + caedere, to kill (cf. tyrannicide & regicide).
∴Ergo: Cognitive liberticide = “the destruction of cognitive liberty”.
bernay
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. "
~ Edward Bernays on the first page of his book entitled "Propaganda" published in 1928.
Bernays was a nephew of Sigmund Freud and applied his ideas about the unconscious mind to mass-psychology. Bernays is allso called the father of public relations and the father of spin.
“Human freedom is best understood as self-determination. free action consists of deliberation, decision, and action. the free human person deserves dignity, that is, we each deserve to be treated as a moral end and not merely as a means to someone else’s end. neurocentrist philosophy-a form of eliminative materialism-based on neuroscience, however, threatens the extinction of the human self and, thereby, threatens to turn our experience of freedom and dignity into a mere delusion. this evacuates the moral agenda of every activist liberation theology. one task of today’s public theologian is to protect cognitive liberty, because it conceptually undergirds political, economic, and social liberation.”
Sommaggio, P., Mazzocca, M., Gerola, A., & Ferro, F.. (2017). Cognitive Liberty. A first step towards a human neuro-rights declaration. BioLaw Journal
“This paper discusses the emerging debate concerning the concept of cognitive liberty and its connection with human rights. therefore, considering how recent developments of neurosciences are granting us an increasing ability to monitor and influence mental processes, this article aims to provide a clear definition of cognitive liberty understood as a necessary condition to all other freedoms that cannot be reduced to existing rights. in this regard, after presenting the most important positions on the issue, we introduce our point of view, according to which cognitive liberty allows us to lay the groundwork for building new neurorelated human rights.”
Weissenbacher, A.. (2018). Defending cognitive liberty in an age of moral engineering. Theology and Science
“In 2009, mark walker first proposed the genetic virtue project, advancing that science should explore using genetic engineering to eliminate moral evils just as it attempts to eliminate natural ones like disease. this seemed like an issue for the far future given the unique challenges. walker focused on the wrong aspect of personhood, however, as moral engineering of the brain appears to be a more likely possibility. as early aspects of moral engineering the brain are in development, especially through the manipulation of the neural correlates of religious and political beliefs, emotions, and behaviors, i consider several issues surrounding this project so as to protect individual rights and prevent future harms. i advance an internal criterion for the field called acceptability across ideologies to serve as a guide to protect against coercive and harmful technologies and analyze how current laws protecting cognitive liberty are lacking and in need of revision.”
Sommaggio, P., & Mazzocca, M.. (2020). Cognitive liberty and human rights. In Neuroscience and Law: Complicated Crossings and New Perspectives
“This chapter discusses the emerging debate regarding the relationship between the concept of cognitive liberty and human rights. for this reason, after briefly presenting some issues related to the development of recent neurotechnology, the different types of definitions of the concept of cognitive liberty, that have been recently proposed, are illustrated. starting from these last, this chapter aims to analyze how, the whole relationship between human rights and cognitive liberty can change depending on the legislative strategy that one prefers to undertake.”
Ienca, M.. (2017). The Right to Cognitive Liberty. Scientific American
“Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. this paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. after analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.”
Walsh, C.. (2010). Drugs and human rights: Private palliatives, sacramental freedoms and cognitive liberty. International Journal of Human Rights
Kraft, C. J., & Giordano, J.. (2017). Integrating brain science and law: Neuroscientific evidence and legal perspectives on protecting individual liberties. Frontiers in Neuroscience
“Advances in neuroscientific techniques have found increasingly broader applications, including in legal neuroscience (or ‘neurolaw’), where experts in the brain sciences are called to testify in the courtroom. but does the incursion of neuroscience into the legal sphere constitute a threat to individual liberties? and what legal protections are there against such threats? in this paper, we outline individual rights as they interact with neuroscientific methods. we then proceed to examine the current uses of neuroscientific evidence, and ultimately determine whether the rights of the individual are endangered by such approaches. based on our analysis, we conclude that while federal evidence rules constitute a substantial hurdle for the use of neuroscientific evidence, more ethical safeguards are needed to protect against future violations of fundamental rights. finally, we assert that it will be increasingly imperative for the legal and neuroscientific communities to work together to better define the limits, capabilities, and intended direction of neuroscientific methods applicable for use in law.”
Rainey, S., Martin, S., Christen, A., Mégevand, P., & Fourneret, E.. (2020). Brain Recording, Mind-Reading, and Neurotechnology: Ethical Issues from Consumer Devices to Brain-Based Speech Decoding. Science and Engineering Ethics
“Brain reading technologies are rapidly being developed in a number of neuroscience fields. these technologies can record, process, and decode neural signals. this has been described as ‘mind reading technology’ in some instances, especially in popular media. should the public at large, be concerned about this kind of technology? can it really read minds? concerns about mind-reading might include the thought that, in having one’s mind open to view, the possibility for free deliberation, and for self-conception, are eroded where one isn’t at liberty to privately mull things over. themes including privacy, cognitive liberty, and self-conception and expression appear to be areas of vital ethical concern. overall, this article explores whether brain reading technologies are really mind reading technologies. if they are, ethical ways to deal with them must be developed. if they are not, researchers and technology developers need to find ways to describe them more accurately, in order to dispel unwarranted concerns and address appropriately those that are warranted.”
Ienca, M., & Andorno, R.. (2021). Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and Neurotechnology. Analisis Filosofico
“Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. this paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. after analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.”
Wolpe, P. R.. (2017). Neuroprivacy and cognitive liberty. In The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics
“The term ‘‘cognitive liberty’’ has been used in a variety of ways. in general, it refers to the degree to which an individual has the right to control his or her own mental and emotional brain processes against the desires of external agents, especially the state, to control or access them. it is largely reflective of the value of neuroprivacy, the idea that privacy rights extend to a citizen’s brain, and that if privacy has any meaning at all, it must mean one’s right to protect the contents of one’s brain (i.e., one’s thoughts, emotions, and other subjective states). these terms are relatively recent concepts, reactions to the development of neurotechnologies that are beginning to allow unprecedented access to the inner workings of the brain. the values they reflect, however, have a long pedigree.”
Walsh, C.. (2014). Beyond religious freedom: Psychedelics and cognitive liberty. In Prohibition, Religious Freedom, and Human Rights: Regulating Traditional Drug Use
“This chapter will examine the blurred boundaries between the sacred and the secular when it comes to psychedelic experiences, and the inevitable ensuing arbitrariness involved in protecting some such rituals and not others. it will put forth the argument that there is a need to move beyond simply seeking exemptions from drug prohibition in the name of religious freedom; rather, there should be a broader right to ingest psychedelics as an aspect of cognitive liberty. cognitive liberty is the right to control one’s own consciousness. it is a concept that equates to freedom of thought, a right protected internationally by the universal declaration of human rights and enforceable in europe through article 9 of the european convention of human rights.”
White, A. E.. (2010). The lie of fMRI: An examination of the ethics of a market in lie detection using functional magnetic resonance imaging. HEC Forum
“The financial crisis, and associated scandals, created a sense of a juridical deficit with regard to the financial sector. forms of independent judgement within the sector appeared compromised, while judgement over the sector seemed unattainable. elites, in the classical millsian sense of those taking tacitly coordinated ‘big decisions’ over the rest of the public, seemed absent. this article argues that the eradication of jurisdictional elites is an effect of neoliberalism, as articulated most coherently by hayek. it characterizes the neoliberal project as an effort to elevate ‘unconscious’ processes over ‘conscious’ ones, which in practice means elevating cybernetic, non- human systems and processes over discursive spheres of politics and judgement. yet such a system still produces its own types of elite power, which come to consist in acts of translation, rather than judgement. firstly, there are ‘cyborg intermediaries’: elites which operate largely within the system of codes, data, screens and prices. secondly, there are ‘diplomatic intermediaries’: elites who come to narrate and justify what markets (and associated technologies and bodies) are ‘saying’. the paper draws on lazzarato’s work on signifying vs asignifying semiotics in order to articulate this, and concludes by considering the types of elite crisis which these forms of power tend to produce.”
Foster, J. B., & Holleman, H.. (2010). The Financial Power Elite. Monthly Review
“The article presents an historical overview of the emergence of the financial sector within the u.s. banking system, focusing on the developments of the end of the 20th century which led to the formation of a financial elite. introductory comments are given noting the rise and fall of different regulatory regimes within the u.s. banking sector in the first half of the century up to 1980. in-depth discussion is then provided highlighting the concentration of the financial sector as a dominant force in the nation’s economy up to the events of the 2008 global financial crisis and the return of political demands for regulation.”
Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P., & Haidt, J.. (2012). Understanding libertarian morality: The psychological dispositions of self-identified libertarians. PLoS ONE
“Libertarians are an increasingly prominent ideological group in u.s. politics, yet they have been largely unstudied. across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, we sought to understand the moral and psychological characteristics of self-described libertarians. based on an intuitionist view of moral judgment, we focused on the underlying affective and cognitive dispositions that accompany this unique worldview. compared to self-identified liberals and conservatives, libertarians showed 1) stronger endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding principle, and weaker endorsement of all other moral principles; 2) a relatively cerebral as opposed to emotional cognitive style; and 3) lower interdependence and social relatedness. as predicted by intuitionist theories concerning the origins of moral reasoning, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences. our findings add to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.”
Boire, R.. (2000). On Cognitive Liberty. In Journal of Cognitive Liberties
“Mirando la pagina de este hombre resulta que es un abogado que dirige un centro por el derecho a la libertad cognitiva y dirigia una revista del mismo nombre que defiende el derecho a mi propio cerebro, especialmente en (a) nadie me puede obligar a tomar psicofarmacos (b) tengo todo el derecho a consumar las drogas que me de la gana (incluyendo marihuana, cannabis etc”
Ienca, M., & Andorno, R.. (2017). Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology. Life Sciences, Society and Policy
“Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. this paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. after analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.”
Shanker, S. G.. (2009). Three concepts of liberty. In After Cognitivism: A Reassessment of Cognitive Science and Philosophy
Rindermann, H.. (2012). Intellectual classes, technological progress and economic development: The rise of cognitive capitalism. Personality and Individual Differences
SENTENTIA, W.. (2006). Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
“Developers of nbic (nano-bio-info-cogno) technologies face a multitude of obstacles, not the least of which is navigating the public ethics of their applied research. biotechnologies have received widespread media attention and spawned heated interest in their perceived social implications. now, in view of the rapidly expanding purview of neuroscience and the growing array of technologic developments capable of affecting or monitoring cognition, the emerging field of neuroethics calls for a consideration of the social and ethical implications of neuroscientific discoveries and trends. to negotiate the complex ethical issues at stake in new and emerging kinds of technologies for improving human cognition, we need to overcome political, disciplinary, and religious sectarianism. we need analytical models that protect values of personhood at the heart of a functional democracy-values that allow, as much as possible, for individual decision-making, despite transformations in our understanding and ability to manipulate cognitive processes. addressing cognitive enhancement from the legal and ethical notion of ‘cognitive liberty’ provides a powerful tool for assessing and encouraging nbic developments.”
Desai, A. C.. (2011). Libertarian Paternalism, Externalities, and the “Spirit of Liberty”: How Thaler and Sunstein Are Nudging Us toward an “Overlapping Consensus”. Law and Social Inquiry, 36(1), 263–295.
“In their 2008 book nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, andnhappiness, richard thaler and cass sunstein use research from psychologynand behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematicncognitive biases. they propose that policy makers mitigate these biasesnby framing people’s choices in ways that help people act in their ownnself-interest. thaler and sunstein call this approach “libertariannpaternalism,{’’} and they market it as “the real third way.{’’} in thisnessay, i argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinkingnabout policy making but that “choice architecture{’’} is not just ansolution to the problem of cognitive biases. rather, it is a means ofnapproaching any kind of policy making. i further argue that policynmakers must take externalities into account, even when using choicenarchitecture. finally, i argue that libertarian paternalism can best benseen as motivated by what sunstein has celebrated in his work onnconstitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy-makernerror embodied in learned hand’s famous aphorism about the “spirit ofnliberty{’’} and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching fornwhat john rawls called an “overlapping consensus.{’’}.”
Pustilnik, A. C.. (2012). Neurotechnologies at the intersection of criminal procedure and constitutional law. In The Constitution and the Future of Criminal Justice in America
“The rapid development of neurotechnologies poses novel constitutional issues for criminal law and criminal procedure. these technologies can identify directly from brain waves whether a person is familiar with a stimulus like a face or a weapon, can model blood flow in the brain to indicate whether a person is lying, and can even interfere with brain processes themselves via high-powered magnets to cause a person to be less likely to lie to an investigator. these technologies implicate the constitutional privilege against compelled, self-incriminating speech under the fifth amendment and the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment of the united states constitution. law enforcement use of these technologies will not just require extending existing constitutional doctrine to cover new facts but will challenge these doctrines’ foundations. this short chapter discusses cognitive privacy and liberty under the fourth and fifth amendments, showing how current jurisprudence under both amendments stumbles on limited and limiting distinctions between the body and the mind, the physical and the informational. brain processes and emanations sit at the juncture of these categories. this chapter proposes a way to transcend these limitations while remaining faithful to precedent, extending these important constitutional protections into a new era of direct access to the brain/mind.”
Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. The soldan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.
Opinion is of two kinds, to wit, opinion of interest, and opinion of right. By opinion of interest, I chiefly understand the sense of the general advantage which is reaped from government; together with the persuasion, that the particular government, which is established, is equally advantageous with any other that could easily be settled. When this opinion prevails among the generality of a state, or among those who have the force in their hands, it gives great security to any government.
Right is of two kinds, right to Power and right to Property. What prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind, may easily be understood, by observing the attachment which all nations have to their ancient government, and even to those names, which have had the sanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right; and whatever disadvantageous sentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal° both of blood and treasure in the maintenance of public justice.a There is, indeed, no particular, in which, at first sight, there may appear a greater contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men act in a faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to serve their party; and yet, when a faction is formed upon a point of right or principle, there is no occasion, where men discover a greater obstinacy, and a more determined sense of justice and equity. The same social disposition of mankind is the cause of these contradictory appearances.
It is sufficiently understood, that the opinion of right to property is of moment in all matters of government. A noted author has made property the foundation of all government;1[34] and most of our political writers seem inclined to follow him in that particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but still it must be owned, that the opinion of right to property has a great influence in this subject.
Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of right to power, and of right to property, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles, which add force to these, and determine, limit, or alter their operation; such as self-interest,fear, and affection: But still we may assert, that these other principles can have no influence alone, but suppose the antecedent influence of those opinions above-mentioned. They are, therefore, to be esteemed the secondary, not the original principles of government.
For, first, as to self-interest, by which I mean the expectation of particular rewards, distinct from the general protection which we receive from government, it is evident that the magistrate’s authority must be antecedently established, at least be hoped for, in order to produce this expectation. The prospect of reward may augment his authority with regard to some particular persons; but can never give birth to it, with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the greatest favours from their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of any considerable number of the state would never center in any particular set of men, if these men had no other title to magistracy, and had no separate influence over the opinions of mankind. The same observation may be extended to the other two principles of fear and affection. No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; since, as a single man, his bodily force can reach but a small way, and all the farther power he possesses must be founded either on our own opinion, or on the presumed opinion of others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a sovereign extends very far, and has great influence; yet he must antecedently be supposed invested with a public character, otherwise the public esteem will serve him in no stead,° nor will his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow sphere.
[35]
A Government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power, and the balance of property do not coincide. This chiefly happens, where any rank or order of the state has acquired a large share in the property; but from the original constitution of the government, has no share in the power. Under what pretence would any individual of that order assume authority in public affairs? As men are commonly much attached to their ancient government, it is not to be expected, that the public would ever favour such usurpations. But where the original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an order of men, who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for them gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the case with the house of commons in England.
Most writers, that have treated of the British government, have supposed, that, as the lower house represents all the commons of Great Britain, its weight in the scale is proportioned to the property and power of all whom it represents. But this principle must not be received as absolutely true. For though the people are apt to attach themselves more to the house of commons, than to any other member of the constitution; that house being chosen by them as their representatives, and as the public guardians of their liberty; yet are there instances where the house, even when in opposition to the crown, has not been followed by the people; as we may particularly observe of the tory house of commons in the reign of king William.2 Were the members obliged to receive instructions from their constituents, like the Dutch deputies, [36] this would entirely alter the case; and if such immense power and riches, as those of all the commons of Great Britain, were brought into the scale, it is not easy to conceive, that the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withstand that overbalance of property. It is true, the crown has great influence over the collective body in the elections of members; but were this influence, which at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted; and no skill, popularity, or revenue, could support it. I must, therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration in this particular would introduce a total alteration in our government, and would soon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form. For though the people, collected in a body like the Roman tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when dispersed in small bodies, they are more susceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great measure, broken; and the public interest may be pursued with some method and constancy. But it is needless to reason any farther concerning a form of government, which is never likely to have place in Great Britain, and which seems not to be the aim of any party amongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much as possible, without encouraging a passion for such dangerous novelties.b
Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice; without which there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse. We are, therefore, to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice, or, in other words, the support of the twelve judges. Kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers, and privy-counsellors, are all subordinate in their end to this part of administration. Even the clergy, as their duty leads them to inculcate morality, may [38] justly be thought, so far as regards this world, to have no other useful object of their institution.
All men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace and order for the maintenance of society. Yet, notwithstanding this strong and obvious necessity, such is the frailty or perverseness of our nature! it is impossible to keep men, faithfully and unerringly, in the paths of justice. Some extraordinary circumstances may happen, in which a man finds his interests to be more promoted by fraud or rapine, than hurt by the breach which his injustice makes in the social union. But much more frequently, he is seduced from his great and important, but distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often very frivolous temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature.
Men must, therefore, endeavour to palliate° what they cannot cure. They must institute some persons, under the appellation° of magistrates, whose peculiar° office it is, to point out the decrees of equity, to punish transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and to oblige men, however reluctant, to consult their own real and permanent interests. In a word, Obedience is a new duty which must be invented to support that of Justice; and the tyes° of equity must be corroborated by those of allegiance.
But still, viewing matters in an abstract light, it may be thought, that nothing is gained by this alliance, and that the factitious° duty of obedience, from its very nature, lays as feeble a hold of the human mind, as the primitive and natural duty of justice. Peculiar interests and present temptations may overcome the one as well as the other. They are equally exposed to the same inconvenience. And the man, who is inclined to be a bad neighbour, must be led by the same motives, well or ill understood, to be a bad citizen and subject. Not to mention, that the magistrate himself may often be negligent, or partial, or unjust in his administration.
Experience, however, proves, that there is a great difference between the cases. Order in society, we find, is much [39] better maintained by means of government; and our duty to the magistrate is more strictly guarded by the principles of human nature, than our duty to our fellow-citizens. The love of dominion is so strong in the breast of man, that many, not only submit to, but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government; and men, once raised to that station, though often led astray by private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible interest in the impartial administration of justice. The persons, who first attain this distinction by the consent, tacit or express, of the people, must be endowed with superior personal qualities of valour, force, integrity, or prudence, which command respect and confidence: and after government is established, a regard to birth, rank, and station has a mighty influence over men, and enforces the decrees of the magistrate. The prince or leader exclaims°against every disorder, which disturbs his society. He summons all his partizans and all men of probity°to aid him in correcting and redressing it: and he is readily followed by all indifferent persons in the execution of his office. He soon acquires the power of rewarding these services; and in the progress of society, he establishes subordinate ministers and often a military force, who find an immediate and a visible interest, in supporting his authority. Habit soon consolidates what other principles of human nature had imperfectly founded; and men, once accustomed to obedience, never think of departing from that path, in which they and their ancestors have constantly trod, and to which they are confined by so many urgent and visible motives.
But though this progress of human affairs may appear certain and inevitable, and though the support which allegiance brings to justice, be founded on obvious principles of human nature, it cannot be expected that men should beforehand be able to discover them, or foresee their operation. Government commences more casually and more imperfectly. It is probable, that the first ascendant° of one man over multitudes begun during a state of war; where the superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself most visibly, where unanimity and concert [40] are most requisite, and where the pernicious effects of disorder are most sensibly felt. The long continuance of that state, an incident common among savage tribes, enured the people to submission; and if the chieftain possessed as much equity as prudence and valour, he became, even during peace, the arbiter of all differences, and could gradually, by a mixture of force and consent, establish his authority. The benefit sensibly felt from his influence, made it be cherished by the people, at least by the peaceable and well disposed among them; and if his son enjoyed the same good qualities, government advanced the sooner to maturity and perfection; but was still in a feeble state, till the farther progress of improvement procured the magistrate a revenue, and enabled him to bestow rewards on the several instruments of his administration, and to inflict punishments on the refractory° and disobedient. Before that period, each exertion of his influence must have been particular, and founded on the peculiar circumstances of the case. After it, submission was no longer a matter of choice in the bulk of the community, but was rigorously exacted by the authority of the supreme magistrate.
In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine° struggle, open or secret, between Authority and Liberty; and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the contest. A great sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in every government; yet even the authority, which confines liberty, can never, and perhaps ought never, in any constitution, to become quite entire and uncontroulable. The sultan is master of the life and fortune of any individual; but will not be permitted to impose new taxes on his subjects: a French monarch can impose taxes at pleasure; but would find it dangerous to attempt the lives and fortunes of individuals. Religion also, in most countries, is commonly found to be a very intractable principle; and other principles or prejudices frequently resist all the authority of the civil magistrate; whose power, being founded on opinion, can never subvert other opinions, equally rooted with that of his title to dominion. The government, which, in common appellation, receives the appellation of [41] free, is that which admits of a partition of power among several members, whose united authority is no less, or is commonly greater than that of any monarch; but who, in the usual course of administration, must act by general and equal laws, that are previously known to all the members and to all their subjects. In this sense, it must be owned,° that liberty is the perfection of civil society; but still authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence: and in those contests, which so often take place between the one and the other, the latter may, on that account, challenge the preference. Unless perhaps one may say (and it may be said with some reason) that a circumstance, which is essential to the existence of civil society, must always support itself, and needs be guarded with less jealousy, than one that contributes only to its perfection, which the indolence of men is so apt to neglect, or their ignorance to overlook.
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave,and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public good. Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no security at all.
It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears [43] somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact.But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider, that men are generally more honest in their private than in their public capacity, and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries. To which we may add, that every court or senate is determined by the greater number of voices; so that, if self-interest influences only the majority, (as it will always dob) the whole senate follows the allurements of this separate interest, and acts as if it contained not one member, who had any regard to public interest and liberty.
When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among several courts,° and several orders of men, we should always consider the separate interest of each court, and each order; and, if we find that, by the skilful division of power, this interest must necessarily, in its operation, concur with public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy. If, on the contrary, separate interest be not checked, and be not directed to the public, we ought to look for nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny from such a government. In this opinion I am justified by experience, as well as by the authority of all philosophers and politicians, both antient and modern.
How much, therefore, would it have surprised such a genius as Cicero, or Tacitus, to have been told, that, in a future age, there should arise a very regular system of mixed government, where the authority was so distributed, that one rank, whenever it pleased, might swallow up all the rest, and engross the whole power of the constitution. Such a government, they would say, will not be a mixed government. For so great is the natural ambition of men, that they are never satisfied [44] with power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own interest, can usurp upon every other order, it will certainly do so, and render itself, as far as possible, absolute and uncontroulable.
But, in this opinion, experience shews they would have been mistaken. For this is actually the case with the British constitution. The share of power, allotted by our constitution to the house of commons, is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king’s legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. For though the king has a negative in framing laws; yet this, in fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two houses, is always sure to pass into a law, and the royal assent is little better than a form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the executive power. But besides that the executive power in every government is altogether subordinate to the legislative; besides this, I say, the exercise of this power requires an immense expence; and the commons have assumed to themselves the sole right of granting money. How easy, therefore, would it be for that house to wrest from the crown all these powers, one after another; by making every grant conditional, and choosing their time so well, that their refusal of supply should only distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us? Did the house of commons depend in the same manner on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command all their resolutions, and be from that moment absolute? As to the house of lords, they are a very powerful support to the Crown, so long as they are, in their turn, supported by it; but both experience and reason shew, that they have no force or authority sufficient to maintain themselves alone, without such support.
How, therefore, shall we solve this paradox? And by what means is this member of our constitution confined within the proper limits; since, from our very constitution, it must necessarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itself? How is this consistent with our experience [45]of human nature? I answer, that the interest of the body is here restrained by that of the individuals, and that the house of commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The crown has so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the house, it will always command the resolutions of the whole so far, at least, as to preserve the antient constitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government.
Instead then of asserting1 absolutely, that the dependence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of British liberty, the country-party should have made some concessions to their adversaries, and have only examined what was the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But such a moderation is not to be expected in party-men of any kind. After a concession of this nature, all declamation must be abandoned; and a calm enquiry into the proper degree of court-influence and parliamentary dependence would have been expected by the readers. And though the advantage, in such a controversy, might possibly remain to the country-party;yet the victory would not be so compleat as they wish for, nor would a true patriot have given an entire loose to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, by diminishing too2 far the influence [46] of the crown. It was, therefore, thought best to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the constitution, or that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.
All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are difficult to be decided; both because it is not easy to find words proper to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in such cases, run so gradually into each other, as even to render our sentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the present case, which would embarrass the most knowing and most impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodged in a single person, either king or minister; and as this person may have either a greater or less degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, where the authority is distributed among several assemblies or senates, the checks and controuls are more regular in their operation; because the members of such numerous assemblies may be presumed to be always nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and it is only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into consideration. But a limited monarchy admits not of any such stability; nor is it possible to assign to the crown such a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counterbalance to the other parts of the constitution. This is an unavoidable disadvantage, among the many advantages, attending that species of government.
[47]
ESSAY VII: WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INCLINES MORE TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, OR TO A REPUBLIC↩
It affords a violent° prejudice against almost every science, that no prudent man, however sure of his principles, dares prophesy concerning any event, or foretel the remote consequences of things. A physician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after: And still less dares a politician foretel the situation of public affairs a few years hence. Harrington thought himself so sure of his general principle, that the balance of power depends on that of property, that he ventured to pronounce it impossible ever to re-establish monarchy in England: But his book was scarcely published when the king was restored; and we see, that monarchy has ever since subsisted upon the [48] same footing as before.1 Notwithstanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine an important question, to wit, Whether theBritishgovernment inclines more to absolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of these two species of government it will most probably terminate? As there seems not to be any great danger of a sudden revolution either way, I shall at least escape the shame attending my temerity,° if I should be found to have been mistaken.
Those who assert, that the balance of our government inclines towards absolute monarchy, may support their opinion by the following reasons. That property has a great influence on power cannot possibly be denied; but yet the general maxim, that the balance of one depends on the balance of the other, must be received with several limitations. It is evident, that much less property in a single hand will be able to counterbalance a greater property in several; not only because it is difficult to make many persons combine in the same views and measures; but because property, when united, causes much greater dependence, than the same property, when dispersed. A hundred persons, of 1000l. a year a-piece, can consume all their income, and no body shall ever be the better for them, except their servants and tradesmen, who justly regard their profits as the product of their own labour. But a man possessed of 100,000l. a year, if he has either any generosity or any cunning, may create a great dependence by obligations, and still a greater by expectations. Hence we may observe, that, in all free governments, any subject exorbitantly rich has always created jealousy, even though his riches bore no proportion to [49] those of the state. Crassus’s fortune,2 if I remember well, amounted only to about two millions and a half of our money;a,b yet we find, that, though his genius was nothing extraordinary, he was able, by means of his riches alone, to counterbalance, during his lifetime, the power of Pompey as well as that of Cæsar, who afterwards became master of the world. The wealth of the Medici made them masters of Florence;3 though, it is probable, it was not considerable, compared to the united property of that opulent republic.
These considerations are apt to make one entertain a magnificent idea of the British spirit and love of liberty; since we could maintain our free government, during so many centuries, against our sovereigns, who, besides the power and dignity and majesty of the crown, have always been possessed of much more property than any subject has ever enjoyed in any commonwealth. But it may be said, that this spirit, however great, will never be able to support itself against that immense property, which is now lodged in the king, and which is still encreasing. Upon a moderate computation, there are near three millions a year at the disposal of the crown. The civil list amounts to near a million; the collection of all taxes to another; and the employments in the army and navy, together with ecclesiastical preferments,° to above a third million: An enormous sum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth part of the whole income and labour of the kingdom. When we add to this great property, the encreasing luxury of the nation, our proneness to corruption, together with the great power and prerogatives of the crown, and the [50] command of military force, there is no one but must despair of being able, without extraordinary efforts, to support our free government much longer under these disadvantages.
On the other hand, those who maintain, that the byass° of the British government leans towards a republic, may support their opinion by specious° arguments. It may be said, that, though this immense property in the crown, be joined to the dignity of first magistrate, and to many other legal powers and prerogatives, which should naturally give it greater influence; yet it really becomes less dangerous to liberty upon that very account. Were England a republic, and were any private man possessed of a revenue, a third, or even a tenth part as large as that of the crown, he would very justly excite jealousy; because he would infallibly have great authority, in the government: And such an irregular authority, not avowed by the laws, is always more dangerous than a much greater authority, derived from them. A man, possessed of usurped power, can set no bounds to his pretensions:c His partizans have liberty to hope for every thing in his favour: His enemies provoke his ambition, with his fears, by the violence of their opposition: And the government being thrown into a ferment, every corrupted humour in the state naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal authority, though great, has always some bounds, which terminate both the hopes and pretensions of the person possessed of it: The laws must have provided a remedy against its excesses: Such an eminent magistrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his usurpations: And as his legal authority is quietly submitted to, he has small temptation and small opportunity of extending it farther. Besides, it happens, with regard to ambitious aims and projects, what may be observed with regard to sects of philosophy and religion. A new sect excites such a ferment, and is both opposed and defended with such vehemence, that it always spreads faster, and multiplies its partizans with greater rapidity, than any old established opinion, recommended by the sanction of the laws and of antiquity. Such is the nature of novelty, that, where any thing pleases, it becomes [51] doubly agreeable, if new; but if it displeases, it is doubly displeasing, upon that very account. And, in most cases, the violence of enemies is favourable to ambitious projects, as well as the zeal of partizans.
It may farther be said, that, though men be much governed by interest; yet even interest itself, and all human affairs, are entirely governed by opinion. Now, there has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of men within these last fifty years, by the progress of learning and of liberty. Most people, in this island, have divested themselves of all superstitious reverence to names and authority: The clergy have much lostd their credit: Their pretensions and doctrines have been ridiculed; and even religion can scarcely support itself in the world. The mere name of king commands little respect; and to talk of a king as GOD’s vicegerent° on earth, or to give him any of those magnificent titles, which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one. Though the crown, by means of its large revenue, may maintain its authority in times of tranquillity, upon private interest and influence; yet, as the least shock or convulsion must break all these interests to pieces, the royal power, being no longer supported by the settled principles and opinions of men, will immediately dissolve. Had men been in the same disposition at the revolution, as they are at present, monarchy would have run a great risque° of being entirely lost in this island.
Durst I° venture to deliver my own sentiments amidst these opposite arguments, I would assert, that, unless there happen some extraordinary convulsion, the power of the crown, by means of its large revenue, is rather upon the encrease; though, at the same time I own, that its progress seems very slow, and almost insensible. The tide has run long, and with some rapidity, to the side of popular government, and is just beginning to turn towards monarchy.
It is well known, that every government must come to a period,° and that death is unavoidable to the political as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to another, it may be enquired, whether it be more [52] desirable for the British constitution to terminate in a popular government, or in absolute monarchy? Here I would frankly declare, that, though liberty be preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I should rather wish to see an absolute monarch than a republic in this island. For, let us consider, what kind of republic we have reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary republic, of which a man may form a plan in his closet.° There is no doubt, but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than absolute monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But what reason have we to expect that any such government will ever be established in Great Britain, upon the dissolution of our monarchy? If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an absolute monarch; and we have already had an instance of this kind, sufficient to convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or establish any free government.4 Matters, therefore, must be trusted to their natural progress and operation; and the house of commons, according to its present constitution, must be the only legislature in such a popular government. The inconveniencies attending such a situation of affairs, present themselves by thousands. If the house of commons, in such a case, ever dissolve itself, which is not to be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it continue itself, we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction, subdivided into new factions. And, as such a violent government cannot long subsist, [53] we shall, at last, after many convulsions, and civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have been happier for us to have established peaceably from the beginning. Absolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest death, the true Euthanasia° of the British constitution.
Thus, if we have reason to be more jealous of monarchy, because the danger is more imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to be more jealous of popular government, because that danger is more terrible. This may teach us a lesson of moderation in all our political controversies.
Of all men, that distinguish themselves by memorable achievements, the first place of honour seems due to Legislators and founders of states, who transmit a system of laws and institutions to secure the peace, happiness, and liberty of future generations. The influence of useful inventions in the arts and sciences may, perhaps, extend farther than that of wise laws, whose effects are limited both in time and place; but the benefit arising from the former, is not so sensible as that which results from the latter. Speculative sciences do, indeed, improve the mind; but this advantage reaches only to a few persons, who have leisure to apply themselves to them. And as to practical arts, which encrease the commodities and enjoyments of life, it is well known, that [55] men’s happiness consists not so much in an abundance of these, as in the peace and security with which they possess them; and those blessings can only be derived from good government. Not to mention, that general virtue and good morals in a state, which are so requisite to happiness, can never arise from the most refined precepts of philosophy, or even the severest injunctions of religion; but must proceed entirely from the virtuous education of youth, the effect of wise laws and institutions. I must, therefore, presume to differ from Lord Bacon in this particular, and must regard antiquity as somewhat unjust in its distribution of honours, when it made gods of all the inventors of useful arts, such as Ceres, Bacchus, Æsculapius; and dignify legislators, such as Romulus and Theseus, only with the appellation of demigods and heroes.1
As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other. And what should render the founders of parties more odious is, the difficulty of extirpating°these weeds, when once they have taken root in any state. They naturally propagate themselves for many centuries, and seldom end but by the total dissolution of that government, in which they are sown. They are, besides, plants which grow most plentifully in the richest soil; and though absolute governments be not wholly free from them, it must be confessed, that they rise more easily, and propagate themselves faster in free governments, [56] where they always infect the legislature itself, which alone could be able, by the steady application of rewards and punishments, to eradicate them.
Factions may be divided into Personal and Real; that is, into factions, founded on personal friendship or animosity among such as compose the contending parties, and into those founded on some real difference of sentiment or interest. The reason of this distinction is obvious; though I must acknowledge, that parties are seldom found pure and unmixed, either of the one kind or the other. It is not often seen, that a government divides into factions, where there is no difference in the views of the constituent members, either real or apparent, trivial or material: And in those factions, which are founded on the most real and most material difference, there is always observed a great deal of personal animosity or affection. But notwithstanding this mixture, a party may be denominated either personal or real, according to that principle which is predominant, and is found to have the greatest influence.
Personal factions arise most easily in small republics. Every domestic quarrel, there, becomes an affair of state. Love, vanity, emulation, any passion, as well as ambition and resentment, begets public division. The Neri and Bianchi of Florence, the Fregosi and Adorni of Genoa, the Colonesi and Orsini of modern Rome, were parties of this kind.2
Men have such a propensity to divide into personal factions, that the smallest appearance of real difference will produce [57] them. What can be imagined more trivial than the difference between one colour of livery and another in horse races? Yet this difference begat two most inveterate factions in the Greek empire, the Prasini and Veneti, who never suspended their animosities, till they ruined that unhappy government.3
We find in the Roman history a remarkable dissension between two tribes, the Pollia and Papiria, which continued for the space of near three hundred years, and discovered itself in their suffrages at every election of magistrates.4[58] This faction was the more remarkable, as it could continue for so long a tract of time; even though it did not spread itself, nor draw any of the other tribes into a share of the quarrel. If mankind had not a strong propensity to such divisions, the indifference of the rest of the community must have suppressed this foolish animosity, that had not any aliment° of new benefits and injuries, of general sympathy and antipathy, which never fail to take place, when the whole state is rent into two equal factions.a
Nothing is more usual than to see parties, which have begun upon a real difference, continue even after that difference is lost. When men are once inlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions they often transmit to their posterity. The real difference between Guelf and Ghibbelline was long lost in Italy, before these factions were extinguished. The Guelfs adhered to the pope, the Ghibbellines to the emperor; yet the family of Sforza, who were in alliance with the emperor, though they were Guelfs, being expelled Milan by the king5 of France, assisted by Jacomo Trivulzio and the Ghibbellines, the pope concurred with the latter, and they formed leagues with the pope against the emperor.6
[59]
The civil wars which arose some few years ago in Morocco, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a pleasant difference.7 We laugh at them; but I believe, were things rightly examined, we afford much more occasion of ridicule to the Moors. For, what are all the wars of religion, which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world? They are certainly more absurd than the Moorish civil wars. The difference of complexion is a sensible and a real difference: But the controversy about an article of faith, which is utterly absurd and unintelligible, is not a difference in sentiment, but in a few phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of, without understanding them; and the other refuses in the same manner.c
Real factions may be divided into those from interest, from principle, and from affection. Of all factions, the first are the most reasonable, and the most excusable. Where two orders of men, such as the nobles and people, have a distinct authority in a government, not very accurately balanced and modelled, they naturally follow a distinct interest; nor can we reasonably expect a different conduct, considering that degree of selfishness implanted in human nature. It requires great skill in a legislator to prevent such parties; and many philosophers are of opinion, that this secret, like the grand elixir, or perpetual motion, may amuse men in theory, but can never possibly be reduced to practice.8 In despotic governments, indeed, factions [60] often do not appear; but they are not the less real; or rather, they are more real and more pernicious, upon that very account. The distinct orders of men, nobles and people, soldiers and merchants, have all a distinct interest; but the more powerful oppresses the weaker with impunity, and without resistance; which begets a seeming tranquillity in such governments.d
There has been an attempt in England to divide the landed and trading part of the nation; but without success. The interests of these two bodies are not really distinct, and never will be so, till our public debts encrease to such a degree, as to become altogether oppressive and intolerable.
Parties from principle, especially abstract speculative principle, are known only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable phænomenon, that has yet appeared in human affairs. Where different principles beget a contrariety° of conduct, which is the case with all different political principles, the matter may be more easily explained. A man, who esteems the true right of government to lie in one man, or one family, cannot easily agree with his fellow-citizen, who thinks that another man or family is possessed of this right. Each naturally wishes that right may take place, according to his own notions of it. But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?
Two men travelling on the highway, the one east, the other west, can easily pass each other, if the way be broad enough: But two men, reasoning upon opposite principles of religion, cannot so easily pass, without shocking; though one should think, that the way were also, in that case, sufficiently broad, and that each might proceed, without interruption, in his own course. But such is the nature of the human mind, that it always lays hold on every mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully fortified by an unanimity of sentiments, so is [61] it shocked and disturbed by any contrariety. Hence the eagerness, which most people discover° in a dispute; and hence their impatience of opposition, even in the most speculative and indifferent opinions.
This principle, however frivolous it may appear, seems to have been the origin of all religious wars and divisions. But as this principle is universal in human nature, its effects would not have been confined to one age, and to one sect of religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental causes, which raise it to such a height, as to produce the greatest misery and devastation. Most religions of the ancient world arose in the unknown ages of government, when men were as yet barbarous and uninstructed, and the prince, as well as peasant, was disposed to receive, with implicit faith, every pious tale or fiction, which was offered him. The magistrate embraced the religion of the people, and entering cordially into the care of sacred matters, naturally acquired an authority in them, and united the ecclesiastical with the civil power. But the Christian religion arising, while principles directly opposite to it were firmly established in the polite part of the world, who despised the nation that first broached this novelty; no wonder, that, in such circumstances, it was but little countenanced by the civil magistrate, and that the priesthood was allowed to engross all the authority in the new sect. So bad a use did they make of this power, even in those early times, that the primitive persecutions may, perhaps, in part,9 be [62] ascribed to the violence instilled by them into their followers. And the same principles of priestly government continuing, after Christianity became the established religion, they have engendered a spirit of persecution, which has ever since been the poison of human society, and the source of the most inveterate factions in every government. Such divisions, therefore, on the part of the people, may justly be esteemed factions of principle; but, on the part of the priests, who are the prime movers, they are really factions of interest.
There is another cause (beside the authority of the priests, and the separation of the ecclesiastical and civil powers) which has contributed to render Christendom° the scene of religious wars and divisions. Religions, that arise in ages totally ignorant and barbarous, consist mostly of traditional tales and fictions, which may be different in every sect, without being contrary to each other; and even when they are contrary, every one adheres to the tradition of his own sect, without much reasoning or disputation. But as philosophy was widely spread over the world, at the time when Christianity arose, the teachers of the new sect were obliged to form a system of speculative opinions; to divide, with some accuracy, their articles of faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and defend with all the subtilty of argument and science. Hence naturally arose keenness in dispute, when the Christian religion came to be [63] split into new divisions and heresies: And this keenness assisted the priests in their policy, of begetting a mutual hatred and antipathy among their deluded followers. Sects of philosophy, in the ancient world, were more zealous than parties of religion; but in modern times, parties of religion are more furious and enraged than the most cruel factions that ever arose from interest and ambition.
I have mentioned parties from affection as a kind of real parties, beside those from interest and principle. By parties from affection, I understand those which are founded on the different attachments of men towards particular families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them. These factions are often very violent; though, I must own, it may seem unaccountable, that men should attach themselves so strongly to persons, with whom they are no wise acquainted, whom perhaps they never saw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for any favour. Yet this we often find to be the case, and even with men, who, on other occasions, discover no great generosity of spirit, nor are found to be easily transported by friendship beyond their own interest. We are apt to think the relation between us and our sovereign very close and intimate. The splendour of majesty and power bestows an importance on the fortunes even of a single person. And when a man’s good-nature does not give him this imaginary interest, his ill-nature will, from spite and opposition to persons whose sentiments are different from his own.
Were the British government proposed as a subject of speculation, one would immediately perceive in it a source of division and party, which it would be almost impossible for it, under any administration, to avoid. The just balance between the republican and monarchical part of our constitution is really, in itself, so extremely delicate and uncertain, that, when joined to men’s passions and prejudices, it is impossible but different opinions must arise concerning it, even among persons of the best understanding. Those of mild tempers, who love peace and order, and detest sedition and civil wars, will always entertain more favourable sentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous° spirits, who are passionate lovers of liberty, and think no evil comparable to [65] subjection and slavery. And though all reasonable men agree in general to preserve our mixed government; yet, when they come to particulars, some will incline to trust greater powers to the crown, to bestow on it more influence, and to guard against its encroachments with less caution, than others who are terrified at the most distant approaches of tyranny and despotic power. Thus are there parties of Principle involved in the very nature of our constitution, which may properly enough be denominated those of Court and Country.aThe strength and violence of each of these parties will much depend upon the particular administration. An administration may be so bad, as to throw a great majority into the opposition; as a good administration will reconcile to the court many of the most passionate lovers of liberty. But however the nation may fluctuate between them, the parties themselves will always subsist, so long as we are governed by a limited monarchy.
But, besides this difference of Principle, those parties are very much fomented by a difference of Interest, without which they could scarcely ever be dangerous or violent. The crown will naturally bestow all trust and power upon those, whose principles, real or pretended, are most favourable to monarchical government; and this temptation will naturally engage them to go greater lengths than their principles would otherwise carry them. Their antagonists, who are disappointed in their ambitious aims, throw themselves into the party whose sentiments incline them to be most jealous of royal power, and naturally carry those sentiments to a greater height than sound politics will justify. Thus Court and Country, which are the genuine offspring of the British government, are a kind of mixed parties, and are influenced both by principle and by interest. The heads of the factions are commonly most governed by the latter motive; the inferior members of them by the former.b
As to ecclesiastical parties; we may observe, that, in all ages of the world, priests have been enemies to liberty;c and it is certain, that this steady conduct of theirs must have been founded on fixed reasons of interest and ambition. Liberty of [66] thinking, and of expressing our thoughts, is always fatal to priestly power, and to those pious frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and, by an infallible connexion, which prevails among all kinds of liberty, this privilege can never be enjoyed, at least has never yet been enjoyed, but in a free government. Hence it must happen, in such a constitution as that of Great Britain, that the established clergy, while things are in their natural situation, will always be of the Court-party; as, on the contrary, dissenters of all kinds will be of the Country-party; since they can never hope for that toleration, which they stand in need of, but by means of our free government. All princes, that have aimed at despotic power, have known of what importance it was to gain the established clergy: As the clergy, on their part, have shewn a great facility in entering into the views of such princes.1Gustavus Vaza was, perhaps, the only ambitious monarch, that ever depressed the church, at the same time that he discouraged liberty. But the exorbitant power of the bishops in Sweden, who, at that time, overtopped the crown itself, together with their attachment to a foreign family, was the reason of his embracing such an unusual system of politics.2
[67]
This observation, concerning the propensity of priests to the government of a single person, is not true with regard to one sect only. The Presbyterian and Calvinistic clergy in Holland were professed friends to the family of Orange; as the Arminians, who were esteemed heretics, were of the Louvestein faction, and zealous for liberty.3 But if a prince have the choice of both, it is easy to see, that he will prefer the episcopal to the presbyterian form of government, both because of the greater affinity between monarchy and episcopacy, and because of the facility, which he will find, in such a government, of ruling the clergy, by means of their ecclesiastical superiors.4
If we consider the first rise of parties in England, during the great rebellion,5 we shall observe, that it was conformable to this general theory, and that the species of government gave birth to them, by a regular and infallible operation. The English constitution, before that period, had lain in a kind of confusion; yet so, as that the subjects possessed many noble privileges, which, though not exactly bounded and secured by [68] law, were universally deemed, from long possession, to belong to them as their birth-right. An ambitious, or rather a misguided, prince arose, who deemed all these privileges to be concessions of his predecessors, revokeable at pleasure; and, in prosecution of this principle, he openly acted in violation of liberty, during the course of several years. Necessity, at last, constrained him to call a parliament: The spirit of liberty arose and spread itself: The prince, being without any support, was obliged to grant every thing required of him: And his enemies, jealous and implacable, set no bounds to their pretensions.6 Here then began those contests, in which it was no wonder, that men of that age were divided into different parties; since, even at this day, the impartial are at a loss to decide concerning the justice of the quarrel. The pretensions of the parliament, if yielded to, broke the balance of the constitution, by rendering the government almost entirely republican. If not yielded to, the nation was, perhaps, still in danger of absolute power, from the settled principles and inveterate habits of the king, which had plainly appeared in every concession that he had been constrained to make to his people. In this question, so delicate and uncertain, men naturally fell to the side which was most conformable to their usual principles; and the more passionate favourers of monarchy declared for the king, as the zealous friends of liberty sided with the parliament. The hopes of success being nearly equal on both sides, interest had no general influence in this contest: So that Round-head and Cavalier were merely parties of principle;7 neither of [69] which disowned either monarchy or liberty; but the former party inclined most to the republican part of our government, the latter to the monarchical. In this respect, they may be considered as court and country-party, enflamed into a civil war, by an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, and by the turbulent spirit of the age. The commonwealth’s men, and the partizans of absolute power, lay concealed in both parties, and formed but an inconsiderable part of them.
The clergy had concurred with the king’s arbitrary designs; and, in return, were allowed to persecute their adversaries, whom they called heretics and schismatics. The established clergy were episcopal; the non-conformists presbyterian: So that all things concurred to throw the former, without reserve, into the king’s party; and the latter into that of the parliament.f
Every one knows the event of this quarrel; fatal to the king first, to the parliament afterwards. After many confusions and revolutions, the royal family was at last restored, and the ancient government re-established.8Charles II. was not made wiser by the example of his father; but prosecuted the same measures, though at first, with more secrecy and caution. New parties arose, under the appellation of Whig and Tory, which have continued ever since to confound and distract our government.9 To determine the nature of these parties is, perhaps, one of the most difficult problems, that can be met with, and is a proof that history may contain questions, as uncertain as any to be found in the most abstract sciences. We have seen the conduct of the two parties, during the course of seventy [70] years, in a vast variety of circumstances, possessed of power, and deprived of it, during peace, and during war: Persons, who profess themselves of one side or other, we meet with every hour, in company, in our pleasures, in our serious occupations: We ourselves are constrained, in a manner, to take party; and living in a country of the highest liberty, every one may openly declare all his sentiments and opinions: Yet are we at a loss to tell the nature, pretensions, and principles of the different factions.g
When we compare the parties of Whig and Tory with those of Round-head and Cavalier, the most obvious difference, that appears between them, consists in the principles of passive obedience, and indefeasible right, which were but little heard of among the Cavaliers, but became the universal doctrine, and were esteemed the true characteristic of a Tory. Were these principles pushed into their most obvious consequences, they imply a formal renunciation of all our liberties, and an avowal of absolute monarchy; since nothing can be a greater absurdity than a limited power, which must not be resisted, even when it exceeds its limitations. But as the most rational principles are often but a weak counterpoise° to passion; it is no wonder that these absurd principlesh were found too weak for that effect. The Tories, as men, were enemies to oppression; and also as Englishmen, they were enemies to arbitrary power. Their zeal for liberty, was, perhaps, less fervent than that of their antagonists; but was sufficient to make them forget all their general principles, when they saw themselves openly threatened with a subversion of the ancient government. From these sentiments arose the revolution;10 an event of mighty consequence, and the firmest foundation of British liberty. The conduct of the Tories, during that event, and after it, will afford us a true insight into the nature of that party.
In the first place, they appear to have had the genuine sentiments of Britons in their affection for liberty, and in [71] their determined resolution not to sacrifice it to any abstract principle whatsoever, or to any imaginary rights of princes. This part of their character might justly have been doubted of before the revolution, from the obvious tendency of their avowed principles, and from theiri compliances with a court, which seemed to make little secret of its arbitrary designs. The revolution shewed them to have been, in this respect, nothing, but a genuine court-party, such as might be expected in a Britishgovernment: That is, Lovers of liberty, but greater lovers of monarchy. It must, however, be confessed, that they carried their monarchical principles farther, even in practice, but more so in theory, than was, in any degree, consistent with a limited government.
Secondly, Neither their principles nor affections concurred, entirely or heartily, with the settlement made at the revolution, or with that which has since taken place. This part of their character may seem opposite to the former; since any other settlement, in those circumstances of the nation, must probably have been dangerous, if not fatal to liberty. But the heart of man is made to reconcile contradictions; and this contradiction is not greater than that between passive obedience, and the resistance employed at the revolution. A Tory, therefore, since the revolution, may be defined in a few words, to be a lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the family ofStuart. As a Whigmay be defined to be a lover of liberty though without renouncing monarchy; and a friend to the settlement in theProtestantline.j
These different views, with regard to the settlement of the crown, were accidental, but natural additions to the principles of the court and country parties, which are the genuine divisions in the Britishgovernment. A passionate lover of monarchy is apt to be displeased at any change of the succession; as savouring too much of a commonwealth: A passionate lover of liberty is apt to think that every part of the government ought to be subordinate to the interests of liberty.
Some, who will not venture to assert, that the real difference between Whig and Tory was lost at the revolution,[72] seem inclined to think, that the difference is now abolished, and that affairs are so far returned to their natural state, that there are at present no other parties among us but court and country; that is, men, who, by interest or principle, are attached either to monarchy or liberty. The Tories have been so long obliged to talk in the republican stile, that they seem to have made converts of themselves by their hypocrisy, and to have embraced the sentiments, as well as language of their adversaries. There are, however, very considerable remains of that party in England, with all their old prejudices; and a proof that court and country are not our only parties, is, that almost all the dissenters side with the court, and the lower clergy, at least, of the church of England, with the opposition. This may convince us, that some biass still hangs upon our constitution, some extrinsic weight, which turns it from its natural course, and causes a confusion in our parties.11,k
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. From 1929 to 1947, Wittgenstein taught at the University of Cambridge .More at Wikipedia
“The aspects of things that are most important to us are hidden from us because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes” (1958, §129)
“Migration movements to industrialized countries have grown in number and size, and the presence of large numbers of immigrants has raised concerns about their integration and assimilation into host societies. this article is an empirical study of assimilation of foreign nationals in germany. their experience may hold lessons for other relatively recent immigration destinations. as expected, language is one of the most critical factors for determining integration and assimilation at the workplace and in society. our results indicate uneven success in these two areas, and suggest that greater language skills may be required for social assimilation, compared to economic assimilation. among the most important findings of our study are the strong and statistically significant effects of the attitudes by germans toward immigrants, the significant influence of the region of residence, and the ambivalence of german-born foreign residents toward naturalization and continued stay. this signals the failure of past integration and assimilation policies. the results show that negative attitudes by ethnic germans against others at work or in society, in general, reduce interest in integration and assimilation. this is neither new nor surprising and this research does not contribute new theoretical insights, but it demonstrates the magnitude and significance of the effects. the question of why different locations seemed to have different impacts on citizenship aspirations is beyond the scope of this article. the data do not provide information to pursue this question and we suspect that the causes are too complex for a short answer. as expected, non-eu citizens showed greater interest in acquiring german citizenship than eu citizens. finally, the results also indicate that the immediate post-world war ii notion of ‘guest workers’ was not completely false. there has been significant return migration and a significant number of respondents to the survey say that they intend to return.”
Kripke, S.. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Ethics
“In the interpretation of wittgenstein’s thinking about the concept of a rule, two sharply differing positions have emerged. on one reading wittgenstein is taken to hold that the concept of a rule presupposes a community within which a common agreement in actions fixes the meaning of a rule. baker and hacker argue vigorously against this reading. they take wittgenstein to be holding that agreement is necessary only for ‘shared’ rules, ‘shared’ concepts, ‘shared’ language. according to their interpretation, wittgenstein allows the possibility that a human being who had always lived in isolation from any human community, could have a language and could follow rules. in my article i argue that baker and hacker have misunderstood wittgenstein on the concept of a rule, that the passages they adduce in support of their reading do not support it, and that many passages in his writings show wittgenstein’s position to be that without general agreement there could be neither rules nor language.”
Grayling, A. C.. (2001). Wittgenstein : a very short introduction. Very short introductions
“Ludwig wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an extraordinarily original philospher, whose influence on twentieth-century thinking goes well beyond philosophy itself. in this book, which aims to make wittgenstein’s thought accessible to the general non-specialist reader, a. c. grayling explains the nature and impact of wittgenstein’s views. he describes both his early and later philosophy, the differences and connections between them, and gives a fresh assessment of wittgenstein’s continuing influence on contemporary thought.”
Hamilton, A.. (2017). Ludwig Wittgenstein. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
“This study tried to determine if drainage fluid amylase reflects pancreatic leakage after pancreaticoduodenectomy and to determine the factors affecting the drainage amylase level. patients undergoing pancreaticoduodenectomy were recruited. the drainage amylase was measured from postoperative day (pod) 1 to pod 7. direct evidence of pancreatic leakage was provided by upper gastrointestinal studies using a water-soluble contrast medium and methylene blue dye in the pancreaticogastrostomy group or by pancreaticography with injected contrast medium via an exteriorized pancreatic stent in the pancreaticojejunostomy group on pod 7. a total of 37 patients were recruited. the drainage amylase level was higher than the normal serum amylase (>or= 190 u/l) in more than half of the cases on the initial pod 2 specimen, with a median of 745 u/l on pod 1 and 663 u/l on pod 2. the drainage amylase level was more than three times the normal serum amylase level (>or= 190 x 3 u/l) in 56.8% on pod 1, in 51.4% on pod 2, and in nearly one-third on pod 7 (29.7%). however, no pancreatic leakage occurred in any of the patients with a drainage amylase of >or= 190 u/l. only one case of pancreatic leakage with a small amount of drainage fluid (10 ml) and low amylase level (74 u/l), was noted. soft pancreatic parenchyma and a nondilated pancreatic duct were significantly associated with higher drainage amylase levels. in conclusion, biochemical leakage defined by amylase-rich drainage fluid might have no clinical significance and was not necessarily clinical pancreatic leakage following pancreaticoduodenectomy.”
Wittgenstein, L.. (1975). On Certainty. Igarss 2014
“Mycotoxins are small (mw approximately 700), toxic chemical products formed as secondary metabolites by a few fungal species that readily colonise crops and contaminate them with toxins in the field or after harvest. ochratoxins and aflatoxins are mycotoxins of major significance and hence there has been significant research on broad range of analytical and detection techniques that could be useful and practical. due to the variety of structures of these toxins, it is impossible to use one standard technique for analysis and/or detection. practical requirements for high-sensitivity analysis and the need for a specialist laboratory setting create challenges for routine analysis. several existing analytical techniques, which offer flexible and broad-based methods of analysis and in some cases detection, have been discussed in this manuscript. there are a number of methods used, of which many are lab-based, but to our knowledge there seems to be no single technique that stands out above the rest, although analytical liquid chromatography, commonly linked with mass spectroscopy is likely to be popular. this review manuscript discusses (a) sample pre-treatment methods such as liquid-liquid extraction (lle), supercritical fluid extraction (sfe), solid phase extraction (spe), (b) separation methods such as (tlc), high performance liquid chromatography (hplc), gas chromatography (gc), and capillary electrophoresis (ce) and (c) others such as elisa. further currents trends, advantages and disadvantages and future prospects of these methods have been discussed.”
Anscombe, G. E. M.. (1995). Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophy
“In the safety of his manuscripts, ludwig wittgenstein was free to endlessly revise, rework and reframe his philosophical thoughts. thus his published work yields a glimpse of just a small portion of wittgenstein’s philosophical thought the portion that eventually appeared in print. yet for wittgenstein, philosophy was an on-going activity, a process. only in his dialog with the philosophical community and in his private moments does wittgenstein’s philosophical practice fully come to light. those public and private occasions are collected here. in private occasions, co-editor alfred nordmann presents wittgenstein’s diaries from the 1930s to an english audience for the first time. they are accompanied by wittgenstein’s letters to and from friend ludwig hansel. together, they reveal a great deal about wittgenstein, who himself says ‘the movement of thought in my philosophizing should be discernible also in the history of my mind.’ in public occasions, james klagge collects wittgenstein’s papers and speeches, some newly published, from a number of forums, including his lectures at cambridge and his involvement with the cambridge moral science club. much of wittgenstein’s philosophical work came through, or in the form of, dialogs, making these public encounters particularly valuable. the result of this collaboration, ludwig wittgenstein: public and private occasions, is a thorough look at the philosophy of one of the 20th century’s greatest thinkers that goes beyond a mere study of his published work.””
Das, V.. (1998). Wittgenstein and Anthropology. Annu. Rev. Anthropol
“This essay explores the theme of wittgenstein as a philosopher of culture. the primary text on which the essay is based is philosophical investigations; it treats stanley cavell’s work as a major guide for the understanding and re- ception of wittgenstein into anthropology. some wittgensteinian themes ex- plored in the essay are the idea of culture as capability, horizontal and verti- cal limits to forms of life, concepts of everyday life in the face of skepticism, and the complexity of the inner in relation to questions of belief and pain. while an attempt has been made to relate these ideas to ethnographic de- scriptions, the emphasis in this essay is on the question of how anthropology may receive wittgenstein.”
ColivaMc, A.. (1997). Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. Lingua e Stile
“Schroeder isolates three points in wittgenstein’s discussion of reasons that set reasons apart from causes: (i) sometimes, reasons are rules that justify actions. (ii) giving a reason is like describing the route one has taken: it is «the description of a e{singular} process, not the specification of a cause which always involves a whole host of observations. for this reason we say too that we know the reason for our action with certainty {…} but not the cause of an act» (vw 424; cf. bb 15). later, wittgenstein came to revise this view: «the reason may be nothing more than just the one he gives when asked» (al 5; cf. pi {s}479). (iii) agents have first-person authority about their reasons for their actions: what they sincerely claim to be their reason is what we call their reason (vw 30f., 110f.).nsuch first-person authority applies even to reasons given for one’s past actions. one knows what one was going to say or wanted to say, and yet one does not read it off from some mental process which took place then and which one remembers (pi {s}637). words do not report what happened on that occasion, they are a conditional statement about the past, a reaction to what i remember of the situation (pi {s}{s}648, 657, 659, 684). we ask people for their reasons, and given that (a) the agent’s claim as to his reason is sincere and not in conflict with what he expressed (by words or deeds, including the action in question) at other times, and (b) that reason was a fact of which the agent was aware and not a supposed fact which the agent did not believe to (or knew not to) obtain, we accept the avowed reasons, which provide us with an insight into the agent’s character. n”
Bloor, D.. (1999). Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies
“Clearly and engagingly written, this volume is vital reading for those interested in philosophy and sociology, and in wittgenstein’s later thought. david bloor provides a challenging and informative evaluation of wittgenstein’s account of rules and rule-following. arguing for a collectivist reading, bloor offers the first consistent sociological interpretation of wittgenstein’s work for many years.”
Sen, A.. (2003). Sraffa, Wittgenstein, and Gramsci. Journal of Economic Literature
“The article focuses on economist piero sraffa and his relationship with and influence on philosopher ludwig wittgenstein and marxist theorist antonio gramsci. sraffa’s intellectual impact includes several new explorations in economic theory, including a reassessment of the history of political economy (starting with the work of david ricardo). his economic contributions, particularly his one book, ‘production of commodities by means of commodities: prelude to a critique of economic theory,’ have generated major controversies in economics. even though sraffa was only 29 years old at that time (he was born in turin on august 5th, 1898), he was already well known in britain and italy as a highly original economist. he had obtained a research degree (testi de laurea) from the university of turin in late 1920, with a thesis on monetary economics, but its was an article on the foundations of price theory which he published in 1925 in ‘annali di economia’ (a journal based in milan) that made him a major celebrity in italy and britain. the influence that sraffa had on wittgenstein’s thinking came through a series of regular conversations between the two. it concerned a change in wittgenstein’s philosophical approach in the years following 1929–a change in which conversations with sraffa evidently played a vital role. wittgenstein told a friend (rush rhees, another cambridge philosopher) that the most important thing that sraffa taught him was an ‘anthropological way’ of seeing philosophical problems. antonio gramsci was less reticent that sraffa about writing down his philosophical ideas. after some harrowing experiences of imprisonment, not least in milan, gramsci faced a trial, along with a number of other political prisoners, in rome in the summer of 1928. from february 1929 gramsci was engaged in writing essays and notes that would later be famous as his ‘prison notebooks.’”
Sluga, H., & Stern, D. G.. (2017). Preface to the second edition. The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Second Edition
“The photo-catalytic degradation of 1,2-dichloroethane (1, 2-dce) using nitrogen-doped tio2 photo-catalysts under fluorescent light irradiation was investigated. highly pure tio2 and nitrogen-doped tio2 were prepared by a sol-gel method and characterized by thermo-gravimetric/differential-thermal analysis (tg/dta), x-ray diffraction (xrd), x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (xps), and fourier transform infrared (ftir) spectroscopy. the results indicate that the photo-catalysts were mainly nano-size with an anatase-phase structure. the degradation reaction of 1,2-dce was operated under visible-light irradiation, and the photo-catalytic oxidation was conducted in a batch photo-reactor with various nitrogen doping ratios (n/ti = 0-25 mol%). the relative humidity (rh) was controlled at 0-20% and the oxygen concentration was controlled at 0-21%. the photo-degradation with nitrogen-doped tio2 showed superior photo-catalytic activity compared to that for pure tio2. tio2 doped with 15 mol% nitrogen exhibited the best photo-catalytic efficiency under the tested conditions. the products from the 1,2-dce photo-catalytic oxidation were co2 and water; the by-products included dichloromethane, methyl chloride, ethyl chloride, carbon monoxide, and hydrogen chloride. the reaction pathway of 1,2-dce indicates that oxygen molecules are the major factor that causes the degradation of 1,2-dce in the gas phase. ?? 2011 elsevier b.v. all rights reserved.”
Wittgenstein, L.. (1965). I: A Lecture on Ethics. The Philosophical Review
“In non-ethical contexts judgments of value (i.e., ‘this is the right way to granchester’) are judgments of relative value, and can be converted to statements of fact. in ethics and religion, we find what appear to be judgments of ‘absolute’ value. all such ‘judgments’ turn out to be incoherent expressions, however. as attempts to say more than facts, they are attempts to go beyond the world, and so beyond the bounds of significant language. (staff)”
Wittgenstein, L.. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books. New York
“Preliminary studies for the ‘philosophical investigations,’ generally known as the”
Wittgenstein, L.. (1984). Zettel. In Werkausgabe in 8 Bänden
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“Zettel, an en face bilingual edition, collects fragments from wittgenstein’s work between 1929 and 1948 on issues of the mind, mathematics, and language.”
Picardi, E.. (1997). Wittgenstein and Quine. Lingua e Stile
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“This unique study brings together for the first time two of the most important philosophers of this century. never before have these two thinkers been compared – and commentators’ opinions on their relationship differ greatly. are the views of wittgenstein and quine on method and the nature of philosophy comparable or radically opposed? does wittgenstein’s concept of language engender that of quine, or threaten its philosophical foundations? an understanding of the similarities and differences between the thought of wittgenstein and of quine is essential if we are to have a full picture of contemporary philosophy. this collection of essays offers diverse and original ways in which to view their relationship.”
Glock, H.-J.. (1996). A Wittgenstein dictionary. The Blackwell philosopher dictionaries
“This lucid and accessible dictionary presents technical terms that wittgenstein introduced into philosophical debate or transformed substantially, and also topics to which he made a substantial contribution. hans-johann glock places wittgenstein’s ideas in their relevance to current debates. the entries delineate wittgenstein’s lines of argument on particular issues, assessing their strengths and weaknesses, and shed light on fundamental exegetical controversies. the dictionary entries are prefaced by a ‘sketch of a intellectual biography’, which links the basic themes of the early and later philosophy and describes the general development of wittgenstein’s thinking. extensive textual references, a detailed index and an annotated bibliography will facilitate further study. authoritative, comprehensive and clear, the volume will be welcomed by anyone with an interest in wittgenstein – his life, work or influence. each blackwell philosopher dictionary presents the life and work of an individual philosopher in a scholarly but accessible manner. entries cover key ideas and thoughts, as well as the main themes of the philosopher’s works. a comprehensive biographical sketch is also included.”
Schatzki, T. R.. (1996). Social practices: A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Review of Metaphysics
“This book addresses key topics in social theory such as the basic structures of social life, the character of human activity, and the nature of individuality. drawing on the work of wittgenstein, the author develops an account of social existence that argues that social practices are the fundamental phenomenon in social life. this approach offers new insight into the social formation of individuals, surpassing and critiquing the existing practice theories of bourdieu, giddens, lyotard, and oakeshott.”
“Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, tractatus logico-philosophicus was the only philosophical work that ludwig wittgenstein published during his lifetime. written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme brilliance, it captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers. for wittgenstein, logic was something we use to conquer a reality which is in itself both elusive and unobtainable. he famously summarized the book in the following words: ‘What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.’ david pears and brian mcguinness received the highest praise for their meticulous translation. the work is prefaced by bertrand russell’s original introduction to the first english edition.”
Block, N.. (2012). Wittgenstein and qualia. In Reading Putnam
“Wittgenstein (1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. this paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that wittgenstein endorsed (the innocuous inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the dangerous kind). the danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in public language. i will pinpoint the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios that matters for the argument for qualia, give arguments in favor of the coherence and possibility of the dangerous scenario, and try to show that some standard arguments against qualia are ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario i will be advocating. one of the two arguments for qualia i will give is a shifted spectrum argument that is much less controversial than the version i gave in block (1999), and the other argument for qualia is an inverted spectrum argument that is much less controversial than the one i gave in block (1990). the inverted spectrum argument is much less controversial because it does not require a behaviorally indistinguishable spectrum inversion. wittgensteins views provide a convenient starting point for a paper that is much more about qualia than about wittgenstein.”
McDowell, J.. (1984). Wittgenstein on following a rule. Synthese
“This paper originated in an attempt to respond to simon blackburn’s lsquorule-following and moral realismrsquo, in steven holtzman and christopher leich (eds.), wittgenstein: to follow a rule, routledge and kegan paul, london, boston and henley, 1981, pp. 163187; i was stimulated also, in writing the first draft, by an unpublished paper of blackburn’s called lsquorule-followingrsquo. i have been greatly helped by comments on the first draft from margaret gilbert, susan hurley, saul kripke, david lewis, christopher peacocke, philip pettit, david wiggins, and crispin wright, who also kindly let me see a draft of his lsquokripke’s wittgensteinrsquo, a paper presented to the seventh wittgenstein symposium at kirchberg, austria, in august 1982, and forthcoming in the journal of philosophy.”
Free thought and official propaganda : delivered at South Place Institute on March 24, 1922
“Manwhile the whole machinery of the State, in all the different countries, is turned on to making defenceless children believe absurd propositions the effect of which is to make them willing to die in defence of sinister interests under the impression that they are fighting for truth and right. This is only one of countless ways in which education is designed, not to give true knowledge, but to make the people pliable to the will of their masters. Without an elaborate system of deceit in the elementary schools it would be impossible to preserve the camouflage of democracy.
… It must not be supposed that the officials in charge of education desire the young to become educated. On the contrary, their problem is to impart information without imparting intelli- gence. Education should have two objects : first, to give definite knowledge — reading and writing, languages and mathematics, and so on ; secondly, to create those mental habits which will enable people to acquire knowledge and form sound judgments for themselves. The first of these we may call information, the second intelligence. The utility of information is admitted practically as well as theoretically ; without a literate population a modern State is impossible. But the utility of intelligence is admitted only theoretically, not practically ; it is not desired that ordinary people should think for themselves, because it is felt that people who think for themselves are awkward to manage and cause administrative difficulties. Only the guardians, in Plato‘s language, are to think ; the rest are to obey, or to follow leaders like a herd of sheep. This doctrine, often unconsciously, has survived the introduction of political democracy, and has radically vitiated all national systems of education.
The term habitus(/ˈhæbɪtəs/) refers to ingrained habits, skills, and psychological/behavioral dispositions. It is the way that individuals perceive the social world around them and react to it. These dispositions are usually shared by people with similar backgrounds (such as social class, religion, nationality, ethnicity, education, profession etc.). The habitus is acquired through imitation (mimesis) and is the reality that individuals are socialized, which includes their individual experience and opportunities. Thus, the habitus represents the way group culture and personal history shape the body and the mind, and as a result, shape present social actions of an individual.
Pierre Bourdieu suggested that the habitus consists of both the hexis (the tendency to hold and use one’s body in a certain way, such as posture and accent) and more abstract mental habits, schemes of perception, classification, appreciation, feeling, and action. These schemes are not mere habits: Bourdieu suggested they allow individuals to find new solutions to new situations without calculated deliberation, based on their gut feelings and intuitions, which Bourdieu believed were collective and socially shaped. These attitudes, mannerisms, tastes, moral intuitions and habits have influence on the individual’s life chances, so the habitus not only is structured by an individual’s objective past position in the social structure but also structures the individual’s future life path. Pierre Bourdieu argued that the reproduction of the social structure results from the habitus of individuals (Bourdieu, 1987).
References
Reay, D.. (2004). “It’s all becoming a habitus”: Beyond the habitual use of habitus in educational research. British Journal of Sociology of Education
“The concept of habitus lies at the heart of bourdieu’s theoretical framework. it is a complex concept that takes many shapes and forms in bourdieu’s own writing, even more so in the wider sociological work of other academics. in the ®rst part of this paper i develop an understanding of habitus, based on bourdieu’s many writings on the concept, that recognizes both its permeability and its ability to capture continuity and change. i also map its relationship to bourdieu’s other concepts, in particular ®eld and cultural capital. in the second part of the paper i examine attempts to operationalize habitus in empirical research in education. i critique the contemporary fashion of overlaying research analyses with bourdieu’s concepts, including habitus, rather than making the concepts work in the context of the data and the research settings. in the ®nal part of the paper i draw on a range of research examples that utilize habitus as a research tool to illustrate how habitus can be made to work in educational research.”
Lyons, A. P., Bourdieu, P., & Nice, R.. (1980). Outline of a Theory of Practice. ASA Review of Books
“Outline of a theory of practice is recognized as a major theoretical text on the foundations of anthropology and sociology. pierre bourdieu, a distinguished french anthropologist, develops a theory of practice which is simultaneously a critique of the methods and postures of social science and a general account of how human action should be understood. with his central concept of the habitus, the principle which negotiates between objective structures and practices, bourdieu is able to transcend the dichotomies which have shaped theoretical thinking about the social world. the author draws on his fieldwork in kabylia (algeria) to illustrate his theoretical propositions. with detailed study of matrimonial strategies and the role of rite and myth, he analyses the dialectical process of the ‘incorporation of structures’ and the objectification of habitus, whereby social formations tend to reproduce themselves. a rigorous consistent materialist approach lays the foundations for a theory of symbolic capital and, through analysis of the different modes of domination, a theory of symbolic power.”
Bourdieu, P.. (1969). Structures, Habitus, Practices. In The Logic of Practice
“This paper aims to balance the conceptual reception of bourdieu’s sociology in the united states through a conceptual re-examination of the concept of habitus. i retrace the intellectual lineage of the habitus idea, showing it to have roots in claude levi-strauss structural anthropology and in the developmental psychology of jean piaget, especially the latter’s generalization of the idea of operations from mathematics to the study of practical, bodily-mediated cognition. one important payoff of this exercise is that the common misinterpretation of the habitus as an objectivist and reductionist element in bourdieu’s thought is dispelled. the habitus is shown to be instead a useful and flexible way to conceptualize agency and the ability to transform social structure. thus ultimately one of bourdieu’s major contributions to social theory consists of his development of a new radical form of cognitive sociology, along with an innovative variety of multilevel sociological explanation in which the interplay of different structural orders is highlighted.”
Jason D. Edgerton, & Roberts, L. W.. (2014). Habitus. In Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research
“Definition the relationship (correlation) between separate scales or subscales. description the value between +1 and −1 that represents the correlation between two scales is the interscale correlation. in quality of life literature, interscale correlations are used frequently (aaronson et al., 1993; borghede & sullivan, 1996; fekkes et al., 2000; hearn & higginson, 1997). a researcher may choose to determine the interscale correlation in situations in which she/he has multiple scales and wants to investigate the relationship between the variables that those scales are measuring. depending on the nature of the research, a high or low interscale correlation could be sought after. in the case of a validity study, a researcher may want to examine how similar a newly created scale is to another scale that is deemed to be a ‘gold standard.’ finding that the researcher’s scale has a high correlation with the other scale would lend itself to evidence of”
Wacquant, L.. (2007). Esclarecer o Habitus. Educação & Linguagem
“Tomando como referência a obra do sociólogo pierre bourdieu, o presente artigo traz uma reconstituição da gênese da noção de habitus presente nos trabalhos do autor e, em uma perspectiva de síntese, procura documentar algumas de suas principais propriedades teóricas. traça, igualmente, um pequeno retrato dos principais horizontes de mobilização sociológica de que a noção tem sido alvo, destacando que a noção de habitus, para bourdieu, é um modo estenográfico de designar uma postura de investigação adequada à observação metódica da constituição social de agentes em quadros institucionais diversos.”
Crossley, N.. (2013). Habit and Habitus. Body and Society
“This article compares the concept of habitus, as formulated in the work of mauss and bourdieu, with the concept of habit, as formulated in the work of merleau-ponty and dewey. the rationale for this, on one level, is to seek to clarify these concepts and any distinction that there may be between them – though the article notes the wide variety of uses of both concepts and suggests that these negate the possibility of any definitive definitions or contrasts. more centrally, however, the purpose of the comparison is to draw out a number of important issues and debates which, it is argued, further work must address if the concepts of habit and habitus are to continue to prove useful and illuminating in social science.”
Silva, E. B.. (2016). Habitus: Beyond sociology. Sociological Review
“This paper presents a contribution of a set of interrelated innovative thinking to revitalize the sociological understanding of the notion of the habitus. it discusses contributions by sociologists exploring the sources of bourdieu’s inspiration from psychology and psychoanalysis to the development of the concept, and brings in new thinking inspired by authors and frameworks that branch out of sociology to bring into sociology fresher thinking. three areas of concern about habitus are focused on: firstly, the objectivism and subjectivism dichotomy; secondly, the plasticity or rigidity of the concept; and thirdly, the implications of intangibles attached to the notion. the paper introduces a special section including five articles on theoretical and empirical explorations bringing exciting perspectives to creative and critical sociology.”
Gaddis, S. M.. (2013). The influence of habitus in the relationship between cultural capital and academic achievement. Social Science Research
“This paper examines some of the issues surrounding student retention in higher education. it is based on the case study of a modern university in england that has good performance indicators of both widening participation (i.e. increasing the diversity of the student intake) and student retention. the two-fold nature of this success is significant, as it has been asserted that greater diversity will necessarily lead to an increase in student withdrawal. furthermore, changes to student funding in the uk put greater financial pressures and stress on students, especially those from low-income groups. nevertheless, many students cope with poverty, high levels of debt and significant burdens of paid work to successfully complete their courses of study. drawing on the work of r eay et al. (2001), this paper adopts and explores the terinstitutional habitus’, and attempts to provide a conceptual and empirical understand-ing of the ways in which the values and practices of a higher education institution impact on student retention.”
Mutch, A.. (2003). Communities of practice and habitus: A critique. Organization Studies
“Outline of a theory of practice is recognized as a major theoretical text on the foundations of anthropology and sociology. pierre bourdieu, a distinguished french anthropologist, develops a theory of practice which is simultaneously a critique of the methods and postures of social science and a general account of how human action should be understood. with his central concept of the habitus, the principle which negotiates between objective structures and practices, bourdieu is able to transcend the dichotomies which have shaped theoretical thinking about the social world. the author draws on his fieldwork in kabylia (algeria) to illustrate his theoretical propositions. with detailed study of matrimonial strategies and the role of rite and myth, he analyses the dialectical process of the ‘incorporation of structures’ and the objectification of habitus, whereby social formations tend to reproduce themselves. a rigorous consistent materialist approach lays the foundations for a theory of symbolic capital and, through analysis of the different modes of domination, a theory of symbolic power.”
Bourdieu, P.. (1986). Habitus, code et codification. Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales
“S’il est de la vocation même de la sociologie de rappeler que, selon le mot de montesquieu, on ne transforme pas la société par décret, il reste que la conscience des conditions sociales de l’efficacité des actes juridiques ne doit pas conduire à ignorer ou à nier ce qui fait l’efficacité propre de la règle, du règlement et de la loi. la juste réaction contre le juridisme, qui conduit à restituer leur place, dans l’explication des pratiques, aux dispositions constitutives de l’habitus, n’implique nullement que l’on mette entre parenthèses l’effet propre de la règle explicitement énoncée, surtout lorsque, comme la règle juridique, elle est associée à des sanctions. et inversement, s’il n’est pas douteux que le droit exerce une efficacité spécifique, imputable notamment au travail de codification, de mise en forme et en formule, de neutralisation et de systématisation, que réalisent, selon les lois propres de leur univers, les professionnels du travail symbolique, il reste que cette efficacité, qui se définit par opposition à l’inapplication pure et simple ou à l’application fondée sur la contrainte pure, s’exerce dans la mesure et dans la mesure seulement où le droit est socialement reconnu, et rencontre un accord, même tacite et partiel, parce qu’il répond, au moins en apparence, à des besoins et des intérêts réels.”
Hanks, W. F.. (2005). PIERRE BOURDIEU AND THE PRACTICES OF LANGUAGE. Annual Review of Anthropology
“This paper synthesizes research on linguistic practice and critically examines the legacy of pierre bourdieu from the perspective of linguistic anthropology. bourdieu wrote widely about language and linguistics, but his most far reaching engagement with the topic is in his use of linguistic reasoning to elaborate broader sociological concepts including habitus, field, standardization, legitimacy, censorship, and symbolic power. the paper examines and relates habitus and field in detail, tracing the former to the work of erwin panofsky and the latter to structuralist discourse semantics. the principles of relative autonomy, boundedness, homology, and embedding apply to fields and their linkage to habitus. authority, censorship, and euphemism are traced to the field, and symbolic power is related to misrecognition. and last, this chapter relates recent work in linguistic anthropology to practice and indicates lines for future research.”
Bourdieu, P.. (2000). Making the Economic Habitus: Algerian Workers Revisited. Ethnography
“During the war of national liberation algeria offered a quasi-laboratory situation for analysing the mismatch between the economic dispositions fashioned in a precapitalist economy, embedded in relations of group honour, and the rationalized economic cosmos imposed by colonization. ethnographic observation of this mismatch revealed that, far from being axiomatic, the most elementary economic behaviours (working for a wage, saving, credit, birth control, etc.) have definite economic and social conditions of possibility which both economic theory and the `new economic sociology’ ignore. acquiring the spirit of calculation required by the modern economy entails a veritable conversion via the apostasy of the embodied beliefs that underpin exchange in traditional kabyle society. the `folk economics’ of a cook from algiers allows us to grasp the practical economic sense guiding the emerging algerian working class at the dawn of the country’s independence.”
King, A.. (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A “practical” critique of the habitus. Sociological Theory
“There are two strands in bourdieu’s sociological writings. on the one hand, bourdieu argues for a theoretical position one might term his ‘practical theory’ which emphasizes virtuosic interactions between individuals. on the other hand, and most frequently, bourdieu appeals to the concept of the habitus according to which society consists of objective structures and determined-and isolated-individuals. although bourdieu believes that the habitus is compatible with his practical theory and overcomes the impasse of objectivism and subjectivism in social theory, neither claim is the case; the habitus is incompatible with his practical theory, and it retreats quickly into objectivism. however, bourdieu’s practical theory does offer a way out of the impasse of objectivism and subjectivism by focussing on the intersubjective interactions between individuals.”
Crossley, N.. (2001). The phenomenological habitus and its construction. Theory and Society
“This article focuses on the phenomenological habitus and its construction. the concepts ‘habit’ and ‘habitus,’ having almost disappeared from the sociological lexicon during the earlier part of the post-war period, are currently enjoying renewed interest in the social sciences. this is due, in large part, to the work of the sociologist pierre bourdieu. his work draws out the significance and relevance of the concept of habit for sociological purposes and in doing so makes a very appealing case for a habit or disposition based theory of agency. this is not intended as a phenomenological critique of bourdieu, a call to replace his conception of habit with a phenomenological one nor a call for a full scale ‘marriage’ of phenomenology with bourdieu’s sociology. bourdieu formulates his concept of the habitus in the context of a critical engagement with structuralism and ‘social physics,’ on the one hand, and ‘social phenomenology’ on the other. against social physics and structuralism, he argues for a notion of competent and active agency.”
Sewell, W. H.. (1992). A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation. American Journal of Sociology
“‘Structure’ is one of the most important, elusive, and undertheo- rized concepts in the social sciences. setting out from a critique and reformulation of anthony giddens’s notion of the duality of structure and pierre bourdieu’s notion of habitus, this article at- tempts to develop a theory of structure that restores human agency to social actors, builds the possibility of change into the concept of structure, and overcomes the divide between semiotic and material- ist visions of structure. ‘structure’”
Nash, R.. (1990). Bourdieu on Education and Social and Cultural Reproduction. British Journal of Sociology of Education
“Bourdieu’s work has attracted considerable interest and, not withstanding criticism of his style and obscure theoretical formulations, has introduced some powerful concepts into social theory. this paper examines bourdieu’s contribution to the sociology of education and especially his account of socially differentiated educational attainment. particular attention is given to issues of structure, agency and habitus, the cultural autonomy of the school, arbitrary and necessary school cultures, and the distinction between primary and secondary effects on educational differences. some specific criticisms, for example elster’s charge of a double account of domination, are also addressed. bourdieu’s concentration on habitus as the most significant generator of practice is held to be a theory of socialisation and the paper examines the nature of the explanation of social practice provided by such theories. the argument concludes with a plea for critical tolerance with respect to bourdieu’s work but with a suggestion that his account of socially differentiated educational attainment in terms of habitus is finally inadequate.”
The propaganda model is a conceptual model in political economy advanced by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky to explain how propaganda and systemic biases function in corporate mass media. The model seeks to explain how populations are manipulated and how consent for economic, social, and political policies is “manufactured” in the public mind due to this propaganda. The theory posits that the way in which corporate media is structured (e.g. through advertising, concentration of media ownership, government sourcing) creates an inherent conflict of interest that acts as propaganda for undemocratic forces.
The book begins with the following quotation by John Milton:
They who have put out the people’s eyes, reproach them of their blindness.
~ John Milton
First presented in their 1988 book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, the propaganda model views private media as businesses interested in the sale of a product—readers and audiences—to other businesses (advertisers) rather than that of quality news to the public. Describing the media’s “societal purpose”, Chomsky writes, “… the study of institutions and how they function must be scrupulously ignored, apart from fringe elements or a relatively obscure scholarly literature”.[1] The theory postulates five general classes of “filters” that determine the type of news that is presented in news media. These five classes are: Ownership of the medium, Medium’s funding sources, Sourcing, Flak, and Anti-communism or “fear ideology”.
The first three are generally regarded by the authors as being the most important. In versions published after the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, Chomsky and Herman updated the fifth prong to instead refer to the “War on Terror” and “counter-terrorism”, although they state that it operates in much the same manner.
Although the model was based mainly on the characterization of United States media, Chomsky and Herman believe the theory is equally applicable to any country that shares the basic economic structure and organizing principles that the model postulates as the cause of media biases.
Further References
Herman, E. S.. (2000). The Propaganda Model: a retrospective. Journalism Studies
“In manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media, noam chomsky and i put forward a ‘propaganda model’ as a framework for analysing and understanding how the mainstream u.s. media work and why they perform as they do (herman and chomsky 1988). we had long been impressed with the regularity with which the media operate on the basis of a set of ideological prem-ises, depend heavily and uncritically on elite information sources, and participate in propaganda campaigns helpful to elite interests. in trying to explain why they do this we looked to structural factors as the only possible root of the systematic patterns of behavior and performance. because the propaganda model challenges basic premises and suggests that the media serve antidemocratic ends, it is commonly excluded from mainstream de-bates on media bias. such debates typically include conservatives, who criticize the media for excessive liberalism and an adversarial stance toward government and business, and centrists and liberals, who deny the charge of adversarialism and contend that the media behave fairly and responsibly. the exclusion of the propaganda model perspective is noteworthy, for one reason, because that per-spective is consistent with long standing and widely held elite views that ‘the masses are notoriously short-sighted’ (bailey 1948: 13) and are ‘often poor judges of their own interests’ (lasswell 1933: 527), so that ‘our statesmen must deceive them’ (bailey 1948: 13); and they ‘can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality’ (walter lippmann 1921: 310). in lippmann’s view, the ‘manufacture of consent’ by an elite class had already be-come ‘a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government’ by the 1920s (lippman 1921: 248). clearly the manufacture of consent by a ‘specialized class’ that can override the short-sighted perspectives of the masses must entail media control by that class. political scientist thomas ferguson contends that the major media, ’controlled by large profit-maximizing investors do not encourage the dissemination of news and”
Herman, Edward S., & Chomsky, N.. (2002). A Propaganda Model. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of The Mass Media
“THIS book centers in what we call a ‘propaga:n’da model,’ an analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of the u.s. media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate. it is our view that, among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them. the representatives of these interests have important agendas and principles that they want to advance, and they are well positioned to shape and constrain media policy. this is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors’ and working journalists’ internalization of priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institution’s policy.”
Chomsky, N.. (2002). An Exchange on Manufacturing Consent. I Can
“В данной работе представлены результаты экспериментального исследования возможности генерации собственных колебаний пограничного слоя путем сосредоточенного воздействия.”
Herman, E.. (1996). The Propaganda Model Revisited. Monthly Review
“The writer discusses the ‘propaganda model’ put forward by he and noam chomsky (1988) as a framework for analyzing and understanding how the mainstream american media work and why they perform as they do. he describes the model, addresses some of the criticisms that have been leveled against it, and discusses how it holds up almost a decade after its publication. in addition, he outlines some examples of how the model can help explain the nature of media coverage of important political topics in the 1990s. he points out that he and chomsky never claimed that the model explains everything or that it reveals media omnipotence and complete effectiveness in manufacturing consent. he states that it should be viewed as a model of media behavior and performance, not media effects. he suggests that the model remains a very workable framework for analyzing and understanding the mainstream media and that it often surpasses expectations of media subservience to government propaganda.”
Klaehn, J.. (2002). A critical review and assessment of Herman and Chomsky’s “propaganda model”. European Journal of Communication
“Mass media play an especially important role in democratic societies. they are presupposed to act as intermediary vehicles that reflect public opinion, respond to public concerns and make the electorate cognizant of state policies, important events and viewpoints. the fundamental principles of democracy depend upon the notion of a reasonably informed electorate. the ‘propaganda model’ of media operations laid out and applied by edward herman and noam chomsky in manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media postulates that elite media interlock with other institutional sectors in ownership, management and social circles, effectively circumscribing their ability to remain analytically detached from other dominant institutional sectors. the model argues that the net result of this is self-censorship without any significant coercion. media, according to this framework, do not have to be controlled nor does their behaviour have to be patterned, as it is assumed that they are integral actors in class warfare, fully integrated into the institutional framework of society, and act in unison with other ideological sectors, i.e. the academy, to establish, enforce, reinforce and ‘police’ corporate hegemony. it is not a surprise, then, given the interrelations of the state and corporate capitalism and the ‘ideological network’, that the propaganda model has been dismissed as a ‘conspiracy theory’ and condemned for its ‘overly deterministic’ view of media behaviour. it is generally excluded from scholarly debates on patterns of media behaviour. this article provides a critical assessment and review of herman and chomsky’s propaganda model and seeks to encourage scholarly debate regarding the relationship between corporate power and ideology. highly descriptive in nature, the article is concerned with the question of whether media can be seen to play a hegemonic role in society oriented towards legitimization, political accommodation and ideological management.”
Herman, E.. (2000). The Propaganda Model. Journalism Studies
“First presented in their 1988 book manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media, the propaganda model views private media as businesses interested in the sale of a product—readers and audiences—to other businesses (advertisers) rather than that of quality news to the public. describing the media’s ‘societal purpose’, chomsky writes, ‘… the study of institutions and how they function must be scrupulously ignored, apart from fringe elements or a relatively obscure scholarly literature’.[1] the theory postulates five general classes of ‘filters’ that determine the type of news that is presented in news media. these five classes are: ownership of the medium, medium’s funding sources, sourcing, flak, anti- communism and fear ideology. the first three are generally regarded by the authors as being the most important. in versions published after the 9/11 attacks on the united states in 2001, chomsky and herman updated the fifth prong to instead refer to the ‘war on terror’ and ‘counter-terrorism’, although they state that it operates in much the same manner. although the model was based mainly on the characterization of united states media, chomsky and herman believe the theory is equally applicable to any country that shares the basic economic structure and organizing principles which the model postulates as the cause of media biases.[2] contents”
Fleming, P., & Oswick, C.. (2014). Educating consent? A conversation with Noam Chomsky on the university and business school education. Organization
“In what follows, we present a conversation with professor noam chomsky on the topic of whether the business school might be a site for progressive political change. the conversation covers a number of key issues related to pedagogy, corporate social responsibility and working conditions in the contemporary business school. we hope the conversion will contribute to the ongoing discussion about the role of the business school in neoliberal societies.”
Entman, R. M.. (1990). News as propaganda. Journal of Communication
“The article reviews the book ‘manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media,’ by edward s. herman and noam chomsky.”
Klaehn, J.. (2002). Corporate hegemony: A Critical Assessment of the Globe and Mail’s News Coverage of Near-Genocide in Occupied East Timor 1975–80. Gazette
“The study asks whether the news coverage accorded the near-genocide in east timor by the globe and mail (g&m) followed the predictions of the ‘propaganda model’ (pm) of media operations laid out and applied by edward s. herman and noam chomsky in manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media. the research asks whether the g&m’s news coverage of the near-genocide in east timor and of canada’s ‘aiding and abetting’ of ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ in occupied east timor was hegemonic or ideologically serviceable given canada’s (geo)political-economic interests in indonesia throughout the invasion and occupation periods. did the news coverage provide a political and historical benchmark by which to inform the canadian public (or not) and influence (or not) canadian government policy on indonesia and east timor?”